|
|
Jackson, R. R., Pollard, S. D., Li, D., & Fijn, N. (2002). Interpopulation variation in the risk-related decisions of Portia labiata, an araneophagic jumping spider (Araneae, Salticidae), during predatory sequences with spitting spiders. Anim. Cogn., 5(4), 215–223.
Abstract: The extent to which decision-making processes are constrained in animals with small brains is poorly understood. Arthropods have brains much smaller and simpler than those of birds and mammals. This raises questions concerning limitations on how intricate the decision-making processes might be in arthropods. At Los Banos in the Philippines, Scytodes pallidus is a spitting spider that specialises in preying on jumping spiders, and Portia labiata is a jumping spider that preys on S. pallidus. Scytodid spit comes from the mouth, and egg-carrying females are less dangerous than eggless scytodids because the female uses her chelicerae to hold her eggs. Held eggs block her mouth, and she has to release them before she can spit. The Los Banos P. labiata sometimes adjusts its tactics depending on whether the scytodid encountered is carrying eggs or not. When pursuing eggless scytodids, the Los Banos P. labiata usually takes detour routes that enable it to close in from behind (away from the scytodid's line of fire). However, when pursuing egg-carrying scytodids, the Los Banos P. labiata sometimes takes faster direct routes to reach these safer prey. The Los Banos P. labiata apparently makes risk-related adjustments specific to whether scytodids are carrying eggs, but P. labiata from Sagada in the Philippines (allopatric to Scytodes) fails to make comparable risk-related adjustments.
|
|
|
|
Janson, C., & Byrne, R. (2007). What wild primates know about resources: opening up the black box. Anim. Cogn., 10(3), 357–367.
Abstract: Abstract We present the theoretical and practical difficulties of inferring the cognitive processes involved in spatial movement decisions of primates and other animals based on studies of their foraging behavior in the wild. Because the possible cognitive processes involved in foraging are not known a priori for a given species, some observed spatial movements could be consistent with a large number of processes ranging from simple undirected search processes to strategic goal-oriented travel. Two basic approaches can help to reveal the cognitive processes: (1) experiments designed to test specific mechanisms; (2) comparison of observed movements with predicted ones based on models of hypothesized foraging modes (ideally, quantitative ones). We describe how these two approaches have been applied to evidence for spatial knowledge of resources in primates, and for various hypothesized goals of spatial decisions in primates, reviewing what is now established. We conclude with a synthesis emphasizing what kinds of spatial movement data on unmanipulated primate populations in the wild are most useful in deciphering goal-oriented processes from random processes. Basic to all of these is an estimate of the animals ability to detect resources during search. Given knowledge of the animals detection ability, there are several observable patterns of resource use incompatible with a pure search process. These patterns include increasing movement speed when approaching versus leaving a resource, increasingly directed movement toward more valuable resources, and directed travel to distant resources from many starting locations. Thus, it should be possible to assess and compare spatial cognition across a variety of primate species and thus trace its ecological and evolutionary correlates.
|
|
|
|
Janson, C. H. (2007). Experimental evidence for route integration and strategic planning in wild capuchin monkeys. Anim. Cogn., 10(3), 341–356.
Abstract: Abstract Both in captivity and the wild, primates are found to travel mostly to the nearest available resource, but they may skip over the closest resource and travel to more distant resources, which are often found to be more productive. This study examines the tradeoff between distance and reward in the foraging choices of one group of wild capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella nigritus) using feeding platforms in large-scale foraging experiments conducted over four years. Three feeding sites were arrayed in an oblique triangle, such that once the monkey group had chosen one site to feed, they had a choice between two remaining sites, a close one with less food and the other up to 2.3 times as far away but with more food. Sites were provisioned once per day. The capuchins generally chose the closer feeding site, even when the more distant site offered up to 12 times as much food. The distances to, rewards of, or various profitability measures applied to each alternative site individually did not explain the groups choices in ways consistent with foraging theory or principles of operant psychology. The groups site choices were predicted only by comparing efficiency measures of entire foraging pathways: (1) direct travel to the more rewarding distant site, versus (2) the longer “detour” through the closer site on the way to the more distant one. The group chose the detour more often when the reward was larger and the added detour distance shorter. They appeared to be more sensitive to the absolute increase in detour distance than to the relative increase compared to the straight route. The qualitative and quantitative results agree with a simple rule: do not use the detour unless the energy gain from extra food outweighs the energy cost of extra travel. These results suggest that members of this group integrate information on spatial location, reward, and perhaps potential food competition in their choice of multi-site foraging routes, with important implications for social foraging.
|
|
|
|
Johnson, C. M. (2001). Distributed primate cognition: a review. Anim. Cogn., 3(4), 167–183.
