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Fiset, S., & Leblanc, V. (2007). Invisible displacement understanding in domestic dogs (Canis familiaris): the role of visual cues in search behavior. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 211–224.
Abstract: Recently, (Collier-Baker E, Davis JM, Suddendorf T (2004) J Comp Psychol 118:421-433) suggested that domestic dogs do not understand invisible displacements. In the present study, we further investigated the hypothesis that the search behavior of domestic dogs in invisible displacements is guided by various visual cues inherent to the task rather than by mental representation of an object's past trajectory. Specifically, we examined the role of the experimenter as a function of the final position of the displacement device in the search behavior of domestic dogs. Visible and invisible displacement problems were administered to dogs (N = 11) under two conditions. In the Visible-experimenter condition, the experimenter was visible whereas in the Concealed-experimenter condition, the experimenter was visibly occluded behind a large rigid barrier. Our data supported the conclusion that dogs do not understand invisible displacements but primarily search as a function of the final position of the displacement device and, to a lesser extent, the position of the experimenter.
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Forkman, B. (2000). Domestic hens have declarative representations. Anim. Cogn., 3(3), 135–137.
Abstract: It is generally considered that information can be stored either as a procedural or as a declarative representation. A devaluation technique was used to determine whether hens have declarative representations. Individual hens (Gallus gallus domesticus) were fed in an enclosure with two containers, each with a new food type. One of the food types was devalued by pre-feeding with that food, after which the hens were tested with empty food containers. The pre-feeding should only affect the choice of the hens if they have learned where a particular food type was (declarative representation) rather than “go left when coming into the enclosure” (procedural representation). A significant proportion of the hens went to the location previously occupied by the non-devalued food (seven out of eight). This supports the hypothesis that domestic hens can form declarative representations.
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Fortes, A. F., Merchant, H., & Georgopoulos, A. P. (2004). Comparative and categorical spatial judgments in the monkey: “high” and “low”. Anim. Cogn., 7(2), 101–108.
Abstract: Adult human subjects can classify the height of an object as belonging to either of the “high” or “low” categories by utilizing an abstract concept of midline that divides the vertical dimension into two halves. Children lack this abstract concept of midline, do not have a sense that these categories are directional opposites, and their categorical and comparative usages of high(er) or low(er) are restricted to the corresponding poles. We investigated the abilities of a rhesus monkey to perform categorical judgments in space. We were also interested in the presence of the congruity effect (a decrease in response time when the objects compared are closer to the category pole) in the monkey. The presence of this phenomenon in the monkey would allow us to relate the behavior of the animal to the two major competing hypotheses that have been suggested to explain the congruity effect in humans: the analog and semantic models. The monkey was trained in delayed match-to-sample tasks in which it had to categorize objects as belonging to either a high or low category. The monkey was able to generate an abstract notion of midline in a fashion similar to that of adult human subjects. The congruity effect was also present in the monkey. These findings, taken together with the notion that monkeys are not considered to think in propositional terms, may favor an analog comparison model in the monkey.
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Fountain, S. B., Rowan, J. D., & Benson, D. M. J. (1999). Rule learning in rats: serial tracking in interleaved patterns. Anim. Cogn., 2(1), 41–54.
Abstract: Humans have the ability to chunk together information from nonadjacent serial positions in sequential patterns. For example, human subjects can extrapolate the pattern, A-M-B-N-C-O-D-P-E-..., to find the missing element, Q, by sorting pattern elements into two component interleaved subpatterns: A-B-C-D-E and M-N-O-P-... Two experiments investigated the ability of rats to reorganize pattern elements from nonadjacent serial positions into chunks not presented by the experimenter. Rats learned either a structured or unstructured sequence interleaved with elements of a repeating sequence (experiment 1) or an alternation sequence (experiment 2). In both experiments, rats learned the interleaved subpatterns at different rates. Acquisition rate was correlated with the structural properties of component subpatterns and the nature of the rules required to describe the interleaved subpatterns. The results indicate that rats are sensitive to the organization of nonadjacent elements in serial patterns and that they can detect and sort structural relationships in interleaved patterns.
