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Clark, T. B., Peterson, B. V., Whitcomb, R. F., Henegar, R. B., Hackett, K. J., & Tully, J. G. (1984). Spiroplasmas in the Tabanidae. Isr J Med Sci, 20(10), 1002–1005.
Abstract: Spiroplasmas were observed in seven species of the family Tabanidae (horse flies and deer flies). This is the fifth family of the order Diptera now known to harbor spiroplasmas. Noncultivable spiroplasmas were seen in the hemolymph of three species of the genus Tabanus, and cultivable forms were isolated from the guts of six species in three genera. Isolates from T. calens and T. sulcifrons were serologically similar and closely related to a spiroplasma in the lampyrid beetle, Ellychnia corrusca. These three isolates represent a new serogroup. Isolates from Hybomitra lasiophthalma were related to Group IV strains, while those from T. nigrovittatus and Chrysops sp. both represented new serogroups. At least some tabanids probably acquire spiroplasmas from contaminated flower surfaces. The possibility of vertebrate reservoirs for some tabanid spiroplasmas remains an open question.
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Gallup, G. G. J. (1985). Do minds exist in species other than our own? Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 631–641.
Abstract: An answer to the question of animal awareness depends on evidence, not intuition, anecdote, or debate. This paper examines some of the problems inherent in an analysis of animal awareness, and whether animals might be aware of being aware is offered as a more meaningful distinction. A framework is presented which can be used to make a determination about the extent to which other species have experiences similar to ours based on their ability to make inferences and attributions about mental states in others. The evidence from both humans and animals is consistent with the idea that the capacity to use experience to infer the experience of others is a byproduct of self-awareness.
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Epstein, R. (1985). Animal cognition as the praxist views it. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 9(4), 623–630.
Abstract: The distinction between psychology and praxics provides a clear answer to the question of animal cognition. As Griffin and others have noted, the kinds of behavioral phenomena that lead psychologists to speak of cognition in humans are also observed in nonhuman animals, and therefore those who are convinced of the legitimacy of psychology should not hesitate to speak of and to attempt to study animal cognition. The behavior of organisms is also a legitimate subject matter, and praxics, the study of behavior, has led to significant advances in our understanding of the kinds of behaviors that lead psychologists to speak of cognition. Praxics is a biological science; the attempt by students of behavior to appropriate psychology has been misguided. Generativity theory is an example of a formal theory of behavior that has proved useful both in the engineering of intelligent performances in nonhuman animals and in the prediction of intelligent performances in humans.
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Griffin, D. R. (2001). Animals know more than we used to think (Vol. 98).
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Cohen, J. (2007). Animal behavior. The world through a chimp's eyes (Vol. 316).
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Morell, V. (2007). Nicola Clayton profile. Nicky and the jays (Vol. 315).
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Man's best friend(s) reveal the possible roots of social intelligence (Vol. 312).
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Social animals prove their smarts (Vol. 312).
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Pennisi, E. (1999). Are out primate cousins 'conscious'? (Vol. 284).
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Pennisi, E. (1997). Schizophrenia clues from monkeys (Vol. 277).
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