Abstract: It was formerly argued that alternative evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) are possible for animal contests characterized by some asymmetry that can be perceived with perfect accuracy. Where roles A and B refer to the asymmetry between opponents, ESSs are: [`]fight when A, retreat when B', and vice versa. Either can be an ESS, but only if the [`]reserve strategy' (=what an animal does when it fights) is sufficiently damaging. We examine the [`]war of attrition' (winner = opponent that persists longer). In a population at either ESS, reserve strategy is never normally shown; it is therefore subject to drift unless the selective action of rare individuals which break the convention is considered. These could arise either by mutation or by mistakes in role assessment. When mutations and mistakes simply specify that occasionally an animal fights when it [`]should' retreat, selection adjusts reserve strategy to a level where only one ESS (the [`]commonsense' ESS) is possible, if the asymmetry is relevant to payoff. Thus for asymmetries in fighting ability or resource value, the individual with the lower score will retreat. However, we are particularly concerned with cases where both payoff-relevant aspects (fighting ability and resource value) are asymmetric. If opponents sustain contest costs at rates KA and KB, and their resource values are VA and VB, an [`]optimal assessor' strategy defined by the interaction between the two asymmetries, is a unique ESS. It obeys the rule [`]fight on estimating role A, where VA/KA>VB/KB; retreat in B'. If mistakes can occur in both roles, but are very rate, the ESS is not fundamentally altered though there will be infinitesimal tendencies for persisting in role B. Selection to improve assessment abilities intensifies as abilities improve, but is weak if roles A and B are rather similar. Over a range of similarity between roles, an [`]owner wins' convention may be adopted if ownership correlates positively with role A and an individual cannot tell when it would otherwise pay him to break the convention. We also examine a contest in which information about roles can be acquired only during a contest itself, and at a cost. Much depends on the rate at which information is acquired relative to the rate at which costs are expended, and on whether contests normally escalate in intensity, remain at the same level, or de-escalate. Selection favours short contests when costs are high relative to resource value, where the outcome of a round contains much information about fighting ability, and where the actual disparity in fighting ability is large.

Abstract: Many forms of interaction within and between species appear to be based on `scrounger' individuals or species exploiting a limited resource provided `producers'. A mathematical model is presented which shows whether or not scroungers are maintained in a group, depending on their frequency and the group size. Some of the predictions of the model were tested in captive flocks of house sparrows Passer domesticus L. Here the scroungers obtained most of their food (mealworms) by interaction and the producers found most of their food by actively foraging: the pay-off to each type was measured as mealworm capture rate. Neither type changed strategy opportunistically in response to instantaneous flock composition but, not surprisingly, scroungers fared better when one of more producers were present. However, scrougers did much worse than expected when greatly outnumbered by producers, perhaps because producers then found the available food very quickly.

Abstract: Learning and imitation were examined in animals selected from two groups of sixteen pigtail monkeys. There were significant differences in performance on a cued-alternation task as a function of both social status within the stable group, and prior exposure to a social model. High status animals responded more frequently, but were less successful in acquiring appropriate response delay. Exposure to the model improved response latencies and acquisition of response delay for all subjects. However, model exposure did not improve alternation performance. Results are discussed in terms of prior social experience of the subjects, general learning strategies, and differential sensitivity to multiple reinforcement contingencies. Findings are related to ethological concepts of imitation, and field reports on primate social learning.

Abstract: Studies on social animals often seek to identify dominance hierarchies, in which individuals are ranked according to competitive abilities based on counts of wins and losses in pairwise encounters. I illustrate Bayesian approaches, based on the method of paired comparisons, for determining ranks and for estimating relationships between dominance ability and other attributes. Bayesian inference combines prior probability distributions for each unknown parameter with likelihood functions to produce the joint posterior probability distribution for the quantities of interest. In contrast to nonparametric techniques for inferring ranks, Bayesian models yield measures of certainty for each inference and allow rigorous estimates of correlations between ranks and covariates even when there is considerable uncertainty as to the ranks themselves. A possible objection to the Bayesian approach is that it appears to entail more restrictive assumptions than do simpler methods. However, simulations show that Bayesian inferences are more robust to deviations from these assumptions than are the results of nonparametric methods.

Abstract: In vertebrates, the mating preferences of individual females can be flexible and the probability of a female mating with a particular male can be significantly increased by her having previously observed another conspecific female affiliate and mate with that same male. In theory, such mate-choice-copying behaviour has potentially important consequences for both the genetic and social (`cultural') transmission of female mating preferences. For copying to result in the `cultural inheritance' of mating preferences, individual females must not only copy the mate choice decisions of other females but they also should tend to repeat this type of behaviour (i.e. make similar mating decisions) subsequently and to generalize their socially induced preference for a particular male to other males that share his distinctive characteristics. Here, we show experimentally that individual female guppies, Poecilia reticulata, not only copy the observed mating preferences of other females for particular males, but that the preference now assumed via copying is subsequently repeated and generalized to other males of a similar colour phenotype. These results provide empirical evidence for social enhancement of female preference for particular phenotypic traits of chosen males rather than for the particular males possessing those traits, and thus have important implications for our understanding of the role of social learning in the evolution of female mating preferences and of male epigamic traits.