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Horowitz, A. C. (2003). Do humans ape? Or do apes human? Imitation and intention in humans (Homo sapiens) and other animals. J Comp Psychol, 117(3), 325–336.
Abstract: A. Whiten, D. M. Custance, J.-C. Gomez, P. Teixidor, and K. A. Bard (1996) tested chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) and human children's (Homo sapiens) skills at imitation with a 2-action test on an “artificial fruit.” Chimpanzees imitated to a restricted degree; children were more thoroughly imitative. Such results prompted some to assert that the difference in imitation indicates a difference in the subjects' understanding of the intentions of the demonstrator (M. Tomasello, 1996). In this experiment, 37 adult human subjects were tested with the artificial fruit. Far from being perfect imitators, the adults were less imitative than the children. These results cast doubt on the inference from imitative performance to an ability to understand others' intentions. The results also demonstrate how any test of imitation requires a control group and attention to the level of behavioral analysis.
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Houpt, K. A., Thornton, S. N., & Allen, W. R. (1989). Vasopressin in dehydrated and rehydrated ponies. Physiol. Behav., 45(3), 659–661.
Abstract: Six pony mares deprived of water for 24 hours showed significant increases in plasma vasopressin (2.8 pg/ml) and osmolality (9 mosmol/kg). When water was made available the ponies drank rapidly (5 of 6 drank to satiety within 90 seconds) and corrected their fluid deficits precisely. Vasopressin did not return to predehydration levels until osmolality did after 15 minutes of access to water. The horse differs from rodents and humans, but is similar to pigs in that vasopressin levels do not fall before osmolality returns to normal. Oropharyngeal factors, therefore, may not be as important in vasopressin release in horses as in other species.
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Lonon, A. M., & Zentall, T. R. (1999). Transfer of value from S+ to S- in simultaneous discriminations in humans. Am J Psychol, 112(1), 21–39.
Abstract: When animals learn a simultaneous discrimination, some of the value of the positive stimulus (S+) appears to transfer to the negative stimulus (S-). The present experiments demonstrate that such value transfer can also be found in humans. In Experiment 1 humans were trained on 2 simple simultaneous discriminations, the first between a highly positive stimulus, A (1,000 points); and a negative stimulus, B (0 points); and the second between a less positive stimulus, C (100 points); and a negative stimulus, D (0 points). On test trials, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiments 2 and 3 the value of the 2 original discriminations was equated in training (A[100]B[0] and C[100]D[0]). In Experiment 2 the values of the positive stimuli were then altered (A[1,000]C[0]); again, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiment 3, however, when the values of B and D were altered (B[1,000]D[0]), participants were indifferent to A and C. Thus, the mechanism that underlies value transfer in humans appears to be related to Pavlovian second-order conditioning. Similar mechanisms may be involved in assimilation processes in social contexts.
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Moses, S. N., Villate, C., & Ryan, J. D. (2006). An investigation of learning strategy supporting transitive inference performance in humans compared to other species. Neuropsychologia, 44(8), 1370–1387.
Abstract: Generalizations about neural function are often drawn from non-human animal models to human cognition, however, the assumption of cross-species conservation may sometimes be invalid. Humans may use different strategies mediated by alternative structures, or similar structures may operate differently within the context of the human brain. The transitive inference problem, considered a hallmark of logical reasoning, can be solved by non-human species via associative learning rather than logic. We tested whether humans use similar strategies to other species for transitive inference. Results are crucial for evaluating the validity of widely accepted assumptions of similar neural substrates underlying performance in humans and other animals. Here we show that successful transitive inference in humans is unrelated to use of associative learning strategies and is associated with ability to report the hierarchical relationship among stimuli. Our work stipulates that cross-species generalizations must be interpreted cautiously, since performance on the same task may be mediated by different strategies and/or neural systems.
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Nevin, J. A., & Shettleworth, S. J. (1966). An analysis of contrast effects in multiple schedules. J Exp Anal Behav, 9(4), 305–315.
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Singer, R. A., Klein, E. D., & Zentall, T. R. (2006). Use of a single-code/default strategy by pigeons to acquire duration sample discriminations. Learn Behav, 34(4), 340–347.
Abstract: Past evidence that pigeons may adopt a single-code/default strategy to solve duration sample discriminations may be attributable to the similarity between the intertrial interval (ITI) and the retention interval. The present experiments tested whether pigeons would adopt a single-code/default strategy when possible ITI-retention-interval ambiguity was eliminated and sample salience was increased. Previous studies of duration sample discriminations that have purported to show evidence for the use of a single-code/default coding strategy have used durations of 0, 2, and 10 sec (Zentall, Klein, and Singer, 2004). However, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that the use of a 0-sec sample may produce an artifact resulting in inadvertent present/absent sample matching. In Experiment 2, when pigeons were trained with three nonzero duration samples (2, 8, and 32 sec), clear evidence for the use of a single-code/default strategy was found.
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Stoet, G., & Snyder, L. H. (2003). Task preparation in macaque monkeys ( Macaca mulatta). Anim. Cogn., 6(2), 121–130.
Abstract: We investigated whether macaque monkeys possess the ability to prepare abstract tasks in advance. We trained two monkeys to use different stimulus-response (S-R) mappings. On each trial, monkeys were first informed with a visual cue which of two S-R mapping to use. Following a delay, a visual target was presented to which they would respond with a left or right button-press. We manipulated delay time between cue and target and found that performance was faster and more accurate with longer delays, suggesting that monkeys used the delay time to prepare each task in advance.
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Zentall, T. R., & Clement, T. S. (2002). Memory mechanisms in pigeons: evidence of base-rate neglect. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 28(1), 111–115.
Abstract: In delayed matching to sample, once acquired, pigeons presumably choose comparisons according to their memory for (the strength of) the sample. When memory for the sample is sufficiently weak, comparison choice should depend on the history of reinforcement associated with each of the comparison stimuli. In the present research, pigeons acquired two matching tasks in which Sample S1 was associated with one comparison from each task, C1 and C3, whereas Sample S2 was associated with Comparison C2, and Sample S3 was associated with Comparison C4. As the retention interval increased, the pigeons showed a bias to choose the comparison (C1 or C3) associated with the more frequently occurring sample (S1). Thus, pigeons were sensitive also to the (irrelevant) likelihood that each of the samples was presented. The results suggest that pigeons may allow their reference memory for the overall sample frequency to influence comparison choice, independent of the comparison stimuli present.
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