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Acuna, B. D., Sanes, J. N., & Donoghue, J. P. (2002). Cognitive mechanisms of transitive inference. Exp Brain Res, 146(1), 1–10.
Abstract: We examined how the brain organizes interrelated facts during learning and how the facts are subsequently manipulated in a transitive inference (TI) paradigm (e.g., if A<B and B<C, then A<C). This task determined features such as learned facts and behavioral goals, but the learned facts could be organized in any of several ways. For example, if one learns a list by operating on paired items, the pairs may be stored individually as separate facts and reaction time (RT) should decrease with learning. Alternatively, the pairs may be stored as a single, unified list, which may yield a different RT pattern. We characterized RT patterns that occurred as participants learned, by trial and error, the predetermined order of 11 shapes. The task goal was to choose the shape occurring closer to the end of the list, and feedback about correctness was provided during this phase. RT increased even as its variance decreased during learning, suggesting that the learnt knowledge became progressively unified into a single representation, requiring more time to manipulate as participants acquired relational knowledge. After learning, non-adjacent (NA) list items were presented to examine how participants reasoned in a TI task. The task goal also required choosing from each presented pair the item occurring closer to the list end, but without feedback. Participants could solve the TI problems by applying formal logic to the previously learnt pairs of adjacent items; alternatively, they could manipulate a single, unified representation of the list. Shorter RT occurred for NA pairs having more intervening items, supporting the hypothesis that humans employ unified mental representations during TI. The response pattern does not support mental logic solutions of applying inference rules sequentially, which would predict longer RT with more intervening items. We conclude that the brain organizes information in such a way that reflects the relations among the items, even if the facts were learned in an arbitrary order, and that this representation is subsequently used to make inferences.
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Allman, J. M. (2000). Evolving brains. New York: Scientific American Library.
Abstract: How did the human brain with all its manifold capacities evolve from basic functions in simple organisms that lived nearly a billion years ago? John Allman addresses this question in Evolving Brains, a provocative study of brain evolution that introduces readers to some of the most exciting developments in science in recent years.
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Andrew, R. J. (1974). Changes in visual responsiveness following intercollicular lesions and their effects on avoidance and attack. Brain Behav Evol, 10(4-5), 400–424.
Abstract: In the normal chick, conspicuous visual stimuli induce targetting and pecking together, with vocalization. All three are abolished by lesion of the intercollicular area (ICo) or of connections passing through its medial margin. After such lesions, chicks also cease to treat significant visual stimuli as if they were startling and exciting, and may delay response as a result. However, they are still able to recognise, orient accurately to, and respond appropriately to, a variety of complex visual stimuli (e.g. food grains, copulation object). In addition, they are little affected by strange surroundings. Lesion evidence suggests the mammalian subcollicular area to have similar functions to the ICo and to be homologous with it. A route (present in bird), which is well-known in mammals for its association with threat, defense and escape evoked by strange and frightening objects (amygdala-diencephalic periventricular system-central mesencephalic grey, A-DPS-CMG) is stimuli via the 2 ICo (subcollicular area). Two different mechanisms may be involved caudal to the ICo. One consists of tectal afferents which might modulate the evocation of targetting, pecking and other responses via the tectum. The other is the predorsal system of tectal efferents which may mediate such responses. Classical syndromes of tameness and unresponsiveness produced by various interruptions of the A-DPS-CMG route may depend on interruption of connections to these midbrain mechanisms. Attack is depressed by ICo lesions as one aspect of reduced responsiveness to conspicuous and startling visual stimuli. Avoidance, which is apparently mediated by a separate system, much as in Anura, is facilitated.
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Arakawa, H., Arakawa, K., Blanchard, D. C., & Blanchard, R. J. (2008). A new test paradigm for social recognition evidenced by urinary scent marking behavior in C57BL/6J mice. Behav. Brain. Res., 190(1), 97–104.
