Abstract: Investigation of tool use is an effective way to determine cognitive abilities of animals. This approach raises hypotheses, which delineate limits of animal's competence in understanding of objects properties and interrelations and the influence of individual and social experience on their behaviour. On the basis of brief review of different models of manipulation with objects and tools manufacturing (detaching, subtracting and reshaping) by various animals (from elephants to ants) in natural conditions the experimental data concerning tool usage was considered. Tool behaviour of anumals could be observed rarely and its distribution among different taxons is rather odd. Recent studies have revealed that some species (for instance, bonobos and tamarins) which didn't manipulate tools in wild life appears to be an advanced tool users and even manufacturers in laboratory. Experimental studies of animals tool use include investigation of their ability to use objects physical properties, to categorize objects involved in tool activity by its functional properties, to take forces affecting objects into account, as well as their capacity of planning their actions. The crucial question is whether animals can abstract general principles of relations between objects regardless of the exact circumstances, or they develop specific associations between concerete things and situations. Effectiveness of laboratory methods is estimated in the review basing on comparative studies of tool behaviour, such as “support problem”, “stick problem”, “tube- and tube-trap problem”, and “reserve tube problem”. Levels of social learning, the role of imprinting, and species-specific predisposition to formation of specific domains are discussed. Experimental investigation of tool use allows estimation of the individuals' intelligence in populations. A hypothesis suggesting that strong predisposition to formation of specific associations can serve as a driving force and at the same time as obstacle to animals' activity is discussed. In several “technically gifted” species (such as woodpecker finches, New Caledonian crows, and chimpanzees) tool use seems to be guided by a rapid process of trial and error learning. Individuals that are predisposed to learn specific connections do this too quickly and thus become enslaved by stereotypic solutions of raising problems.

Abstract: Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) have learned, like humans, to use an uncertain response adaptively under test conditions that create uncertainty, suggesting a metacognitive process by which human and nonhuman primates may monitor their confidence and alter their behavior accordingly. In this study, 4 rhesus monkeys generalized their use of the uncertain response, without additional training, to 2 familiar tasks (2-choice discrimination learning and mirror-image matching to sample) that predictably and demonstrably produce uncertainty. The monkeys were significantly less likely to use the uncertain response on trials in which the answer might be known. These results indicate that monkeys, like humans, know when they do not know and that they can learn to use a symbol as a generalized means for indicating their uncertainty.

Abstract: In the wake of telling critiques of the foundations on which earlier conclusions were based, the last 15 years have witnessed a renaissance in the study of social learning in apes. As a result, we are able to review 31 experimental studies from this period in which social learning in chimpanzees, gorillas, and orangutans has been investigated. The principal question framed at the beginning of this era, Do apes ape? has been answered in the affirmative, at least in certain conditions. The more interesting question now is, thus, How do apes ape? Answering this question has engendered richer taxonomies of the range of social-learning processes at work and new methodologies to uncover them. Together, these studies suggest that apes ape by employing a portfolio of alternative social-learning processes in flexibly adaptive ways, in conjunction with nonsocial learning. We conclude by sketching the kind of decision tree that appears to underlie the deployment of these alternatives.

Abstract: Action imitation, once thought to be a behavior almost exclusively limited to humans and the great apes, surprisingly also has been found in a number of bird species. Because imitation has been viewed by some psychologists as a form of intelligent behavior, there has been interest in how it is distributed among animal species. Although the mechanisms responsible for action imitation are not clear, we are now at least beginning to understand the conditions under which it occurs. In this article, I try to identify and differentiate the various forms of socially influenced behavior (species-typical social reactions, social effects on motivation, social effects on perception, socially influenced learning, and action imitation) and explain why it is important to differentiate imitation from other forms of social influence. I also examine some of the variables that appear to be involved in the occurrence of imitation. Finally, I speculate about why a number of bird species, but few mammal species, appear to imitate.