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Fragaszy, D., Johnson-Pynn, J., Hirsh, E., & Brakke, K. (2003). Strategic navigation of two-dimensional alley mazes: comparing capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees. Anim. Cogn., 6(3), 149–160.
Abstract: Planning is an important component of cognition that contributes, for example, to efficient movement through space. In the current study we presented novel two-dimensional alley mazes to four chimpanzees and three capuchin monkeys to identify the nature and efficiency of planning in relation to varying task parameters. All the subjects solved more mazes without error than expected by chance, providing compelling evidence that both species planned their choices in some manner. The probability of making a correct choice on mazes designed to be more demanding and presented later in the testing series was higher than on earlier, simpler mazes (chimpanzees), or unchanged (capuchin monkeys), suggesting microdevelopment of strategic choice. Structural properties of the mazes affected both species' choices. Capuchin monkeys were less likely than chimpanzees to take a correct path that initially led away from the goal but that eventually led to the goal. Chimpanzees were more likely to make an error by passing a correct path than by turning onto a wrong path. Chimpanzees and one capuchin made more errors on choices farther in sequence from the goal. Each species corrected errors before running into the end of an alley in approximately 40% of cases. Together, these findings suggest nascent planning abilities in each species, and the prospect for significant development of strategic planning capabilities on tasks presenting multiple simultaneous or sequential spatial relations. The computerized maze paradigm appears well suited to investigate movement planning and spatial perception in human and nonhuman primates alike.
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Fremouw, T., Herbranson, W. T., & Shimp, C. P. (2002). Dynamic shifts of pigeon local/global attention. Anim. Cogn., 5(4), 233–243.
Abstract: It has previously been shown that pigeons can shift attention between parts and wholes of complex stimuli composed of larger, “global” characters constructed from smaller, “local” characters. The base-rate procedure used biased target level within any condition at either the local or global level; targets were more likely at one level than at the other. Biasing of target level in this manner demonstrated shifts of local/global attention over a time span consisting of several days with a fixed base rate. Experiment 1 examined the possibility that pigeons can shift attention between local and global levels of perceptual analysis in seconds rather than days. The experiment used priming cues the color of which predicted on a trial-by-trial basis targets at different perceptual levels. The results confirmed that pigeons, like humans, can display highly dynamic stimulus-driven shifts of local/global attention. Experiment 2 changed spatial relations between features of priming cues and features of targets within a task otherwise similar to that used in experiment 1. It was predicted that this change in cues might affect asymmetry but not the occurrence of a priming effect. A priming effect was again obtained, thereby providing generality to the claim that pigeons can learn that trial-by-trial primes predict targets at different levels of perceptual analysis. Pigeons can display perceptual, stimulus-driven priming of a highly dynamic nature.
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Fripp, D., Owen, C., Quintana-Rizzo, E., Shapiro, A., Buckstaff, K., Jankowski, K., et al. (2005). Bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus) calves appear to model their signature whistles on the signature whistles of community members. Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 17–26.
Abstract: Bottlenose dolphins are unusual among non-human mammals in their ability to learn new sounds. This study investigates the importance of vocal learning in the development of dolphin signature whistles and the influence of social interactions on that process. We used focal animal behavioral follows to observe six calves in Sarasota Bay, Fla., recording their social associations during their first summer, and their signature whistles during their second. The signature whistles of five calves were determined. Using dynamic time warping (DTW) of frequency contours, the calves' signature whistles were compared to the signature whistles of several sets of dolphins: their own associates, the other calves' associates, Tampa Bay dolphins, and captive dolphins. Whistles were considered similar if their DTW similarity score was greater than those of 95% of the whistle comparisons. Association was defined primarily in terms of time within 50 m of the mother/calf pair. On average, there were six dolphins with signature whistles similar to the signature whistles of each of the calves. These were significantly more likely to be Sarasota Bay resident dolphins than non-Sarasota dolphins, and (though not significantly) more likely to be dolphins that were within 50 m of the mother and calf less than 5% of the time. These results suggest that calves may model their signature whistles on the signature whistles of members of their community, possibly community members with whom they associate only rarely.
