Abstract: Mobbing signals advertise the location of a stalking predator to all prey in an area and recruit them into the inspection aggregation. Such behavior usually causes the predator to move to another area. However, mobbing calls could be eavesdropped by other predators. Because the predation cost of mobbing calls is poorly known, we investigated whether the vocalizations of the mobbing pied flycatcher, Ficedula hypoleuca, a small hole nesting passerine, increase the risk of nest predation. We used mobbing calls of pied flycatchers to examine if they could lure predators such as the marten, Martes martes. This predator usually hunts by night and may locate its mobbing prey while resting nearby during the day. Within each of 56 experimental plots, from the top of one nest-box we played back mobbing sounds of pied flycatchers, whereas blank tapes were played from the top of another nest-box. The trials with mobbing calls were carried out before sunset. We put pieces of recently abandoned nests of pied flycatchers and a quail, Coturnix coturnix, egg into each of the nest-boxes. Nest-boxes with playbacks of mobbing calls were depredated by martens significantly more than were nest-boxes with blank tapes. The results of the present study indicate that repeated conspicuous mobbing calls may carry a significant cost for birds during the breeding season.

Abstract: The formation of collaborating pairs by individuals belonging to two different classes occurs in the contexts of reproduction and intea-specific cooperation as well as of inter-specific mutualism. There is potential for partner choice and for competition for access to preferred partners in all three contexts. These selective forces have long been recognised as important in sexual selection, but their impact is not yet appreciated in cooperative and mutualistic systems. The formation of partnerships between members of different classes has much in common with the conclusion of trade agreements in human markets with two classes of traders, like producers and consumers, or employers and employees. Similar game-theoretical models can be used to predict the behaviour of rational traders in human markets and the evolutionarily stable strategies used in biological markets. We present a formal model in which the influence of the market mechanism on selection is made explicit. We restrict ourselves to biological markets in which: (1) Individuals do not compete over access to partners in an agonistic manner, but rather by outcompeting each other in those aspects that are preferred by the choosing party. (2) The commodity the partner has to offer cannot be obtained by the use of force, but requires the consent of the partner. These two restrictions ensure a dominant role for partner choice in the formation of partnerships. In a biological market model the decision to cooperate is based on the comparison between the offers of several potential partners, rather than on the behaviour of a single potential partner, as is implicitly assumed in currently accepted models of cooperation. In our example the members of one class A offer a commodity of fixed value in exchange for a commodity of variable value supplied by the other class, B. We show that when the B-class outnumbers the A-class sufficiently and the cost for the A-class to sample the offers of the B-class are low, the choosiness of the A-class will lead to selection for the supply of high value commodities by the B-class (Fig. 3a). Under the same market conditions, but with a high sampling cost this may still be the evolutionariy stable outcome, but another pair of strategies proves to be stable too: relaxed choosiness of class A coupled with low value commodities supplied by class B (Fig. 3b). We give a number of examples of mating, cooperative and mutualistic markets that resemble the low sampling cost situation depicted in Fig. 3a.