| Home | << 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 >> [11–11] |
|
Sueur, C., & Petit, O. (2008). Shared or unshared consensus decision in macaques? Behav. Process., 78(1), 84–92.
Abstract: Members of a social group have to make collective decisions in order to synchronise their activities. In a shared consensus decision, all group members can take part in the decision whereas in an unshared consensus decision, one individual, usually a dominant member of the group, takes the decision for the rest of the group. It has been suggested that the type of decision-making of a species could be influenced by its social style. To investigate this further, we studied collective movements in two species with opposed social systems, the Tonkean macaque (Macaca tonkeana) and the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta). From our results, it appears that the decision to move is the result of the choices and actions of several individuals in both groups. However, this consensus decision involved nearly all group members in Tonkean macaques whereas dominant and old individuals took a prominent role in rhesus macaques. Thus, we suggest that Tonkean macaques display equally shared consensus decisions to move, whereas in the same context rhesus macaque exhibit partially shared consensus decisions. Such a difference in making a collective decision might be linked to the different social systems of the two studied species.
Keywords: Collective movement; Decision-making; Leadership; Social style
|
|
Hanggi, E. B., & Ingersoll, J. F. (2012). Lateral vision in horses: A behavioral investigation. Behav. Process., 91(1), 70–76.
Abstract: This study investigated lateral vision in horses (Equus caballus) for the first time from a behavioral point of view. Three horses were tested using a novel experimental design to determine the range of their lateral and caudolateral vision with respect to stimulus detection and discrimination. Real-life stimuli were presented along a curvilinear wall in one of four different positions (A, B, C, D) and one of two height locations (Top, Bottom) on both sides of the horse. To test for stimulus detection, the correct stimulus was paired against a control; for stimulus discrimination, the correct stimulus was paired against another object. To indicate that the correct stimulus was detected or discriminated, the horses pushed one of two paddles. All horses scored significantly above chance on stimulus detection trials regardless of stimulus position or location. They also accurately discriminated between stimuli when objects appeared in positions A, B, and C for the top or bottom locations; however, they failed to discriminate these stimuli at position D. This study supports physiological descriptions of the equine eye and provides new behavioral data showing that horses can detect the appearance of objects within an almost fully encompassing circle and are able to identify objects within most but not all of their panoramic field of view.
Keywords: Lateral vision; Horse; Equine; Stimulus discrimination; Field of view; Peripheral
|
|
Poling, A., Thomas, J., Hall-Johnson, E., & Picker, M. (1985). Self-control revisited: Some factors that affect autoshaped responding. Behav. Process., 10(1-2), 77–85.
Abstract: Pigeons were exposed to autoshaping procedures under which 50% of red key illuminations were followed by 9-sec food deliveries, and 50% of blue key illuminations were followed by 3-sec food deliveries. When all key illuminations were 6 sec, pigeons preferred the red stimulus. Subsequent manipulations demonstrated that preference could be shifted to the blue stimulus by either increasing the duration of the red stimulus or imposing a delay interval between the offset of that stimulus and food delivery. A final experiment demonstrated that, in two of three subjects, preference for key illuminations associated with longer, but delayed, food deliveries generally increased as the duration of all key illuminations was lengthened. These results, obtained under conditions where keypecking had no programmed consequences, are similar to those previously observed under procedures involving a positive response-food dependency.
|
|
Vallortigara, G., & Andrew, R. J. (1994). Differential involvement of right and left hemisphere in individual recognition in the domestic chick. Behav. Process., 33(1-2), 41–57.
Abstract: Right hemisphere advantage in individual recognition (as shown by differences between response to strangers and companions) is clear in the domestic chick. Chicks using the left eye (and so, thanks to the complete optic decussation, predominantly the right hemisphere) discriminate between stranger and companion. Chicks using the right eye discriminate less clearly or not at all. The ability of left eyed chicks to respond to differences between strangers and companions stimuli is associated with a more general ability to detect and respond to novelty: this difference between left and right eyed chicks also holds for stimuli which are not social partners. The right hemisphere also shows advantage in tasks with a spatial component (topographical learning; response to change in the spatial context of a stimulus) in the chick, as in humans. Similar specialisations of the two hemispheres are also revealed in tests which involve olfactory cues presented by social partners. The special properties of the left hemisphere are less well established in the chick. Evidence reviewed here suggests that it tends to respond to selected properties of a stimulus and to use them to assign it to a category; such assignment then allows an appropriate response. When exposed to an imprinting stimulus (visual or auditory) a chick begins by using right eye or ear (suggesting left hemisphere control), and then shifts to the left eye or ear (suggesting right hemisphere control), as exposure continues. The left hemisphere here is thus involved whilst behaviour is dominated by vigorous response to releasing stimuli presented by an object. Subsequent learning about the full detailed properties of the stimulus, which is crucial for individual recognition, may explain the shift to right hemisphere control after prolonged exposure to the social stimulus. There is a marked sex difference in choice tests: females tend to choose companions in tests where males choose strangers. It is possible that this difference is specifically caused by stronger motivation to sustain social contact in female chicks, for which there is extensive evidence. However, sex differences in response to change in familiar stimuli are also marked in tests which do not involve social partners. Finally, in both sexes there are two periods during development in which there age-dependent shifts in bias to use one or other hemisphere. These periods (days 3-5 and 8-11) coincide with two major changes in the social behaviour of chicks reared by a hen in a normal brood. It is argued that one function of these periods is to bring fully into play the hemisphere most appropriate to the type of response to, and learning about, social partners which is needed at particular points in development. Parallels are discussed between the involvement of lateralised processes in the recognition of social partners in chicks and humans.
