Abstract: Variations in birth sex ratios and sex differences in juvenile mortality occur in a number of mammalian species, and in many cases have been linked to resource availability. Most of these biases in offspring sex ratios concern polygynous species with pronounced sexual dimorphism, and where females only are philopatric. Data on species with unusual life-history strategies, such as slight sexual dimorphism or dispersal by both sexes, are of particular interest. In this study of a natural herd of horses (Equus caballus) which experienced an eruptive cycle, and therefore a period of nutritional stress, male offspring had higher neonatal mortality rates in nutritionally poor years than in good ones, whereas “year quality” had no effect on the mortality of female offspring; year quality could therefore be used by mares as predictor of sex-specific offspring survival. We show that the environmental conditions that predicted lower survival of males were negatively related to their production: the birth sex ratio the following year was female-biased; and mares were less likely to produce a son when they had produced a son the preceding year. There was no significant effect of mother's parity, age or rank, or the timing of conception or birth on offspring sex ratios. The mechanism leading to biases in the birth sex ratio could have been the loss of male embryos by mares that did not foal. As there was no evidence for selective abortion of male foetuses in females that did foal the next year, it is not necessary to invoke maternal adjustment, though this remains a possibility. Finally, there was a suggestion that male offspring were more costly to raise than females, since mothers that reared a son in poor years tended to experience an increase in the interbirth interval between their two subsequent offspring.

Abstract: Predictions of the model of van Schaik (1989) of female-bonding in primates are tested by systematically comparing the ecology, level of within-group contest competition for food (WGC), and patterns of social behaviour found in two contrasting baboon populations. Significant differences were found in food distribution (percentage of the diet from clumped sources), feeding supplant rates and grooming patterns. In accord with the model, the tendencies of females to affiliate and form coalitions with one another, and to be philopatric, were strongest where ecological conditions promoted WGC. Group fission in the population with strong WGC was “horizontal” with respect to female dominance rank, and associated with female-female aggression during a period of elevated feeding competition. In contrast, where WGC was low, females' grooming was focused on adult males rather than other females. Recent evidence suggests that group fission here is initiated by males, tends to result in the formation of one-male groups, and is not related to feeding competition but to male-male competition for mates. An ecological model of baboon social structure is presented which incorporates the effects of female-female competition, male-male competition, and predation pressure. The model potentially accounts for wide variability in group size, group structure and social relationships within the genus Papio. Socio-ecological convergence between common baboons and hamadryas baboons, however, may be limited in some respects by phylogenetic inertia.

Abstract: In 1972, four aerial censuses were carried out to assess the annual migration of zebra and wildebeest between Tarangire National Park and Simanjiro Plains. About 6000 zebra and 10,000 wildebeest were in the Plains in the middle of the rainy season, in April. During the dry season in August the animals were concentrated in the Park. The migration from the Park to the Plains started at beginning of the rains, in November/December. Recent censuses by Tanzania Wildlife Conservation Monitoring (TWCM, 1991, 1995) indicate that an estimated 23,000 zebra and 11,000 wildebeest migrate into the Park from Simanjiro and other wet season areas. Encroaching cultivation is a threat to the migration corridors and sustainability of the ecosystem . Providing benefits from wildlife to communities around the park would safeguard the future of the wildlife.

Abstract: The formation of collaborating pairs by individuals belonging to two different classes occurs in the contexts of reproduction and intea-specific cooperation as well as of inter-specific mutualism. There is potential for partner choice and for competition for access to preferred partners in all three contexts. These selective forces have long been recognised as important in sexual selection, but their impact is not yet appreciated in cooperative and mutualistic systems. The formation of partnerships between members of different classes has much in common with the conclusion of trade agreements in human markets with two classes of traders, like producers and consumers, or employers and employees. Similar game-theoretical models can be used to predict the behaviour of rational traders in human markets and the evolutionarily stable strategies used in biological markets. We present a formal model in which the influence of the market mechanism on selection is made explicit. We restrict ourselves to biological markets in which: (1) Individuals do not compete over access to partners in an agonistic manner, but rather by outcompeting each other in those aspects that are preferred by the choosing party. (2) The commodity the partner has to offer cannot be obtained by the use of force, but requires the consent of the partner. These two restrictions ensure a dominant role for partner choice in the formation of partnerships. In a biological market model the decision to cooperate is based on the comparison between the offers of several potential partners, rather than on the behaviour of a single potential partner, as is implicitly assumed in currently accepted models of cooperation. In our example the members of one class A offer a commodity of fixed value in exchange for a commodity of variable value supplied by the other class, B. We show that when the B-class outnumbers the A-class sufficiently and the cost for the A-class to sample the offers of the B-class are low, the choosiness of the A-class will lead to selection for the supply of high value commodities by the B-class (Fig. 3a). Under the same market conditions, but with a high sampling cost this may still be the evolutionariy stable outcome, but another pair of strategies proves to be stable too: relaxed choosiness of class A coupled with low value commodities supplied by class B (Fig. 3b). We give a number of examples of mating, cooperative and mutualistic markets that resemble the low sampling cost situation depicted in Fig. 3a.

Abstract: Conflicts of interest within and between the sexes are important processes leading to variability in mating systems. The behavioral interactions mediating conflict are little documented. We studied pairs and harems of the snail-shell inhabiting cichlid fish Lamprologus ocellatus in the laboratory. Due to their larger size, males controlled the resource that limited breeding: snail shells. Males were able to choose among females ready to spawn. Females were only accepted if they produced a clutch within a few days of settling. When several females attempted to settle simultaneously the larger female settled first. Females were least aggressive when guarding eggs. Secondary females were more likely to settle when the primary female was guarding eggs. In established harems females continued to be aggressive against each other. The male intervened in about 80% of female aggressive interactions. Male intervention activity correlated with the frequency of aggression among the females in his harem. The male usually attacked the aggressor and chased her back to her own snail shell. When a male was removed from his harem, aggression between females increased immediately and usually the secondary female was expelled by the primary female within a few days. Time to harem break-up was shorter the more mobile the primary females' young were and did not correlate with the size difference between harem females. Male L. ocellatus interfere actively in female conflict and keep the harem together against female interests. Female conflict presumably relates to the cost of sharing male parental investment and to the potential of predation by another female's large juveniles on a female's own small juveniles.