BRYSON, J. O. A. N. N. A. J. EVIDENCE OF MODULARITY FROM PRIMATE ERRORS DURING TASK LEARNING. Retrieved May 1, 2024, from http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/9789812701886_0031.
Abstract: The last two decades have seen a great deal of theorising and speculation about
the modular nature of human intelligence, as well as a rise in use of modular
architectures in artificial intelligence. Nevertheless, whether such models of natural
intelligence are well supported is still an issue of debate. In this paper, I propose
that the most important criteria for modularity is specialised representations. I
present a modular model of primate learning of the transitive inference task, and
propose an extension to this model which would explain task-learning results in
other domains. I also briefly relate this work to both neuroscience and established
AI learning architectures.
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Lombardi, C. Matching and oddity relational learning by pigeons ( Columba livia ): transfer from color to shape. Anim. Cogn., .
Abstract: Abstract Relational learning, as opposed to perceptual learning, is based on the abstract properties of the stimuli. Although at present there is no doubt that pigeons are capable of relational behavior, this study aims to further disclose the conditions under which it occurs. Pigeons were trained in an outdoor cage on a matching-to-sample or an oddity-from-sample task, with colored cardboard stimuli presented horizontally. The apparatus involved three sliding lids on which the stimuli were drawn and which, when displaced, revealed the reinforcement. The lids were either adjacent to each other or somewhat separated. Training sessions involved two colors, and test sessions six different colors (same dimension test), or six different shapes (different dimension test). One group of birds trained under the “adjacent” condition failed when tested with new stimuli, but succeeded in both dimension tests after training under the “separate” condition. Two other groups of birds succeeded in all tests after training under the latter condition. These results show that depending on procedural details, pigeons are or are not able to transfer from one visual dimension to another, thus extending previous related findings.
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Wimmer H, & Perner J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition, 13, 103.
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Baron-Cohen S, Leslie AM, & Frith U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition, 21, 37.
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Cheney, D. L., & Seyfarth, R. M. (1990). The representation of social relations by monkeys. Cognition, 37(1-2), 167–196.
Abstract: Monkeys recognize the social relations that exist among others in their group. They know who associates with whom, for example, and other animals' relative dominance ranks. In addition, monkeys appear to compare types of social relations and make same/different judgments about them. In captivity, longtailed macaques (Macaca fascicularis) trained to recognize the relation between one adult female and her offspring can identify the same relation among other mother-offspring pairs, and distinguish this relation from bonds between individuals who are related in a different way. In the wild, if a vervet monkey (Cercopithecus aethiops) has seen a fight between a member of its own family and a member of Family X, this increases the likelihood that it will act aggressively toward another member of Family X. Vervets act as if they recognize some similarity between their own close associates and the close associates of others. To make such comparisons the monkeys must have some way of representing the properties of social relationships. We discuss the adaptive value of such representations, the information they contain, their structure, and their limitations.
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Wittling, W., & Pflüger, M. (1990). Neuroendocrine hemisphere asymmetries: Salivary cortisol secretion during lateralized viewing of emotion-related and neutral films. Brain Cogn., 14(2), 243–265.
Abstract: The study set out to examine whether the cerebral hemispheres differ in their ability to regulate cortisol secretion during emotion-related situations. One hundred twenty-three adult subjects were shown either an emotionally aversive or a neutral film in the left or right hemisphere by means of a technique for lateralizing visual input that allows prolonged viewing while permitting free ocular scanning. The film-related changes of cortisol secretion were determined by salivary cortisol radioimmunoassay. Right hemispheric viewing of the emotionally aversive film resulted in a significantly higher increase of cortisol secretion than left hemispheric viewing of the same film. No such differences were observed with respect to the neutral film. Comparing the effects of the two films separately for each hemisphere revealed that only the right hemisphere was able to respond neuroendocrinologically in a different manner to the emotional and the neutral film. Therefore, it is concluded that cortical regulation of cortisol secretion in emotion-related situations is under primary control of the right hemisphere. The potential implications of asymmetric control of cortisol secretion with respect to the pathogenesis of psychosomatic and immunological disorders are discussed.
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Lieberman, D. (1993).
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Premack D, & Premack AJ. (1994). Levels of causal understanding in chimpanzees and children. Cognition, 50, 347.
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Loveland, K. A. (1995). Self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: ecological considerations. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 254–257.
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Hart, D., & Whitlow, J. W. J. (1995). The experience of self in the bottlenose dolphin. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 244–247.
Abstract: Marten and Psarakos have presented some evidence which suggests that objective self-awareness and possibly representations of self may characterize the dolphins' experience of self. Their research demonstrates the possibility of similarities in the sense of self between primate species and dolphins, although whether dolphins have subjective self-awareness, personal memories, and theories of self--all important facets of the sense of self in humans--was not examined. Clearly, even this limited evidence was difficult to achieve; the difficulties in adapting methods and coding behavior are quite apparent in their report. Future progress, however, may depend upon clarification of what are the necessary components for a sense of self and an explication of how these might be reflected in dolphin behavior. We are mindful of the authors' point (pp. 219 and 220) that the dolphin lives more in an acoustic than a visual environment. Thus, while tasks relying upon vision may reveal the presence or absence of the sense of self in primates, it might well be the case that in dolphins self-related experiences might be better revealed in auditory tasks. But then, what is the nature of human self-awareness in terms of audition? While both conceptual and methodological hurdles remain, Marten and Psarakos have demonstrated that important questions can be asked about the minds and phenomenal worlds of nonanthropoid species.
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