Abstract: Members of a social group have to make collective decisions in order to synchronise their activities. In a shared consensus decision, all group members can take part in the decision whereas in an unshared consensus decision, one individual, usually a dominant member of the group, takes the decision for the rest of the group. It has been suggested that the type of decision-making of a species could be influenced by its social style. To investigate this further, we studied collective movements in two species with opposed social systems, the Tonkean macaque (Macaca tonkeana) and the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta). From our results, it appears that the decision to move is the result of the choices and actions of several individuals in both groups. However, this consensus decision involved nearly all group members in Tonkean macaques whereas dominant and old individuals took a prominent role in rhesus macaques. Thus, we suggest that Tonkean macaques display equally shared consensus decisions to move, whereas in the same context rhesus macaque exhibit partially shared consensus decisions. Such a difference in making a collective decision might be linked to the different social systems of the two studied species.

Abstract: Right hemisphere advantage in individual recognition (as shown by differences between response to strangers and companions) is clear in the domestic chick. Chicks using the left eye (and so, thanks to the complete optic decussation, predominantly the right hemisphere) discriminate between stranger and companion. Chicks using the right eye discriminate less clearly or not at all. The ability of left eyed chicks to respond to differences between strangers and companions stimuli is associated with a more general ability to detect and respond to novelty: this difference between left and right eyed chicks also holds for stimuli which are not social partners. The right hemisphere also shows advantage in tasks with a spatial component (topographical learning; response to change in the spatial context of a stimulus) in the chick, as in humans. Similar specialisations of the two hemispheres are also revealed in tests which involve olfactory cues presented by social partners. The special properties of the left hemisphere are less well established in the chick. Evidence reviewed here suggests that it tends to respond to selected properties of a stimulus and to use them to assign it to a category; such assignment then allows an appropriate response. When exposed to an imprinting stimulus (visual or auditory) a chick begins by using right eye or ear (suggesting left hemisphere control), and then shifts to the left eye or ear (suggesting right hemisphere control), as exposure continues. The left hemisphere here is thus involved whilst behaviour is dominated by vigorous response to releasing stimuli presented by an object. Subsequent learning about the full detailed properties of the stimulus, which is crucial for individual recognition, may explain the shift to right hemisphere control after prolonged exposure to the social stimulus. There is a marked sex difference in choice tests: females tend to choose companions in tests where males choose strangers. It is possible that this difference is specifically caused by stronger motivation to sustain social contact in female chicks, for which there is extensive evidence. However, sex differences in response to change in familiar stimuli are also marked in tests which do not involve social partners. Finally, in both sexes there are two periods during development in which there age-dependent shifts in bias to use one or other hemisphere. These periods (days 3-5 and 8-11) coincide with two major changes in the social behaviour of chicks reared by a hen in a normal brood. It is argued that one function of these periods is to bring fully into play the hemisphere most appropriate to the type of response to, and learning about, social partners which is needed at particular points in development. Parallels are discussed between the involvement of lateralised processes in the recognition of social partners in chicks and humans.

Abstract: There is much interest in studying animal personalities but considerable debate as to how to define and evaluate them. We assessed the utility of one proposed framework while studying personality in terrestrial hermit crabs (Coenobita clypeatus). We recorded the latency of individuals to emerge from their shells over multiple trials in four unique manipulations. We used the specific testing situations within these manipulations to define two temperament categories (shyness-boldness and exploration-avoidance). Our results identified individual behavioral consistency (i.e., personality) across repeated trials of the same situations, within both categories. Additionally, we found correlations between behaviors across contexts (traits) that suggested that the crabs had behavioral syndromes. While we found some correlations between behaviors that are supposed to measure the same temperament trait, these correlations were not inevitable. Furthermore, a principal component analysis (PCA) of our data revealed new relationships between behaviors and provided the foundation for an alternate interpretation: measured behaviors may be situation-specific, and may not reflect general personality traits at all. These results suggest that more attention must be placed on how we infer personalities from standardized methods, and that we must be careful to not force our data to fit our frameworks.

Abstract: Memory for time by animals appears to undergo a systematic shortening. This so-called choose-short effect can be seen in a conditional temporal discrimination when a delay is inserted between the sample and comparison stimuli. We have proposed that this temporal shortening may result from a procedural artifact in which the delay appears similar to the intertrial interval and thus, produces an inadvertent ambiguity or 'instructional failure'. When this ambiguity is avoided by distinguishing the intertrial interval from the delay, as well as the samples from the delay, the temporal shortening effect and other asymmetries often disappear. By avoiding artifacts that can lead to a misinterpretation of results, we may understand better how animals represent time. An alternative procedure for studying temporal discriminations is with the psychophysical bisection procedure in which following conditional discrimination training, intermediate durations are presented and the point of subjective equality is determined. Research using the bisection procedure has shown that pigeons represent temporal durations not only as their absolute value but also relative to durations from which they must be discriminated. Using this procedure, we have also found that time passes subjectively slower when animals are required to respond to the to-be-timed stimulus.

Abstract: Theories of animal timing have had to account for findings that the memory for the duration of a timed interval appears to be dramatically shorted within a short time of its termination. This finding has led to the subjective shortening hypothesis and it has been proposed to account for the poor memory that animals appear to have for the initial portion of a timed interval when a gap is inserted in the to-be-timed signal. It has also been proposed to account for the poor memory for a relatively long interval that has been discriminated from a shorter interval. I suggest here a simpler account in which ambiguity between the gap or retention interval and the intertrial interval results in resetting the clock, rather than forgetting the interval. The ambiguity hypothesis, together with a signal salience mechanism that determines how quickly the clock is reset at the start of the intertrial interval can account for the results of the reported timing experiments that have used the peak procedure. Furthermore, instructional ambiguity rather than memory loss may account for the results of many animal memory experiments that do not involve memory for time.