Abstract: In many animal groups, certain individuals consistently appear at the forefront of coordinated movements [1-4]. How such leaders emerge is poorly understood [5, 6]. Here, we show that in pairs of sticklebacks, Gasterosteus aculeatus, leadership arises from individual differences in the way that fish respond to their partner's movements. Having first established that individuals differed in their propensity to leave cover in order to look for food, we randomly paired fish of varying boldness, and we used a Markov Chain model to infer the individual rules underlying their joint behavior. Both fish in a pair responded to each other's movements-each was more likely to leave cover if the other was already out and to return if the other had already returned. However, we found that bolder individuals displayed greater initiative and were less responsive to their partners, whereas shyer individuals displayed less initiative but followed their partners more faithfully; they also, as followers, elicited greater leadership tendencies in their bold partners. We conclude that leadership in this case is reinforced by positive social feedback.

Abstract: Group-living animals routinely have to reach a consensus decision and choose between mutually exclusive actions in order to coordinate their activities and benefit from sociality. Theoretical models predict “democratic” rather than “despotic” decisions to be widespread in social vertebrates, because they result in lower “consensus costs”-the costs of an individual foregoing its optimal action to comply with the decision-for the group as a whole. Yet, quantification of consensus costs is entirely lacking, and empirical observations provide strong support for the occurrence of both democratic and despotic decisions in nature. We conducted a foraging experiment on a wild social primate (chacma baboons, Papio ursinus) in order to gain new insights into despotic group decision making. The results show that group foraging decisions were consistently led by the individual who acquired the greatest benefits from those decisions, namely the dominant male. Subordinate group members followed the leader despite considerable consensus costs. Follower behavior was mediated by social ties to the leader, and where these ties were weaker, group fission was more likely to occur. Our findings highlight the importance of leader incentives and social relationships in group decision-making processes and the emergence of despotism.

Abstract: Conflict features in the lives of many animal species and induces social stress mediated by glucocorticoid hormones [1]. Postconflict affiliation, between former opponents (reconciliation) or between former opponents and a bystander (third-party affiliation), has been suggested as a behavioral mechanism for reducing such stress [2], but has been studied almost exclusively in primates [3]. As with many primates, several bird species live in social groups and form affiliative relationships [4]. Do these distantly related animals also use affiliative behavior to offset the costs of conflict? We studied postconflict affiliation in a captive group of rooks. Unlike polygamous primates, monogamous rooks did not reconcile with former opponents. However, we found clear evidence of third-party affiliation after conflicts. Both initiators and targets of aggression engaged in third-party affiliation with a social partner and employed a specific behavior, bill twining, during the postconflict period. Both former aggressors and uninvolved third parties initiated affiliative contacts. Despite the long history of evolutionary divergence, the pattern of third-party affiliation in rooks is strikingly similar to that observed in tolerant primate species. Furthermore, the absence of reconciliation in rooks makes sense in light of the species differences in social systems.