Griffin, A. S. (2008). Social learning in Indian mynahs, Acridotheres tristis: the role of distress calls. Anim. Behav., 75(1), 79–89.
Abstract: Socially acquired predator avoidance is a phenomenon in which individuals acquire an avoidance response towards an initially neutral stimulus after they have experienced it together with the antipredator signals of social companions. Earlier research has established that alarm calls used for intraspecific communication are effective stimuli for triggering acquisition. However, animals produce a large range of other antipredator responses that might engage antipredator learning. Here, I examine the effects of conspecific distress calls, a signal that is produced by birds when restrained by a predator, and that appears to be directed towards predators, rather than conspecifics, on predator avoidance learning in Indian mynahs, Acridotheres tristis. Distress calls reflect high levels of alarm in the caller and should, therefore, mediate robust learning. Experiment 1 revealed that subjects performed higher rates of head movements in response to a previously unfamiliar avian mount after it had been presented simultaneously with playbacks of conspecific distress vocalizations. Experiment 2 revealed that increased rates of head saccades resembled the spontaneous response evoked by a novel stimulus more closely than it resembled the response evoked by a perched raptor, suggesting that distress calls inculcated a visual exploratory response, rather than an antipredator response. While it is usually thought that the level of acquisition in learners follows a simple relationship with the level of alarm shown by demonstrators, the present results suggest that this relationship may be more complex. Antipredator signals with different functions may have differential effects on learners.
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Griffin, A. S., & Galef, J., Bennett G. (2005). Social learning about predators: does timing matter? Anim. Behav., 69(3), 669–678.
Abstract: In Pavlovian conditioning, animals acquire a response to a previously neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus, CS), such as a light, if that stimulus predicts a biologically important event (unconditioned stimulus, US), such as delivery of food. Learning typically occurs when the CS precedes the US (forward conditioning), and not when the CS follows the US (backward conditioning). In social learning about predators, the predator stimulus is considered to be the CS to which observers acquire avoidance responses after the stimulus has been presented in contiguity with an alarmed demonstrator, the US. We tested the prediction that social learning of response to a predator would occur even if the social alarm cues (the US) appeared before the predatory stimulus (the CS). Carib grackles, Quiscalus lugubris, responded to a familiar predator presented at close range by suppressing alarm calls. Presentation of an unfamiliar avian model (black-and-yellow pigeon) also decreased calling, and this inhibition of calling was enhanced following a training session in which the model stimulus was presented in association with grackle alarm calls. Acquired inhibition of calling was independent of the order of presentation of the model and an alarm chorus. These are the first results to indicate that social acquisition of predator avoidance is not dependent upon a particular temporal relationship between predators and social alarm cues. Evolution may have modified some properties of Pavlovian conditioning to accommodate social learning about potentially dangerous stimuli.
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Hare, B., Addessi, E., Call, J., Tomasello, M., & Visalberghi, E. (2003). Do capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, know what conspecifics do and do not see? Anim. Behav., 65(1), 131–142.
Abstract: Capuchin monkeys were tested in five experiments in which two individuals competed over food. When given a choice between retrieving a piece of food that was visible or hidden from the dominant, subordinate animals preferred to retrieve hidden food. This preference is consistent with the hypotheses that either (1) the subordinate knew what the dominant could and could not see or (2) the subordinate was monitoring the behaviour of the dominant and avoiding the piece of food that it approached. To test between these alternatives, we released subordinates with a slight head start forcing them to make their choice (between a piece of food hidden or visible to the dominant) before the dominant entered the area. Unlike chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, subordinates that were given a head start did not preferentially approach hidden pieces of food first. Therefore, our experiments provide little support for the hypothesis that capuchin monkeys are sensitive to what another individual does or does not see. We compare our results with those obtained with chimpanzees in the same paradigm and discuss the evolution of primate social cognition. Copyright 2003 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Hare, B., Call, J., Agnetta, B., & Tomasello, M. (2000). Chimpanzees know what conspecifics do and do not see. Anim. Behav., 59(4), 771–785.