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Fujita, K., Kuroshima, H., & Masuda, T. (2002). Do tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) spontaneously deceive opponents? A preliminary analysis of an experimental food-competition contest between monkeys. Anim. Cogn., 5(1), 19–25.
Abstract: A new laboratory procedure which allows the study of deceptive behavior in nonhuman primates is described. Pairs of tufted capuchin monkeys faced each other in a food-competition contest. Two feeder boxes were placed between the monkeys. A piece of food was placed in one of the boxes. The subordinate individual was able to see the food and to open the box to obtain the bait. A dominant male was unable to see the food or to open the box but was able to take the food once the box was opened by the subordinate. In experiment 1, two of four subordinate monkeys spontaneously started to open the unbaited box first with increasing frequency. Experiment 2 confirmed that this “deceptive” act was not due to a drop in the rate of reinforcement caused by the usurping dominant male, under the situation in which food sometimes automatically dropped from the opened box. In experiment 3, two subordinate monkeys were rerun in the same situation as experiment 1. One of them showed some recovery of the “deceptive” act but the other did not; instead the latter tended to position himself on the side where there was no food before he started to open the box. Although the results do not clearly indicate spontaneous deception, we suggest that operationally defined spontaneous deceptive behaviors in monkeys can be analyzed with experimental procedures such as those used here.
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Funk, M. S. (2002). Problem solving skills in young yellow-crowned parakeets (Cyanoramphus auriceps). Anim. Cogn., 5(3), 167–176.
Abstract: Despite the long divergent evolutionary history of birds and mammals, early avian and primate cognitive development have many convergent features. Some of these features were investigated with a series of tasks designed to assess human infant development. The tasks were presented to young parakeets to assess their means-end problem solving abilities. Examples of these early skills are: attaining and playing with objects, retrieving rewards through use of a stick or rake, or by pulling in rewards on supports or on the ends of strings. Twelve such tasks were presented to 11 young yellow-crowned parakeets ( Cyanoramphus auriceps) to investigate their natural abilities; there was no attempt to train them to do those tasks that they did not spontaneously perform. Six of the birds were parent-raised and five were hand-raised. The birds completed 9 of the 12 tasks, demonstrating all the Piagetian sensorimotor circular reactions, but they failed to hand-watch (“claw-watch”), to stack objects, or to fill a container. Their ordinality on the tasks differed from that of human infants in that locomotion to obtain objects occurred earlier in the avian sequence of development and the mid-level tasks were performed by the two groups of avian subjects in a mixed order perhaps indicating that these abilities may not emerge in any particular order for these birds as they supposedly do for human infants. The hand-raised group needed fewer sessions to complete these means-end tasks.
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Fureix, C., Jego, P., Sankey, C., & Hausberger, M. (2009). How horses (Equus caballus) see the world: humans as significant “objects”. Anim. Cogn., 12(4), 643–654.
Abstract: Abstract  This study aimed to determine whether horses have a kind of memory of humans (based on previous interactions), leading to a general significance of humans revealed by their reactions to humans in subsequent interactions. Subjects were 59 adult horses used to interact daily with humans. Three types of behavioural tests involving an unknown experimenter evaluated three possibly different memorized types of human–animal interactions (not work-related, using work-related objects, unfamiliar working task). We also performed standardized observations of routine interactions between each horse and its familiar handler (caretaker). To get a broad overview of the horses’ reactions to humans, we recorded both investigative and aggressive behaviours during the tests, representing respectively a “positive” and a “negative” memory of the relationship. Whereas correlations between tests revealed a general perception of humans as either positive or negative, unusual tests, i.e. that are not usually performed, elicited more positive reactions. Moreover, some horses reacted positively to a motionless person in their box, but negatively when this same person approached them, for example for halter fitting. Overall, aggressive reactions were more reliable indicators of the relationship than positive reactions, both between tests and between familiar and unfamiliar humans. Our results also show generalization of the perception of humans. These results support our hypothesis that perception of humans by horses may be based on experience, i.e. repeated interactions. Altogether, our results support the hypothesis that horses can form a memory of humans that impacts their reactions in subsequent interactions.
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