Barrett, L., Henzi, P., & Dunbar, R. (2003). Primate cognition: from 'what now?' to 'what if?'. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 7(11), 494–497.
Abstract: The 'social brain' hypothesis has had a major impact on the study of comparative cognition. However, despite a strong sense, gained from both experimental and observational work, that monkeys and apes differ from each other, we are still no closer to understanding exactly how they differ. We hypothesize that the dispersed social systems characteristic of ape societies explains why monkeys and apes should differ cognitively. The increased cognitive control and analogical reasoning ability needed to cope with life in dispersed societies also suggests a possible route for human cognitive evolution. This hypothesis is supported by behavioural and neurobiological data, but we need more of both if we are to fully understand how our primate cousins see the world.
|
Bolhuis, J. J., & Macphail, E. M. (2001). A critique of the neuroecology of learning and memory. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 5(10), 426–433.
Abstract: Recent years have seen the emergence of neuroecology, the study of the neural mechanisms of behaviour guided by functional and evolutionary principles. This research has been of enormous value for our understanding of the evolution of brain- and species-specific behaviour. However, we question the validity of the neuroecological approach when applied to the analysis of learning and memory, given its arbitrary assumption that different [`]problems' engage different memory mechanisms. Differences in memory-based performance in [`]natural' tasks do not prove differences in memory capacity; similarly, differences in the use of memory in the natural environment do not provide a sound basis for expecting differences in anatomical structures that subserve learning and memory. This critique is illustrated with examples taken from the study of the neurobiology of food storing and song learning in birds.
|
|
Byrne R.W. (2000). - Animal Cognition in Nature, edited by Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg and Alan C. Kamil. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 4, 73.
|
de Waal, F. B. M., & Ferrari, P. F. (2010). Towards a bottom-up perspective on animal and human cognition. Trends Cognit. Sci., 14(5), 201–207.
Abstract: Over the last few decades, comparative cognitive research has focused on the pinnacles of mental evolution, asking all-or-nothing questions such as which animals (if any) possess a theory of mind, culture, linguistic abilities, future planning, and so on. Research programs adopting this top-down perspective have often pitted one taxon against another, resulting in sharp dividing lines. Insight into the underlying mechanisms has lagged behind. A dramatic change in focus now seems to be under way, however, with increased appreciation that the basic building blocks of cognition might be shared across a wide range of species. We argue that this bottom-up perspective, which focuses on the constituent capacities underlying larger cognitive phenomena, is more in line with both neuroscience and evolutionary biology.
|
Gomez, J. - C. (2005). Species comparative studies and cognitive development. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(3), 118–125.
Abstract: The comparative study of infant development and animal cognition brings to cognitive science the promise of insights into the nature and origins of cognitive skills. In this article, I review a recent wave of comparative studies conducted with similar methodologies and similar theoretical frameworks on how two core components of human cognition--object permanence and gaze following--develop in different species. These comparative findings call for an integration of current competing accounts of developmental change. They further suggest that evolution has produced developmental devices capable at the same time of preserving core adaptive components, and opening themselves up to further adaptive change, not only in interaction with the external environment, but also in interaction with other co-developing cognitive systems.
|
|
Griffiths D., Dickinson A., & Clayton N. (1999). Episodic memory: what can animals remember about their past? Trends. Cognit. Sci., 3, 74–80.
|
|
Hampton, R. R., Healy, S. D., Shettleworth, S. J., & Kamil, A. C. (2002). Neuroecologists' are not made of straw. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 6(1), 6–7.
|
|
Hanggi, E. B. (2001). Can Horses Recognize Pictures? Proceedings of the Third International Conference of Cognitive Science, , 52–56.
|
Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Human-like social skills in dogs? Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(9), 439–444.
Abstract: Domestic dogs are unusually skilled at reading human social and communicative behavior--even more so than our nearest primate relatives. For example, they use human social and communicative behavior (e.g. a pointing gesture) to find hidden food, and they know what the human can and cannot see in various situations. Recent comparisons between canid species suggest that these unusual social skills have a heritable component and initially evolved during domestication as a result of selection on systems mediating fear and aggression towards humans. Differences in chimpanzee and human temperament suggest that a similar process may have been an important catalyst leading to the evolution of unusual social skills in our own species. The study of convergent evolution provides an exciting opportunity to gain further insights into the evolutionary processes leading to human-like forms of cooperation and communication.
|
Holekamp, K. E. (2006). Questioning the social intelligence hypothesis. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 11(2), 65–69.
Abstract: The social intelligence hypothesis posits that complex cognition and enlarged [`]executive brains' evolved in response to challenges that are associated with social complexity. This hypothesis has been well supported, but some recent data are inconsistent with its predictions. It is becoming increasingly clear that multiple selective agents, and non-selective constraints, must have acted to shape cognitive abilities in humans and other animals. The task now is to develop a larger theoretical framework that takes into account both inter-specific differences and similarities in cognition. This new framework should facilitate consideration of how selection pressures that are associated with sociality interact with those that are imposed by non-social forms of environmental complexity, and how both types of functional demands interact with phylogenetic and developmental constraints.
|