Abstract: A model of “distributed cognition” is contrasted with the “mental representation” model exemplified by Tomasello and Call's Primate Cognition. Rather than using behavior as a basis for inferences to invisible mental events such as intentions, the distributed approach treats communicative interactions as, themselves, directly observable cognitive events. Similar to a Vygotskian approach, this model characterizes cognition as “co-constructed” by the participants. This approach is thus particularly suitable for studying primates (including humans), whose reliance on multiparty negotiations can undermine the researcher's ability to extrapolate from observable outcomes back to individual intentions. Detailed (e.g., frame-by-frame) analyses of such interactions reveal cross-species differences in the relevant media of information flow (e.g., behavioral coordination, relative gaze) as well as in the flexibility and complexity of the trajectories observed. Plus, with its focus on dynamics, the distributed approach is especially useful for modeling developmental and evolutionary processes. In discussing enculturation and the ontogeny of imitation, its emphasis is on changes in how expert and novice participate in such events, rather than how either may represent them. Primate cognitive evolution is seen as involving changes in context sensitivity, multi-tasking, and the coordination of social attention. Humans in particular – in, especially, the context of teaching – are seen as having specialized in linking co-perception with the refined sensory-motor coordination that enables them to translate observed behavior into strategically similar action. Highlighting the continuity between human and nonhuman development, this promising, complementary model enables us to tap the richness of micro-ethology as a cognitive science.
|
|
|
|
Johnson-Pynn, J., & Fragaszy, D. M. (2001). Do apes and monkeys rely upon conceptual reversibility? Anim. Cogn., 4(3), 315–324.
Abstract: The ability to seriate nesting cups as a sensorimotor task has posed interesting questions for cognitive scientists. Greenfield et al. [(1972) Cognit Psychol 3:291–310] found parallels between children's combinatorial activity with nesting cups and patterns of phonological and grammatical constructions. The parallels suggested the possibility of a neurally based developmental homology between language and instrumental action [Greenfield (1991) Behav Brain Sci 14:531–595]. Children who predominantly used subassembly, a hierarchical method of combining cups, succeeded at seriating nesting cups more often than those who did not. Greenfield and others [e.g., Piaget and Inhelder (1969) The psychology of the child. Basic Books, New York; DeLoache et al. (1985) Child Dev 56:928–939] argued that success in seriation reflects the child's growing recognition of a reversible relationship: a particular element in a series is conceived of as being smaller than the previous element and larger than the subsequent element. But is a concept of reversibility or a hierarchical form of object manipulation necessary to seriate cups? In this article, we review studies with very young children and nonhuman primates to determine how individuals that do not evidence conceptual reversibility manage the seriation task. We argue that the development of skill in seriation is experientially, rather than conceptually, driven and that it may be unnecessary to link seriation with cognitive conceptions of reversibility or linguistic capacities. Rather, in ordering a set of objects by size, perceptual-motor learning may enable contemplative refinement.
|
|
|
|
Jordan, K. E., & Brannon, E. M. (2006). Weber's Law influences numerical representations in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Anim. Cogn., 9(3), 159–172.
Abstract: We present the results of two experiments that probe the ability of rhesus macaques to match visual arrays based on number. Three monkeys were first trained on a delayed match-to-sample paradigm (DMTS) to match stimuli on the basis of number and ignore continuous dimensions such as element size, cumulative surface area, and density. Monkeys were then tested in a numerical bisection experiment that required them to indicate whether a sample numerosity was closer to a small or large anchor value. Results indicated that, for two sets of anchor values with the same ratio, the probability of choosing the larger anchor value systematically increased with the sample number and the psychometric functions superimposed. A second experiment employed a numerical DMTS task in which the choice values contained an exact numerical match to the sample and a distracter that varied in number. Both accuracy and reaction time were modulated by the ratio between the correct numerical match and the distracter, as predicted by Weber's Law.
|
|
|
|
Kamil, A. C. (1998). On the Proper Definition of Cognitive Ethology. In Russell P. Balda, Irene M. Pepperberg, & Alan C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal Cognition in Nature (pp. 1–28). London: Academic Press.
