Abstract: When agonistic interventions are nepotistic, individuals are expected to side more often with kin but less often against kin in comparison with non-kin. As yet, however, few mammal studies have been in a position to test the validity of this assertion with respect to paternal relatedness. We therefore used molecular genetic kinship testing to assess whether adult female rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) from the free-ranging colony of Cayo Santiago (Puerto Rico) bias their interventions in ongoing dyadic aggressive interactions towards maternal and paternal half-sisters compared with unrelated females. It turned out that females supported maternal half-sisters significantly more often than paternal half-sisters or non-kin regardless of the costs associated with such interventions. Similarly, females targeted maternal half-sisters significantly less often than non-kin when this was associated with high costs. Unrelated females provided significantly higher mean rates of both high- and low-cost support to each other than did paternal half-sisters. However, females targeted paternal half-sisters significantly less often than non-kin when targeting was at low cost, suggesting that females refrain from intervening against paternal half-sisters. Our data confirm the general view that coalition formation in female mammals is a function of both the level of maternal relatedness and of the costs of intervention. The patterns of coalition formation among paternal kin were found to be more complex, and may also differ across species, but clear evidence for paternal kin discrimination was observed in female rhesus as predicted by kin selection theory.

Abstract: The formation of collaborating pairs by individuals belonging to two different classes occurs in the contexts of reproduction and intea-specific cooperation as well as of inter-specific mutualism. There is potential for partner choice and for competition for access to preferred partners in all three contexts. These selective forces have long been recognised as important in sexual selection, but their impact is not yet appreciated in cooperative and mutualistic systems. The formation of partnerships between members of different classes has much in common with the conclusion of trade agreements in human markets with two classes of traders, like producers and consumers, or employers and employees. Similar game-theoretical models can be used to predict the behaviour of rational traders in human markets and the evolutionarily stable strategies used in biological markets. We present a formal model in which the influence of the market mechanism on selection is made explicit. We restrict ourselves to biological markets in which: (1) Individuals do not compete over access to partners in an agonistic manner, but rather by outcompeting each other in those aspects that are preferred by the choosing party. (2) The commodity the partner has to offer cannot be obtained by the use of force, but requires the consent of the partner. These two restrictions ensure a dominant role for partner choice in the formation of partnerships. In a biological market model the decision to cooperate is based on the comparison between the offers of several potential partners, rather than on the behaviour of a single potential partner, as is implicitly assumed in currently accepted models of cooperation. In our example the members of one class A offer a commodity of fixed value in exchange for a commodity of variable value supplied by the other class, B. We show that when the B-class outnumbers the A-class sufficiently and the cost for the A-class to sample the offers of the B-class are low, the choosiness of the A-class will lead to selection for the supply of high value commodities by the B-class (Fig. 3a). Under the same market conditions, but with a high sampling cost this may still be the evolutionariy stable outcome, but another pair of strategies proves to be stable too: relaxed choosiness of class A coupled with low value commodities supplied by class B (Fig. 3b). We give a number of examples of mating, cooperative and mutualistic markets that resemble the low sampling cost situation depicted in Fig. 3a.