Abstract: We report a series of experiments on social problem solving in chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. In each experiment a subordinate and a dominant individual were put into competition over two pieces of food. In all experiments dominants obtained virtually all of the foods to which they had good visual and physical access. However, subordinates were successful quite often in three situations in which they had better visual access to the food than the dominant, for example, when the food was positioned so that only the subordinate (and not the dominant) could see it. In some cases, the subordinate might have been monitoring the behaviour of the dominant directly and simply avoided the food that the dominant was moving towards (which just happened to be the one it could see). In other cases, however, we ruled out this possibility by giving subordinates a small headstart and forcing them to make their choice (to go to the food that both competitors could see, or the food that only they could see) before the dominant was released into the area. Together with other recent studies, the present investigation suggests that chimpanzees know what conspecifics can and cannot see, and, furthermore, that they use this knowledge to devise effective social-cognitive strategies in naturally occurring food competition situations.
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Hare, B., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2001). Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? Anim. Behav., 61(1), 139–151.
Abstract: We conducted three experiments on social problem solving by chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes. In each experiment a subordinate and a dominant individual competed for food, which was placed in various ways on the subordinate's side of two opaque barriers. In some conditions dominants had not seen the food hidden, or food they had seen hidden was moved elsewhere when they were not watching (whereas in control conditions they saw the food being hidden or moved). At the same time, subordinates always saw the entire baiting procedure and could monitor the visual access of their dominant competitor as well. If subordinates were sensitive to what dominants did or did not see during baiting, they should have preferentially approached and retrieved the food that dominants had not seen hidden or moved. This is what they did in experiment 1 when dominants were either uninformed or misinformed about the food's location. In experiment 2 subordinates recognized, and adjusted their behaviour accordingly, when the dominant individual who witnessed the hiding was replaced with another dominant individual who had not witnessed it, thus demonstrating their ability to keep track of precisely who has witnessed what. In experiment 3 subordinates did not choose consistently between two pieces of hidden food, one of which dominants had seen hidden and one of which they had not seen hidden. However, their failure in this experiment was likely to be due to the changed nature of the competition under these circumstances and not to a failure of social-cognitive skills. These findings suggest that at least in some situations (i.e. competition with conspecifics) chimpanzees know what conspecifics have and have not seen (do and do not know), and that they use this information to devise effective social-cognitive strategies. Copyright 2001 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.
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Hare, B., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Chimpanzees are more skilful in competitive than in cooperative cognitive tasks. Anim. Behav., 68(3), 571–581.
Abstract: In a series of four experiments, chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, were given two cognitive tasks, an object choice task and a discrimination task (based on location), each in the context of either cooperation or competition. In both tasks chimpanzees performed more skilfully when competing than when cooperating, with some evidence that competition with conspecifics was especially facilitatory in the discrimination location task. This is the first study to demonstrate a facilitative cognitive effect for competition in a single experimental paradigm. We suggest that chimpanzee cognitive evolution is best understood in its socioecological context.
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Hare, J. F. (2005). Lee Alan Dugatkin, Principles of Animal Behavior, Norton, New York (2004) Pp. xx+596. Price $80.00. Anim. Behav., 69(1), 247–248.
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Hauser MD, & Kralik J. (1997). Life beyond the mirror: a reply to Anderson & Gallup. Anim. Behav., 54, 1568.
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Hauser MD, Kralik J, & Botto-Mahan C. (1999). Problem solving and functional design features: experiments on cotton-top tamarins, Saguinus oedipus oedipus. Anim. Behav., 57, 565.
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Hauser MD, Pearson H, & Seelig D. (2002). Ontogeny of tool use in cottontop tamarins, Saguinus oedipus: innate recognition of functionally relevant features. Anim. Behav., 64, 299.
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