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Ruiz, A., Gómez, J., Roeder, J., & Byrne, R. (2009). Gaze following and gaze priming in lemurs. Anim. Cogn., 12(3), 427–434.
Abstract: Abstract  Although primates have often been found to co-orient visually with other individuals, members of these same species have usually failed to use co-orientation to find hidden food in object-choice experiments. This presents an evolutionary puzzle: what is the function of co-orientation if it is not used for a function as basic as locating resources? Co-orientation responses have not been systematically investigated in object-choice experiments, and requiring co-orientation with humans (as is typical in object-choice tasks) may underestimate other species’ abilities. Using an object-choice task with conspecific models depicted in photographs, we provide experimental evidence that two lemur species (Eulemur fulvus, n = 4, and Eulemur macaco, n = 2) co-orient with conspecifics. Secondly, by analysing together two measures that have traditionally been examined separately, we show that lemurs’ gaze following behaviour and ultimate choice are closely linked. Individuals were more likely to choose correctly after having looked in the same direction as the model, and thus chose objects correctly more often than chance. We propose a candidate system for the evolutionary origins of more complex gaze following: ‘gaze priming.’
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Dacke, M., & Srinivasan, M. (2008). Evidence for counting in insects. Anim. Cogn., 11(4), 683–689.
Abstract: Abstract  Here we investigate the counting ability in honeybees by training them to receive a food reward after they have passed a specific number of landmarks. The distance to the food reward is varied frequently and randomly, whilst keeping the number of intervening landmarks constant. Thus, the bees cannot identify the food reward in terms of its distance from the hive. We find that bees can count up to four objects, when they are encountered sequentially during flight. Furthermore, bees trained in this way are able count novel objects, which they have never previously encountered, thus demonstrating that they are capable of object-independent counting. A further experiment reveals that the counting ability that the bees display in our experiments is primarily sequential in nature. It appears that bees can navigate to food sources by maintaining a running count of prominent landmarks that are passed en route, provided this number does not exceed four.
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Subiaul, F., Vonk, J., Okamoto-Barth, S., & Barth, J. (2008). Do chimpanzees learn reputation by observation? Evidence from direct and indirect experience with generous and selfish strangers. Anim. Cogn., 11(4), 611–623.
Abstract: Abstract  Can chimpanzees learn the reputation of strangers indirectly by observation? Or are such stable behavioral attributions made exclusively by first-person interactions? To address this question, we let seven chimpanzees observe unfamiliar humans either consistently give (generous donor) or refuse to give (selfish donor) food to a familiar human recipient (Experiments 1 and 2) and a conspecific (Experiment 3). While chimpanzees did not initially prefer to beg for food from the generous donor (Experiment 1), after continued opportunities to observe the same behavioral exchanges, four chimpanzees developed a preference for gesturing to the generous donor (Experiment 2), and transferred this preference to novel unfamiliar donor pairs, significantly preferring to beg from the novel generous donors on the first opportunity to do so. In Experiment 3, four chimpanzees observed novel selfish and generous acts directed toward other chimpanzees by human experimenters. During the first half of testing, three chimpanzees exhibited a preference for the novel generous donor on the first trial. These results demonstrate that chimpanzees can infer the reputation of strangers by eavesdropping on third-party interactions.
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Prato-Previde, E., Marshall-Pescini, S., & Valsecchi, P. (2008). Is your choice my choice` The owners effect on pet dogs? ( Canis lupus familiaris ) performance in a food choice task. Anim. Cogn., 11(1), 167–174.
Abstract: Abstract This study investigates the influence of owners on their dogs performance in a food choice task using either different or equal quantities of food. Fifty-four pet dogs were tested in three different conditions. In Condition 1 we evaluated their ability to choose between a large and small amount of food (quantity discrimination task). In Condition 2 dogs were again presented with a choice between the large and small food quantity, but only after having witnessed their owner favouring the small quantity. In Condition 3 dogs were given a choice between two equally small quantities of food having witnessed their owner favouring either one or the other. A strong effect of the owner on the dogs`` performance was observed. In Condition 1 dogs as a group chose significantly more often the large food quantity, thus showing their ability to solve the quantity discrimination task. After observing their owner expressing a preference for the small food quantity they chose the large quantity of food significantly less than in the independent choice situation. The tendency to conform to the owner`s choice was higher when the dogs had to choose between equally small quantities of food (Condition 3) rather than between a large and a small one (Condition 2). These results provide evidence that dogs can be influenced by their owners even when their indications are clearly in contrast with direct perceptual information, thus leading dogs to ultimately make counterproductive choices.
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Ferkin, M., Combs, A., delBarco-Trillo, J., Pierce, A., & Franklin, S. (2008). Meadow voles, Microtus pennsylvanicus , have the capacity to recall the “what”, “where”, and “when” of a single past event. Anim. Cogn., 11(1), 147–159.
Abstract: Abstract Some non-human animals may possess the ability to recall the “what”, “where”, and “when” of a single past event. We tested the hypothesis that male meadow voles posses the capacity to recall the “what”, “where”, and “when” of a single past event associated with mate selection in two experiments. Briefly, male voles were allowed to explore an apparatus that contained two chambers. One chamber contained a day-20 pregnant female (24 h prepartum). The other chamber contained a sexually mature female that was neither pregnant nor lactating (REF female). Twenty-four hour after the exposure, the males were placed in the same apparatus, which was empty and clean. At this time, the pregnant female would have entered postpartum estrus (PPE), a period of heightened sexual receptivity. Males initially chose and spent significantly more time investigating the chamber that originally housed the pregnant female (now a PPE female) than the chamber that originally housed the REF female. Male voles also explored an apparatus containing a chamber with a PPE female and one chamber containing a REF female. Twenty-four hour later, males were placed into an empty and clean apparatus. The males did not display an initial choice and they spent similar amounts of time investigating the chamber that originally housed the PPE female (now a lactating female) and the chamber that originally housed the REF female. The results of these and additional experiments suggest that male voles may have the capacity to recall the “what”, “where”, and “when” of a single past event, which may allow males to remember the location of females who would currently be in heightened states of sexual receptivity.
