Abstract: Sixteen horses, divided into 2 groups of 8, were used to study observational learning in horses. One group served as controls while the other group served as the treated group (observers). Observers were allowed to watch a correctly performed discrimination task for 5 days prior to testing their learning response using the same task. Discrimination testing was conducted on all horses daily for 14 days, with criterion set at 7 out of 8 responses correct with the last 5 consecutively correct. The maximum number of trials performed without reaching criterion was limited to 20 per day. Mean trials to criteria (MT) by group were: control, 11.25; observer, 10.70. Mean error (ME) scores were: control, 2.37; observer, 2.02. Average initial discrimination error scores were 11.13 for control and 10.38 for observers (P < 0.10). Asymptote was reached by Day 8 for both control and observer groups. Analysis of variance with repeated measures showed an extreme-day effect indicative of learning (P < 0.01), with non-significant differences in learning rate between experimental groups. Whether the initial ability of the horses to perform a discrimination learning task was enhanced by observation of other horses' performance of that task was not obvious from these data.

Abstract: In most cases, the social organisation of each of the seven species of Equidae existing today outside captivity is either territorial or non-territorial. The striking differences found between these two types of organisation in the social grouping and bonds, mating behaviour, leadership and dominance hierarchies of the animals are examined. It is thought that the non-territorial species show a less primitive type of organisation than the territorial animals. Infant Equidae are precocious animals and are able to follow their dams soon after birth. They stay close by their dams and travel with the herd from an early age and are therefore classified as “followers”, in contrast to the species which have a period of hiding after birth. Dams recognise their foals immediately after birth, whereas it takes 2 or 3 days for a foal to form an attachment to its dam. Being in close proximity to their dams, foals are able to nurse frequently and, unless artificially weaned, a foal will nurse until its dam foals again. Foals start to graze during their first week and as they grow older they spend more time grazing and less time nursing and resting. It is normal for foals to be corprophagic until one month old, and this provides them with bacteria essential for the digestion of fibre. Play behaviour is solitary in very young foals, but after 4 weeks of age, foals play together, with male foals playing more than females and showing more aggressive, fighting movements in play.

Abstract: Abstract Horse flies (Tabanidae) on and around feral ponies in harem groups were counted at Assateague Island National Seashore, Maryland, U.S.A., between June and August 1985. Harem stallions attracted the most flies; adult mares showed intermediate fly numbers, while few flies landed on foals under any circumstances. The use of thermal and chemical cues by flies selecting a host may have helped create this disparity. When flies were abundant, ponies reduced spacing within the group. Ponies in larger groups suffered from fewer flies than ponies in smaller groups. There was, however, no evidence that ponies merged into larger groups in response to fly harassment, suggesting that biting flies play little role in structuring pony social organization.

Abstract: Agonistic intervention behavior was observed in captive groups of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), and stumptail monkeys (M. arctoides). Reciprocity correlations of interventions were determined while removing from the data the effects of several symmetrical relationship characteristics, that is, matrillineal kinship, proximity relations, and same-sex combination. It was considered likely that if significant reciprocity persisted after controlling for these characteristics, the reciprocity was based on cognitive mechanisms. Statistical significance was tested by means of recently developed matrix permutation procedures. All three species exhibited significant reciprocity with regard to beneficial interventions, even after controlling for symmetrical traits. Harmful interventions were, however, reciprocal among chimpanzees only. This species showed a “revenge system”, that is, if A often intervened against B, B did the same to A. In contrast, both macaque species showed significantly inversed reciprocity in their harmful interventions: if A often intervened against B, B rarely intervened against A. Further analysis indicates that the strict hierarchy of macaques prevents them from achieving complete reciprocity. Compared to chimpanzees, macaques rarely intervene against higher ranking group members. The observed contrast can be partially explained on the basis of differences in available space, as indicated by a comparison of indoor and outdoor living conditions for the chimpanzee colony. Yet, even when such spatial factors are taken into account, substantial behavior differences between chimpanzees and macaques remain.

Abstract: Abstract * 1Animals can derive leverage over others from (a) resource holding power, based for instance on fighting ability or dominance, and (b) the possession of commodities, such as special skills and resources that cannot be taken away by force. * 2We contend that power based on the possession of commodities strongly depends on the level of supply and demand for that commodity, a phenomenon we call the ‘market effect’. * 3Several theoretical and empirical examples are given of social systems in which animals belong to two distinct classes that offer two different kinds of commodities. * 4The relative frequency of occurrence of the two classes is shown to determine the relative power of their members. * 5We consider the theoretical properties of bargaining processes by which relative power is converted into corresponding pay-off distributions. * 6We propose coalition games, a class of games with more than two players and in which bargaining is possible, as suitable paradigms for collaboration among members of social units.