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Dyer, F. C. (1998). Spatial Cognition: Lessons from Central-place Foraging Insects. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 119–154). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary Spatial orientation has played an extremely important role in the development of ideas about the behavioral capacities of animals. Indeed, as the modern scientific study of animal behavior emerged from its roots in zoology and experimental psychology, studies of spatial orientation figured in the work of many of the pioneering researchers, including Tinbergen (), von ), Watson () and .
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Smith, W. J. (1998). Cognitive Implications of an Information-sharing Model of Animal Communication. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 227–243). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In social communication, one animal signals and another responds. Several cognitive steps are involved as the second animal selects its responses; these steps can be described as follows in terms of an informational model. First, the responding individual must evaluate the information made available by the signaling on the basis of other information, available from sources contextual to the signal. Second, the respondent must fit all of the relevant information into patterns generated from recall of past events (conscious recall is not generally required; pattern fitting is a fundamental skill). Third, conditional predictions must be made; and fourth, the individual must test and modify any of these predictions for which significant consequences exist. Many vertebrate animals appear to respond to signaling with considerable flexibility. Communicative events are thus complex but are by no means intractable. Indeed, communication provides us with excellent opportunities to investigate animal cognition.
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Beer, C. G. (1998). Varying Views of Animal and Human Cognition. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 435–456). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary In this chapter I want to stand back from the splendid empirical work on animal cognitive capacities that is the focus of this book, and look at the broader context of cognitive concerns within which the work can be viewed. Indeed even the term `cognitive ethology' currently connotes and denotes more than is represented here, as other collections of articles, such as and , exemplify. I include the current descendants of behavioristic learning theory, evolutionary epistemology, evolutionary psychology and the recent comparative turn that has been taken in cognitive science. These several approaches, despite their considerable overlap, often appear independent and even ignorant of one another. Like the proverbial blind men feeling the hide of an elephant, they touch hands from time to time, yet collectively have only a piecemeal and distributed understanding of the shape of the whole. Although each approach may indeed need the space to work out its own conceptual and methodological preoccupations without confounding interference from other views, a utopian spirit envisages an ultimate coming together, a more comprehensive realization of the synthetic approach to animal cognition that is this book's theme.
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Baron-Cohen S, Leslie AM, & Frith U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition, 21, 37.
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Wimmer H, & Perner J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition, 13, 103.
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Hauser MD. (1997). Artifactual kinds and functional design features: what a primate understands without language. Cognition, 64, 285.
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Premack D, & Premack AJ. (1994). Levels of causal understanding in chimpanzees and children. Cognition, 50, 347.
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Santos LR, Hauser MD, & Spelke ES. (2001). Recognition and categorization of biologically significant objects by rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta): the domain of food. Cognition, 82, 127.
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Cook, R. G., Shaw, R., & Blaisdell, A. P. (2001). Dynamic object perception by pigeons: discrimination of action in video presentations. Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 137–146.
Abstract: Two experiments examined the discrimination by pigeons of relative motion using computer-generated video stimuli. Using a go/no-go procedure, pigeons were tested with video stimuli in which the camera's perspective went either “around” or “through” an approaching object in a semi-realistic context. Experiment 1 found that pigeons could learn this discrimination and transfer it to videos composed from novel objects. Experiment 2 found that the order of the video's frames was critical to the discrimination of the videos. We hypothesize that the pigeons perceived a three-dimensional representation of the objects and the camera's relative motion and used this as the primary basis for discrimination. It is proposed that the pigeons might be able to form generalized natural categories for the different kinds of motions portrayed in the videos.
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Forkman, B. (2000). Domestic hens have declarative representations. Anim. Cogn., 3(3), 135–137.
Abstract: It is generally considered that information can be stored either as a procedural or as a declarative representation. A devaluation technique was used to determine whether hens have declarative representations. Individual hens (Gallus gallus domesticus) were fed in an enclosure with two containers, each with a new food type. One of the food types was devalued by pre-feeding with that food, after which the hens were tested with empty food containers. The pre-feeding should only affect the choice of the hens if they have learned where a particular food type was (declarative representation) rather than “go left when coming into the enclosure” (procedural representation). A significant proportion of the hens went to the location previously occupied by the non-devalued food (seven out of eight). This supports the hypothesis that domestic hens can form declarative representations.
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