Abstract: The papers in this special issue examine the relationship between social and ecological cognition in primates. We refer to the intersection of these two domains as socioecological cognition. Examples of socioecological cognition include socially learned predator alarm calls and socially sensitive foraging decisions. In this review we consider how primate cognition may have been shaped by the interaction of social and ecological influences in their evolutionary history. The ability to remember distant, out-of-sight locations is an ancient one, shared by many mammals and widespread among primates. It seems some monkeys and apes have evolved the ability to form more complex representations of resources, integrating “what-where-how much” information. This ability allowed anthropoids to live in larger, more cohesive groups by minimizing competition for limited resources between group members. As group size increased, however, competition for resources also increased, selecting for enhanced social skills. Enhanced social skills in turn made a more sophisticated relationship to the environment possible. The interaction of social and ecological influences created a spiraling effect in the evolution of primate intelligence. In contrast, lemurs may not have evolved the ability to form complex representations which would allow them to consider the size and location of resources. This lack in lemur ecological cognition may restrict the size of frugivorous lemur social groups, thereby limiting the complexity of lemur social life. In this special issue, we have brought together two review papers, five field studies, and one laboratory study to investigate the interaction of social and ecological factors in relation to foraging. Our goal is to stimulate research that considers social and ecological factors acting together on cognitive evolution, rather than in isolation. Cross fertilization of experimental and observational studies from captivity and the field is important for increasing our understanding of this relationship.

Abstract: Social learning about actions, objects and sequencing was investigated in a group of 14 wildborn orangutans (four adult females and ten 3- to 5-year-old juveniles). Human models showed alternative methods and sequences for dismantling an artificial fruit to groups of participants matched by gender and age. Each participant received three to six 2-min trials in which they were given access to the artificial fruit for manipulation. Independent coders, who were unaware of which method each participant had seen, gave confidence ratings and collected action frequencies from watching video recordings of the experimental trials. No significant differences were found between groups in terms of the coders' confidence ratings, the action frequencies or the sequence of manipulations. These negative results may at least partly reflect the immaturity of a large proportion of the participants. A positive correlation was found between age and the degree of matching to the method shown. Although none of the juveniles succeeded in opening the “fruit”, two out of the four adults did so and they also seemed to match more closely the sequence of elements touched over successive trials. The results are compared with similar data previously collected from human children, chimpanzees, gorillas, capuchin monkeys and common marmosets.

Abstract: Abstract  Here we investigate the counting ability in honeybees by training them to receive a food reward after they have passed a specific number of landmarks. The distance to the food reward is varied frequently and randomly, whilst keeping the number of intervening landmarks constant. Thus, the bees cannot identify the food reward in terms of its distance from the hive. We find that bees can count up to four objects, when they are encountered sequentially during flight. Furthermore, bees trained in this way are able count novel objects, which they have never previously encountered, thus demonstrating that they are capable of object-independent counting. A further experiment reveals that the counting ability that the bees display in our experiments is primarily sequential in nature. It appears that bees can navigate to food sources by maintaining a running count of prominent landmarks that are passed en route, provided this number does not exceed four.

Abstract: In search of the minimal requirements for transitive reasoning, a simple neural network was trained and tested on the non-verbal version of the conventional “five-term-series task” – a paradigm used with human adults, children and a variety of non-human species. The transitive performance of the network was analogous in several aspects to that reported for children and animals. The three effects usually associated with transitive choices i.e. “symbolic distance”, “lexical marking” and “end-anchor”, were also clearly shown by the neural network. In a second experiment, where the training conditions were manipulated, the network failed to match the behavioural pattern reported for human adults in the test following an ordered presentation of the premises. However, it mimicked young children's performance when tested with a novel comparison term. Although we do not intend to suggest a new model of transitive inference, we conclude, in line with other authors, that a simple error-correcting rule can generate transitive behaviour similar to the choice pattern of children and animals in the binary form of the five-term-series task without requiring high-order logical or paralogical abilities. The analysis of the training history and of the final internal structure of the network reveals the associative strategy employed. However, our results indicate that the scope of the associative strategy used by the network might be limited. The extent to which the conventional five-term-series task, in absence of appropriate manipulations of training and testing conditions, is suitable to detect cognitive differences across species is also discussed on the basis of our results.

Abstract: Animal communication has become a widely studied field of research, especially because of the associated debates on the origin of human language. Due to their phylogenetic proximity with humans, non-human primates represent a suitable model to investigate the precursors of language. This study focuses on the perception of the attentional states of others, an important prerequisite to intentional communication. We investigated whether capuchins (Cebus apella) produce a learnt pointing gesture towards a hidden and unreachable food reward as a function of the attentional status of the human experimenter. For that purpose, we tested five subjects that we first trained to indicate by a pointing gesture towards the human partner the position of a reward hidden by an assistant. Then, capuchins were tested in two experimental conditions randomly ordered. In the first condition—motivation trial—the experimenter was attentive to the subject gestures and rewarded him immediately when it pointed towards the baited cylinder. During the second condition—test trial—the experimenter adopted one of the following attention states and the subject was rewarded after 10 s has elapsed, regardless of the subject’s behaviour. Five attentional states were tested: (1) experimenter absent, (2) experimenter back to the monkey, (3) experimenter’s head away, (4) experimenter watching above the monkey, and (5) experimenter watching the monkey face. Our results reveal a variation in our subjects’ communicative behaviours with a discrimination of the different postural clues (body and head orientation) available in our experimental conditions. This study suggests that capuchins can flexibly use a communicative gesture to adapt to the attentional state of their partner and provides evidence that acquired communicative gestures of monkeys might be used intentionally.