Abstract: Olfaction is a major sensory element in intraspecies recognition and communication in mice. The present study investigated scent marking behaviors of males of the highly inbred C57BL/6J (C57) strain in order to evaluate the ability of these behaviors to provide clear and consistent measures of social familiarity and response to social signals. C57 males engage in scent marking when placed in a chamber with a wire mesh partition separating them from a conspecific. Male mice (C57 or outbred CD-1 mice) showed rapid habituation of scent marking (decreased marking over trials) with repeated exposure at 24-h intervals, to a stimulus animal of the C57 or CD-1 strains, or to an empty chamber. Subsequent exposure to a genetically different novel mouse (CD-1 after CD-1 exposure, or CD-1 after C57 exposure) or to a novel context (different shaped chamber) produced recovery of marking, while responses to a novel but genetically identical mouse (C57 after C57 exposure) or to the empty chamber did not. This finding demonstrated that male mice differentiate familiar and novel conspecifics as expressed by habituation and recovery of scent marking, but neither C57 or CD-1 mice can differentiate new vs. familiar C57 males; likely due to similarities in their odor patterns. The data also indicate that scent marking can differentiate novel from familiar contexts.
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Bizot J.-C., & Thiebot M.-H. (1996). Impulsivity as a confounding factor in certain animal tests of cognitive function. Cognitive Brain Research, 3, 243–250.
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Byrne, R. W. (1993). Do larger brains mean greater intelligence? Behav. Brain Sci., 16(4), 696–697.
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Cheney DL, & Seyfarth RM. (1992). Characterizing the mind of another species. Behav. Brain Sci., 15, 172.
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Cozzi, B., Povinelli, M., Ballarin, C., & Granato, A. (2014). The Brain of the Horse: Weight and Cephalization Quotients. Brain Behav Evol, 83(1), 9–16.
Abstract: The horse is a common domestic animal whose anatomy has been studied since the XVI century. However, a modern neuroanatomy of this species does not exist and most of the data utilized in textbooks and reviews derive from single specimens or relatively old literature. Here, we report information on the brain of Equus caballus obtained by sampling 131 horses, including brain weight (as a whole and subdivided into its constituents), encephalization quotient (EQ), and cerebellar quotient (CQ), and comparisons with what is known about other relevant species. The mean weight of the fresh brains in our experimental series was 598.63 g (SEM ± 7.65), with a mean body weight of 514.12 kg (SEM ± 15.42). The EQ was 0.78 and the CQ was 0.841. The data we obtained indicate that the horse possesses a large, convoluted brain, with a weight similar to that of other hoofed species of like mass. However, the shape of the brain, the noteworthy folding of the neocortex, and the peculiar longitudinal distribution of the gyri suggest an evolutionary specificity at least partially separate from that of the Cetartiodactyla (even-toed mammals and cetaceans) with whom Perissodactyla (odd-toed mammals) are often grouped.
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Davidsson T.E., Leonardson L.G., & Marston H.M. (1996). Analysis of cognitive function in animals, the value of SDT. Cognitive Brain Research, 3, 269–277.
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Friederici, A. D., & Alter, K. (2004). Lateralization of auditory language functions: a dynamic dual pathway model. Brain Lang, 89(2), 267–276.
Abstract: Spoken language comprehension requires the coordination of different subprocesses in time. After the initial acoustic analysis the system has to extract segmental information such as phonemes, syntactic elements and lexical-semantic elements as well as suprasegmental information such as accentuation and intonational phrases, i.e., prosody. According to the dynamic dual pathway model of auditory language comprehension syntactic and semantic information are primarily processed in a left hemispheric temporo-frontal pathway including separate circuits for syntactic and semantic information whereas sentence level prosody is processed in a right hemispheric temporo-frontal pathway. The relative lateralization of these functions occurs as a result of stimulus properties and processing demands. The observed interaction between syntactic and prosodic information during auditory sentence comprehension is attributed to dynamic interactions between the two hemispheres.
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