Mitchell, D., Kirschbaum, E. H., & Perry, R. L. (1975). Effects of neophobia and habituation on the poison-induced avoidance of exteroceptive stimuli in the rat. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 1(1), 47–55.
Abstract: Two experiments on the role of neophobia in poison-induced aversions to exteroceptive stimuli are reported. In Experiment 1, rats were given either 10 or 25 days of habituation to the test situation prior to conditioning. Those animals with the longer habituation period avoided a complex of novel exteroceptive stimuli while those with the shorter habituation period did not. In Experiment 2 rats initially avoided the more novel of two containers, but gradually came to eat equal amounts from both. A single pairing of toxicosis with consumption from either the novel or the familiar container reinstated the avoidance of the novel container in both cases. The results were discussed in terms of an interaction between habituation and conditioning procedures. It was suggested that previously reported differences between interoceptive and exteroceptive conditioning effects may have been influenced by the differential novelty of the two classes of stimuli in the test situation. It was further suggested that non-contingently poisoned control groups should routinely be included in poison avoidance conditioning studies.
|
Nielsen, M., Collier-Baker, E., Davis, J. M., & Suddendorf, T. (2005). Imitation recognition in a captive chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 31–36.
Abstract: This study investigated the ability of a captive chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) to recognise when he is being imitated. In the experimental condition of test 1a, an experimenter imitated the postures and behaviours of the chimpanzee as they were being displayed. In three control conditions the same experimenter exhibited (1) actions that were contingent on, but different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, (2) actions that were not contingent on, and different from, the actions of the chimpanzee, or (3) no action at all. The chimpanzee showed more “testing” sequences (i.e., systematically varying his actions while oriented to the imitating experimenter) and more repetitive behaviour when he was being imitated, than when he was not. This finding was replicated 4 months later in test 1b. When the experimenter repeated the same actions she displayed in the experimental condition of test 1a back to the chimpanzee in test 2, these actions now did not elicit those same testing sequences or repetitive behaviours. However, a live imitation condition did. Together these results provide the first evidence of imitation recognition in a nonhuman animal.
|
O'Connell, S., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2005). The perception of causality in chimpanzees (Pan spp.). Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 60–66.
Abstract: Chimpanzees (Pan spp.) were tested on a habituation/dishabituation paradigm that was originally developed to test for comprehension of causality in very young human infants. Three versions of the test were used: a food item being moved by a hand, a human pushing another human off a chair to obtain a food item, and a film clip of natural chimpanzee behaviour (capturing and eating a monkey). Chimpanzees exhibited similar results to those obtained with human infants, with significantly elevated levels of looking on the dishabituation trials. Since the level of response was significantly greater on natural/unnatural sequences than on unnatural/natural sequences, we conclude that the chimpanzees were not responding just to novelty but rather to events that infringed their sense of natural causation.
|
Parker, S. T. (1997). A general model for the adaptive function of self-knowledge in animals and humans. Conscious Cogn, 6(1), 75–86.
Abstract: This article offers a general definition of self-knowledge that embraces all forms and levels of self-knowledge in animals and humans. It is hypothesized that various levels of self-knowledge constitute an ordinal scale such that each species in a lineage displays the forms of self-knowledge found in related species as well as new forms it and its sister species may have evolved. Likewise, it is hypothesized that these various forms of levels of self-knowledge develop in the sequence in which they evolved. Finally, a general hypothesis for the functional significance of self-knowledge is proposed along with subhypotheses regarding the adaptive significance of various levels of self-knowledge in mammals including human and nonhuman primates. The general hypothesis is that self-knowledge serves as a standard for assessing the qualities of conspecifics compared to those of the self. Such assessment is crucial to deciding among alternative reproductive and subsistence strategies. The qualities that are assessed, which vary across taxa, range from the size and strength of the self to its mathematical or musical abilities. This so-called assessment model of self-knowledge is based on evolutionary biological models for social selection and the role of assessment in animal communication.
|
Piggins, D., & Phillips, C. J. C. (1998). Awareness in domesticated animals--concepts and definitions. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 57(3-4), 181–200.
Abstract: Humans will probably never experience the awareness of another species, but adopting a broad concept of awareness leads to the conclusion that other species have some awareness. The existence of a more complex mind in humans, compared with other species, leads some to suggest that awareness only exists in humans. We postulate that humans possess a significantly increased level of awareness, facilitated in particular by the acquisition of language, but that generally animals possess a level of awareness that is appropriate to their needs. Categories of awareness can be devised by identifying levels, such as are used in the identification of the conscious state in humans, or by ranking states of awareness in order of complexity. A scheme is proposed that combines these two approaches, which is considered suitable for use with domesticated animals. The advantages of identifying awareness as being sensation-, perception- or cognition-based are discussed, as well as the possibility of a scheme based on the degree and site of CNS processing. Finally, the acquisition of awareness by learning and inheritance is considered, and it is argued that in variable environments, animals will evolve increased awareness, whereas in very stable environments the energetic cost of awareness will encourage the evolution of less aware animals.
|
Rudy, J. W., Iwens, J., & Best, P. J. (1977). Pairing novel exteroceptive cues and illness reduces illness-induced taste aversions. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 3(1), 14–25.
Abstract: Four experiments are reported that lead to the conclusion that pairing novel exteroceptive stimulation (placement into a black compartment) with a poison (lithium chloride) attenuates the development of an aversion to a taste (saccharin) subsequently paired with the poison. Such an attenuation effect occurs whether the exteroceptive cues are present or absent when the taste-poison pairing is administered. Interpretation and implications of this finding are discussed.
|
Schwab, C., & Huber, L. (2006). Obey or not obey? Dogs (Canis familiaris) behave differently in response to attentional states of their owners. J Comp Psychol, 120(3), 169–175.
Abstract: Sixteen domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) were tested in a familiar context in a series of 1-min trials on how well they obeyed after being told by their owner to lie down. Food was used in 1/3 of all trials, and during the trial the owner engaged in 1 of 5 activities. The dogs behaved differently depending on the owner's attention to them. When being watched by the owner, the dogs stayed lying down most often and/or for the longest time compared with when the owner read a book, watched TV, turned his or her back on them, or left the room. These results indicate that the dogs sensed the attentional state of their owners by judging observable behavioral cues such as eye contact and eye, head, and body orientation.
|
|
Swartz, K. B. (1997). What is mirror self-recognition in nonhuman primates, and what is it not? Ann N Y Acad Sci, 818, 64–71.
|
