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Legare, C. H., & Nielsen, M. (). Imitation and Innovation: The Dual Engines of Cultural Learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(11), 688–699.
Abstract: Imitation and innovation work in tandem to support cultural learning in children and facilitate our capacity for cumulative culture. Here we propose an integrated theoretical account of how the unique demands of acquiring instrumental skills and cultural conventions provide insight into when children imitate, when they innovate, and to what degree. For instrumental learning, with an increase in experience, high fidelity imitation decreases and innovation increases. By contrast, for conventional learning, imitative fidelity stays high, regardless of experience, and innovation stays low. We synthesize cutting edge research on the development of imitative flexibility and innovation to provide insight into the social learning mechanisms underpinning the uniquely human mind.
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Manser, M. B., Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2002). Suricate alarm calls signal predator class and urgency (Vol. 6).
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Markman, E. M., & Abelev, M. (2004). Word learning in dogs? Trends. Cognit. Sci., 8(11), 479–81; discussion 481.
Abstract: In a recent paper, Kaminski, Call and Fischer report pioneering research on word-learning in a dog. In this commentary we suggest ways of distinguishing referential word use from mere association. We question whether the dog is reasoning by exclusion and, if so, compare three explanations – learned heuristics, default assumptions, and pragmatic reasoning – as they apply to children and might apply to dogs. Kaminski et al.'s work clearly raises important questions about the origins and basis of word learning and social cognition.
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McLaren I.P.L. (1998). Animal Learning and Cognition: A neural network approach. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 2, 236.
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Povinelli, D. J., & Vonk, J. (2003). Chimpanzee minds: suspiciously human? Trends. Cognit. Sci., 7(4), 157–160.
Abstract: Chimpanzees undoubtedly form concepts related to the statistical regularities in behavior. But do they also construe such abstractions in terms of mental states – that is, do they possess a [`]theory of mind'? Although both anecdotal and experimental data have been marshaled to support this idea, we show that no explanatory power or economy of expression is gained by such an assumption. We suggest that additional experiments will be unhelpful as long as they continue to rely upon determining whether subjects interpret behavioral invariances in terms of mental states. We propose a paradigm shift to overcome this limitation.
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Rosati, A. G. (2017). Foraging Cognition: Reviving the Ecological Intelligence Hypothesis. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 21(9), 691–702.
Abstract: What are the origins of intelligent behavior? The demands associated with living in complex social groups have been the favored explanation for the evolution of primate cognition in general and human cognition in particular. However, recent comparative research indicates that ecological variation can also shape cognitive abilities. I synthesize the emerging evidence that ?foraging cognition? ? skills used to exploit food resources, including spatial memory, decision-making, and inhibitory control ? varies adaptively across primates. These findings provide a new framework for the evolution of human cognition, given our species? dependence on costly, high-value food resources. Understanding the origins of the human mind will require an integrative theory accounting for how humans are unique in both our sociality and our ecology.
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Schnall, S., & Gattis, M. (1998). Transitive Inference by Visual Reasoning. Retrieved May 15, 2024, from http://faculty.virginia.edu/schnall/Schnall%20&%20Gattis.pdf
Abstract: Two experiments are reported that investigated the influence
of linear spatial organization on transitive inference
performance. Reward/no-reward relations between
overlapping pairs of elements were presented in a context of
linear spatial order or random spatial order. Participants in
the linear arrangement condition showed evidence for visual
reasoning: They systematically mapped spatial relations to
conceptual relation and used the spatial relations to make
inferences on a reasoning task in a new spatial context. We
suggest that linear ordering may be a “good figure”, by
constituting a parsimonious representation for the integration
of premises, as well as for the inferencing process. The late
emergence of transitive inference in children may be the
result of limited cognitive capacity, which --unless an
external spatial array is available --constrains the
construction of an internal spatial array.
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Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L., & Bergman, T. J. (2005). Primate social cognition and the origins of language. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(6), 264–266.
Abstract: Are the cognitive mechanisms underlying language unique, or can similar mechanisms be found in other domains? Recent field experiments demonstrate that baboons' knowledge of their companions' social relationships is based on discrete-valued traits (identity, rank, kinship) that are combined to create a representation of social relations that is hierarchically structured, open-ended, rule-governed, and independent of sensory modality. The mechanisms underlying language might have evolved from the social knowledge of our pre-linguistic primate ancestors.
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Tomasello M., Call J., & Hare B. (2003). Chimpanzees understand psychological states – the question is which ones and to what extent. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 7, 153–156.
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Vallortigara G. (1998). Minds of Their Own. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 2, 118.
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