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Sovrano, V., & Bisazza, A. (2008). Recognition of partly occluded objects by fish. Anim. Cogn., 11(1), 1435–9448.
Abstract: Abstract The ability to visually complete partly occluded objects (so-called `“amodal completion”) has been documented in mammals and birds. Here, we report the first evidence of such a perceptual ability in a fish species. Fish (Xenotoca eiseni) were trained to discriminate between a complete and an amputated disk. Thereafter, the fish performed test trials in which hexagonal polygons were either exactly juxtaposed or only placed close to the missing sectors of the disk in order to produce or not produce the impression (to a human observer) of an occlusion of the missing sectors of the disk by the polygon. In another experiment, fish were first trained to discriminate between hexagonal polygons that were either exactly juxtaposed or only placed close to the missing sectors of a disk, and then tested for choice between a complete and an amputated disk. In both experiments, fish behaved as if they were experiencing visual completion of the partly occluded stimuli. These findings suggest that the ability to visually complete partly occluded objects may be widespread among vertebrates, possibly inherited in mammals, birds and fish from early vertebrate ancestors.
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Bräuer, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Chimpanzees do not take into account what others can hear in a competitive situation. Anim. Cogn., 11(1), 1435–9448.
Abstract: Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) know what others can and cannot see in a competitive situation. Does this reflect a general understanding the perceptions of others` In a study by Hare et al. (2000) pairs of chimpanzees competed over two pieces of food. Subordinate individuals preferred to approach food that was behind a barrier that the dominant could not see, suggesting that chimpanzees can take the visual perspective of others. We extended this paradigm to the auditory modality to investigate whether chimpanzees are sensitive to whether a competitor can hear food rewards being hidden. Results suggested that the chimpanzees did not take what the competitor had heard into account, despite being able to locate the hiding place themselves by the noise.
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Janson, C., & Byrne, R. (2007). What wild primates know about resources: opening up the black box. Anim. Cogn., 10(3), 357–367.
Abstract: Abstract We present the theoretical and practical difficulties of inferring the cognitive processes involved in spatial movement decisions of primates and other animals based on studies of their foraging behavior in the wild. Because the possible cognitive processes involved in foraging are not known a priori for a given species, some observed spatial movements could be consistent with a large number of processes ranging from simple undirected search processes to strategic goal-oriented travel. Two basic approaches can help to reveal the cognitive processes: (1) experiments designed to test specific mechanisms; (2) comparison of observed movements with predicted ones based on models of hypothesized foraging modes (ideally, quantitative ones). We describe how these two approaches have been applied to evidence for spatial knowledge of resources in primates, and for various hypothesized goals of spatial decisions in primates, reviewing what is now established. We conclude with a synthesis emphasizing what kinds of spatial movement data on unmanipulated primate populations in the wild are most useful in deciphering goal-oriented processes from random processes. Basic to all of these is an estimate of the animals ability to detect resources during search. Given knowledge of the animals detection ability, there are several observable patterns of resource use incompatible with a pure search process. These patterns include increasing movement speed when approaching versus leaving a resource, increasingly directed movement toward more valuable resources, and directed travel to distant resources from many starting locations. Thus, it should be possible to assess and compare spatial cognition across a variety of primate species and thus trace its ecological and evolutionary correlates.
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Voelkl, B., & Huber, L. (2007). Common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) do not utilize social information in three simultaneous social foraging tasks. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 149–158.
Abstract: Abstract Social foraging is suggested to increase foraging efficiency, as individuals might benefit from public information acquired by monitoring the foraging activities of other group members. We conducted a series experiments with captive common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus) to investigate to what extent marmosets utilize social information about food location when foraging simultaneously with conspecifics. Subjects were confronted with dominant and subordinate demonstrators in three experiments which differed in the amount of information about food location available to the demonstrators. In all three experiments, the focal subjects` performance in the social condition was not enhanced in comparison to a non-social control condition. Because we could rule out kleptoparasitism and aggressive displacements as explanations, we argue that the subjects tendency for scramble competition by avoiding others and dispersing over the foraging area seems to inhibit or mask the acquisition of social information about the location of rewarded patches.
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Hattori, Y., Kuroshima, H., & Fujita, K. (2007). I know you are not looking at me: capuchin monkeys` ? (Cebus apella) sensitivity to human attentional states. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 141–148.
Abstract: Abstract The present study asked whether capuchin monkeys recognize human attentional states. The monkeys requested food from the experimenter by extending an arm (pointing) toward the baited one of two transparent cups. On regular trials the experimenter gave the food immediately to the monkeys upon pointing but on randomly inserted test trials she ignored the pointing for 5 s during which she displayed different attentional states. The monkeys looked at the experimenter's face longer when she looked at the monkeys than when she looked at the ceiling in Experiment 1, and longer when she oriented her head midway between the two cups with eyes open than when she did so with eyes closed in Experiment 2. However, the monkeys showed no differential pointing in these conditions. These results suggest that capuchins are sensitive to eye direction but this sensitivity does not lead to differential pointing trained in laboratory experiments. Furthermore, to our knowledge, this is the first firm behavioral evidence that non-human primates attend to the subtle states of eyes in a food requesting task.
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