Keywords: Right hemisphere; Left hemisphere; Domestic fowl; Lateralization; Chick
|
|
Chalmeau, R., & Gallo, A. (1995). Cooperation in primates: Critical analysis of behavioural criteria. Behav. Process., 35(1-3), 101–111.
Abstract: Concerning hunting in chimpanzees, cooperation has generally been attributed to the behaviour of two or more individuals acting together to achieve a common goal (Boesch and Boesch, 1989). The common goal is often considered as the concrete result of a common action by two or several individuals. Although this result could be used as a criterion for cooperation, it could also be an outcome due to chance. We suggest that the goal, viewed as a concrete benefit shared by the partners, is not a requisite of cooperation but rather a possible consequence of a common action largely submitted to social constraints. Individuals engaged in a cooperative task in order to solve a problem have to exchange information to adjust to each other's behaviour. However, evidence of communication between partners during simultaneous cooperation is rare. An experiment in which two chimpanzees each had to simultaneously pull a handle to get a fruit was performed. We analysed not only the concrete result of the partners' activity but also what the individuals took into account before pulling a handle. We tried to specify what the chimpanzees learned by means of a series of logical propositions which we were able to confront the experimental results.
Keywords: Cognition; Communication; Cooperation; Evolution; Primates
|
|
Lefebvre, L. (1995). Ecological correlates of social learning: problems and solutions for the comparative method. Behav. Process., 35(1-3), 163–171.
Abstract: Interspecific variation in learning and cognition is often accounted for by adaptive specialization, an ecological framework where variation between species in the environmental problems they face is thought to select for quantitatively and/or qualitatively different abilities. Adaptive specialization theory relies on the comparative method for testing its hypotheses and assumes a naturally selected basis for the predicted differences. This review examines social learning as a specialization to group-living and scramble feeding competition. It points out one important problem with current studies in the area, the lack of quantitative controls for confounding variables that may cause type 1 or 2 error in comparative tests. A linear regression technique is proposed to measure and remove interspecific differences on control tests for which there is no predicted adaptive specialization; as in other areas of comparative biology, the adaptive prediction is then made on the residual deviation from the regression of these confounding variables. Examples are given from research on opportunistic Columbids, the group-living feral pigeon Columbia livia, and the territorial Zenaida dove, Zenaida aurita.
Keywords: Adaptive specialization; Social learning; Comparative method
|
|
Lejeune, H., Macar, F., & Zakay, D. (1999). Attention and timing: dual-task performance in pigeons. Behav. Process., 45(1-3), 141–157.
Abstract: Pigeons were exposed to an analog of a `dual-task' procedure used to test attentional models of timing in humans. After separate training on an auditory duration discrimination and on a variable ratio (VR) schedule, VR episodes lasting for 5 s were superimposed on the stimuli to be timed, either early (E) or late (L) during the trial. Trials with VR yielded underestimation of the target durations (increased % of `short' choices), relative to trials without VR, and this effect was stronger under the L than under the E condition. Data were similar to those collected with humans and support attentional models of timing according to which the simultaneous non-timing task uses processing resources which are diverted from the timing mechanisms.
|
|
Daniels, T. J., & Bekoff, M. (1989). Feralization: The making of wild domestic animals. Behav. Process., 19(1-3), 79–94.
Abstract: The widely accepted viewpoint that feralization is the reverse of domestication requires that the feralization process be restricted to populations of animals and, therefore, cannot occur in individuals. An alternative, ontogenetic approach is presented in which feralization is defined as the process by which individual domestic animals either become desocialized from humans, or never become socialized, and thus behave as untamed, non-domestic animals. Feralization will vary among species and, intraspecifically, will depend upon an individual's age and history of socialization to humans. Because feralization is not equated with morphological change resulting from evolutionary processes, species formation is not an accurate indicator of feral condition.
Keywords: feralization; domestication; feral dogs
|
|
Zentall, T. R. (2007). Temporal discrimination learning by pigeons. Behav. Process., 74(2), 286–292.
Abstract: Memory for time by animals appears to undergo a systematic shortening. This so-called choose-short effect can be seen in a conditional temporal discrimination when a delay is inserted between the sample and comparison stimuli. We have proposed that this temporal shortening may result from a procedural artifact in which the delay appears similar to the intertrial interval and thus, produces an inadvertent ambiguity or 'instructional failure'. When this ambiguity is avoided by distinguishing the intertrial interval from the delay, as well as the samples from the delay, the temporal shortening effect and other asymmetries often disappear. By avoiding artifacts that can lead to a misinterpretation of results, we may understand better how animals represent time. An alternative procedure for studying temporal discriminations is with the psychophysical bisection procedure in which following conditional discrimination training, intermediate durations are presented and the point of subjective equality is determined. Research using the bisection procedure has shown that pigeons represent temporal durations not only as their absolute value but also relative to durations from which they must be discriminated. Using this procedure, we have also found that time passes subjectively slower when animals are required to respond to the to-be-timed stimulus.
|
|
Zentall, T. R. (2006). Mental time travel in animals: a challenging question. Behav. Process., 72(2), 173–183.
Abstract: Humans have the ability to mentally recreate past events (using episodic memory) and imagine future events (by planning). The best evidence for such mental time travel is personal and thus subjective. For this reason, it is particularly difficult to study such behavior in animals. There is some indirect evidence, however, that animals have both episodic memory and the ability to plan for the future. When unexpectedly asked to do so, animals can report about their recent past experiences (episodic memory) and they also appear to be able to use the anticipation of a future event as the basis for a present action (planning). Thus, the ability to imagine past and future events may not be uniquely human.
|