Abstract: A computational theory of primate social intelligence is proposed in which primates represent social situations internally by discrete symbol structures, called scripts. Three well-defined computational operations on scripts are sufficient to support social learning, planning, and prediction. This gives a formal, predictive model with which to analyse how primate social knowledge is acquired, as well as how it is used. The theory is compared with primate data, such as Cheney and Seyfarth's observations of vervet monkeys. It gives simple, understandable script-based analyses of many observed phenomena--such as the recognition and use of kin relations, learning of alarm calls, habituation to calls, knowledge of rank, tactical deception, and attachment behaviour. I argue that a tight, concise theory of social cognition, such as script theory, is needed to explain the rapid learning and social guile seen in primates. It also has the benefits of simplicity and testability. The extension of scripts to incorporate a primate theory of mind is described in a subsequent paper.

Abstract: Once considered a uniquely human attribute, brain asymmetry has been proved to be ubiquitous among non-human animals. A synthetic review of evidence of animal lateralization in the motor, sensory, cognitive, and affective domains is provided, together with a discussion of its development and possible biological functions. It is argued that investigation of brain asymmetry in a comparative perspective may favor the link between classical neuropsychological studies and modern developmental and evolutionary biology approaches. WIREs Cogni Sci 2011 2 146–157 DOI: 10.1002/wcs.100 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website

Abstract: Two experiments are reported that investigated the influence
of linear spatial organization on transitive inference
performance. Reward/no-reward relations between
overlapping pairs of elements were presented in a context of
linear spatial order or random spatial order. Participants in
the linear arrangement condition showed evidence for visual
reasoning: They systematically mapped spatial relations to
conceptual relation and used the spatial relations to make
inferences on a reasoning task in a new spatial context. We
suggest that linear ordering may be a “good figure”, by
constituting a parsimonious representation for the integration
of premises, as well as for the inferencing process. The late
emergence of transitive inference in children may be the
result of limited cognitive capacity, which --unless an
external spatial array is available --constrains the
construction of an internal spatial array.

Abstract: Chimpanzees undoubtedly form concepts related to the statistical regularities in behavior. But do they also construe such abstractions in terms of mental states – that is, do they possess a [`]theory of mind'? Although both anecdotal and experimental data have been marshaled to support this idea, we show that no explanatory power or economy of expression is gained by such an assumption. We suggest that additional experiments will be unhelpful as long as they continue to rely upon determining whether subjects interpret behavioral invariances in terms of mental states. We propose a paradigm shift to overcome this limitation.