Abstract: Summary The last 20-30 years have seen two `scientific revolutions' in the study of animal behavior: the cognitive revolution that originated in psychology, and the Darwinian, behavioral ecology revolution that originated in biology. Among psychologists, the cognitive revolution has had enormous impact. Similarly, among biologists, the Darwinian revolution has had enormous impact. The major theme of this chapter is that these two scientific research programs need to be combined into a single approach, simultaneously cognitive and Darwinian, and that this single approach is most appropriately called cognitive ethology.
|
|
|
|
Kaminski, G., Gentaz, E., & Mazens, K. (2012). Development of children’s ability to detect kinship through facial resemblance. Anim. Cogn., 15(3), 421–427.
Abstract: Facial features appear to be a prominent kinship cue for ascribing relatedness among human individuals. Although there is evidence that adults can detect kinship in unrelated and unfamiliar individual’s faces, it remains to be seen whether people already possess the ability when they are young. To further understand the development of this skill, we explored children’s ability to detect parent-offspring resemblance in unrelated and unfamiliar faces. To this end, we tested approximately 140 children, aged 5–11, in two photo-matching tasks. We used a procedure that asked them to match one neonate’s face to one of three adults’ faces (Task 1), or to match one adult’s face to one of three neonate’s faces (Task 2). Our findings reveal asymmetrical performance, depending on the tasks assigned (performance of Task 2 is stronger than for Task 1), and on the sex of individuals who made up the parent-offspring pair (male parents are better matched with neonates than female parents, and boys are better matched than girls). The picture that emerges from our study is, on one hand, that the ability to detect kinship is already present at the age of five but continues to improve as one gets older, and on the other, that perception of parent-offspring facial resemblance varies according to the appraisers’ characteristics.
|
|
|
|
Kaminski, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Body orientation and face orientation: two factors controlling apes' behavior from humans. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 216–223.
Abstract: A number of animal species have evolved the cognitive ability to detect when they are being watched by other individuals. Precisely what kind of information they use to make this determination is unknown. There is particular controversy in the case of the great apes because different studies report conflicting results. In experiment 1, we presented chimpanzees, orangutans, and bonobos with a situation in which they had to request food from a human observer who was in one of various attentional states. She either stared at the ape, faced the ape with her eyes closed, sat with her back towards the ape, or left the room. In experiment 2, we systematically crossed the observer's body and face orientation so that the observer could have her body and/or face oriented either towards or away from the subject. Results indicated that apes produced more behaviors when they were being watched. They did this not only on the basis of whether they could see the experimenter as a whole, but they were sensitive to her body and face orientation separately. These results suggest that body and face orientation encode two different types of information. Whereas face orientation encodes the observer's perceptual access, body orientation encodes the observer's disposition to transfer food. In contrast to the results on body and face orientation, only two of the tested subjects responded to the state of the observer's eyes.
|
|
|
|
Katz, M., & Lachlan, R. F. (2003). Social learning of food types in zebra finches (Taenopygia guttata) is directed by demonstrator sex and feeding activity. Anim. Cogn., 6(1), 11–16.
Abstract: In this study we examined how social learning of feeding preferences by zebra finches was affected by the identity of different demonstrators. We presented adult zebra finches with two demonstrators, one male and one female, that exhibited different food choices, and we recorded their subsequent preference when given a choice between the two food types. Previously it was found that young zebra finches' patterns of social learning are affected by the sex of the individual demonstrating a feeding behaviour. This result could be explained by the lack of exposure these animals had to the opposite sex, or by their mating status. Therefore, we investigated the social learning preferences of adult mated zebra finches. We found the same pattern of directed social learning of a different type of feeding behaviour (food colour): female zebra finches preferred the colour of food eaten by male demonstrators, whereas male zebra finches showed little evidence of any preference for the colour of food eaten by female demonstrators. Furthermore, we found that female observers' preferences were biased by demonstrators' relative feeding activity: the female demonstrator was only ever preferred if it ate less than its male counterpart.
|
|
