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Packer, C., & Heinsohn, R. (1996). Response:Lioness leadership. Science, 271(5253), 1215–1216.
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Man's best friend(s) reveal the possible roots of social intelligence (Vol. 312).
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Social animals prove their smarts (Vol. 312).
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Pennisi, E. (1999). Are out primate cousins 'conscious'? (Vol. 284).
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Pennisi, E. (1997). Schizophrenia clues from monkeys (Vol. 277).
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Real, L. A. (1991). Animal choice behavior and the evolution of cognitive architecture. Science, 253(5023), 980–986.
Abstract: Animals process sensory information according to specific computational rules and, subsequently, form representations of their environments that form the basis for decisions and choices. The specific computational rules used by organisms will often be evolutionarily adaptive by generating higher probabilities of survival, reproduction, and resource acquisition. Experiments with enclosed colonies of bumblebees constrained to foraging on artificial flowers suggest that the bumblebee's cognitive architecture is designed to efficiently exploit floral resources from spatially structured environments given limits on memory and the neuronal processing of information. A non-linear relationship between the biomechanics of nectar extraction and rates of net energetic gain by individual bees may account for sensitivities to both the arithmetic mean and variance in reward distributions in flowers. Heuristic rules that lead to efficient resource exploitation may also lead to subjective misperception of likelihoods. Subjective probability formation may then be viewed as a problem in pattern recognition subject to specific sampling schemes and memory constraints.
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Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Marler, P. (1980). Monkey responses to three different alarm calls: evidence of predator classification and semantic communication. Science, 210(4471), 801–803.
Abstract: Vervet monkeys give different alarm calls to different predators. Recordings of the alarms played back when predators were absent caused the monkeys to run into trees for leopard alarms, look up for eagle alarms, and look down for snake alarms. Adults call primarily to leopards, martial eagles, and pythons, but infants give leopard alarms to various mammals, eagle alarms to many birds, and snake alarms to various snakelike objects. Predator classification improves with age and experience.
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Straub, A. (2007). An intelligent crow beats a lab. Science, 316(5825), 688.
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Subiaul, F., Cantlon, J. F., Holloway, R. L., & Terrace, H. S. (2004). Cognitive imitation in rhesus macaques. Science, 305(5682), 407–410.
Abstract: Experiments on imitation typically evaluate a student's ability to copy some feature of an expert's motor behavior. Here, we describe a type of observational learning in which a student copies a cognitive rule rather than a specific motor action. Two rhesus macaques were trained to respond, in a prescribed order, to different sets of photographs that were displayed on a touch-sensitive monitor. Because the position of the photographs varied randomly from trial to trial, sequences could not be learned by motor imitation. Both monkeys learned new sequences more rapidly after observing an expert execute those sequences than when they had to learn new sequences entirely by trial and error.
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Thornton, A., & McAuliffe, K. (2006). Teaching in wild meerkats. Science, 313(5784), 227–229.
Abstract: Despite the obvious benefits of directed mechanisms that facilitate the efficient transfer of skills, there is little critical evidence for teaching in nonhuman animals. Using observational and experimental data, we show that wild meerkats (Suricata suricatta) teach pups prey-handling skills by providing them with opportunities to interact with live prey. In response to changing pup begging calls, helpers alter their prey-provisioning methods as pups grow older, thus accelerating learning without the use of complex cognition. The lack of evidence for teaching in species other than humans may reflect problems in producing unequivocal support for the occurrence of teaching, rather than the absence of teaching.
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