Abstract: Six pony mares deprived of water for 24 hours showed significant increases in plasma vasopressin (2.8 pg/ml) and osmolality (9 mosmol/kg). When water was made available the ponies drank rapidly (5 of 6 drank to satiety within 90 seconds) and corrected their fluid deficits precisely. Vasopressin did not return to predehydration levels until osmolality did after 15 minutes of access to water. The horse differs from rodents and humans, but is similar to pigs in that vasopressin levels do not fall before osmolality returns to normal. Oropharyngeal factors, therefore, may not be as important in vasopressin release in horses as in other species.

Abstract: Stable cooperation requires that each party's pay-offs exceed those available through individual action. The present experimental study on brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) investigated if decisions about cooperation are (a) guided by the amount of competition expected to follow the cooperation, and (b) made instantaneously or only after a period of familiarization. Pairs of adult monkeys were presented with a mutualistic cooperative task with variable opportunities for resource monopolization (clumped versus dispersed rewards), and partner relationships (kin versus nonkin). After pre-training, each pair of monkeys (N=11) was subjected to six tests, consisting of 15 2 min trials each, with rewards available to both parties. Clumped reward distribution had an immediate negative effect on cooperation: this effect was visible right from the start, and remained visible even if clumped trials alternated with dispersed trials. The drop in cooperation was far more dramatic for nonkin than kin, which was explained by the tendency of dominant nonkin to claim more than half of the rewards under the clumped condition. The immediacy of responses suggests a decision-making process based on predicted outcome of cooperation. Decisions about cooperation thus take into account both the opportunity for and the likelihood of subsequent competition over the spoils.

Abstract: When humans acquire a conditional discrimination and are given a novel-sample-comparison choice, they often reject a comparison known to be associated with a different sample and choose the alternative comparison by default (or by exclusion). In Experiment 1, we found that if, following matching training, we replaced both of the samples, acquisition took five times longer than if we replaced only one of the samples. Apparently, the opportunity to reject one of the comparisons facilitated the association of the other sample with the remaining comparison. In Experiment 2, we first trained pigeons to treat two samples differently (to associate Sample A with Comparison 1 and Sample B with Comparison 2) and then trained them to associate one of those samples with a new comparison (e.g., Sample A with Comparison 3) and to associate a novel sample (Sample C) with a different, new comparison (Comparison 4). When Sample B then replaced Sample C, the pigeons showed a significant tendency to choose Comparison 4 over Comparison 3. Thus, when given the opportunity, pigeons will choose by exclusion.

Abstract: When animals learn a simultaneous discrimination, some of the value of the positive stimulus (S+) appears to transfer to the negative stimulus (S-). The present experiments demonstrate that such value transfer can also be found in humans. In Experiment 1 humans were trained on 2 simple simultaneous discriminations, the first between a highly positive stimulus, A (1,000 points); and a negative stimulus, B (0 points); and the second between a less positive stimulus, C (100 points); and a negative stimulus, D (0 points). On test trials, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiments 2 and 3 the value of the 2 original discriminations was equated in training (A[100]B[0] and C[100]D[0]). In Experiment 2 the values of the positive stimuli were then altered (A[1,000]C[0]); again, most participants preferred B over D. In Experiment 3, however, when the values of B and D were altered (B[1,000]D[0]), participants were indifferent to A and C. Thus, the mechanism that underlies value transfer in humans appears to be related to Pavlovian second-order conditioning. Similar mechanisms may be involved in assimilation processes in social contexts.

Abstract: We examined how the brain organizes interrelated facts during learning and how the facts are subsequently manipulated in a transitive inference (TI) paradigm (e.g., if A<B and B<C, then A<C). This task determined features such as learned facts and behavioral goals, but the learned facts could be organized in any of several ways. For example, if one learns a list by operating on paired items, the pairs may be stored individually as separate facts and reaction time (RT) should decrease with learning. Alternatively, the pairs may be stored as a single, unified list, which may yield a different RT pattern. We characterized RT patterns that occurred as participants learned, by trial and error, the predetermined order of 11 shapes. The task goal was to choose the shape occurring closer to the end of the list, and feedback about correctness was provided during this phase. RT increased even as its variance decreased during learning, suggesting that the learnt knowledge became progressively unified into a single representation, requiring more time to manipulate as participants acquired relational knowledge. After learning, non-adjacent (NA) list items were presented to examine how participants reasoned in a TI task. The task goal also required choosing from each presented pair the item occurring closer to the list end, but without feedback. Participants could solve the TI problems by applying formal logic to the previously learnt pairs of adjacent items; alternatively, they could manipulate a single, unified representation of the list. Shorter RT occurred for NA pairs having more intervening items, supporting the hypothesis that humans employ unified mental representations during TI. The response pattern does not support mental logic solutions of applying inference rules sequentially, which would predict longer RT with more intervening items. We conclude that the brain organizes information in such a way that reflects the relations among the items, even if the facts were learned in an arbitrary order, and that this representation is subsequently used to make inferences.