|
Levy, J. (1977). The mammalian brain and the adaptive advantage of cerebral asymmetry. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 299, 264–272.
|
|
|
Lingle, S., Rendall, D., Wilson, W. F., DeYoung, R. W., & Pellis, S. M. (2007). Altruism and recognition in the antipredator defence of deer: 2. Why mule deer help nonoffspring fawns. Anim. Behav., 73(5), 907–916.
Abstract: Both white-tailed deer, Odocoileus virginianus, and mule deer, O. hemionus, females defend fawns against coyotes, Canis latrans, but only mule deer defend nonoffspring conspecific and heterospecific fawns. During a predator attack, females may have to decide whether to defend a fawn while having imperfect information on its identity obtained from hearing a few distress calls. Although imperfect recognition can influence altruistic behaviour, few empirical studies have considered this point when testing functional explanations for altruism. We designed a series of playback experiments with fawn distress calls to test alternative hypotheses (by-product of parental care, kin selection, reciprocal altruism) for the mule deer's defence of nonoffspring, specifically allowing for the possibility that females mistake these fawns for their own. White-tailed deer females approached the speaker only when distress calls of white-tailed deer fawns were played and when their own fawn was hidden, suggesting that fawn defence was strictly a matter of parental care in this species. In contrast, mule deer females responded similarly and strongly, regardless of the caller's identity, the female's reproductive state (mother or nonmother) or the presence of their own offspring. The failure of mule deer females to adjust their responses to these conditions suggests that they do not defend nonoffspring because they mistake them for their own fawns. The lack of behavioural discrimination also suggests that kin selection, reciprocal altruism and defence of the offspring's area are unlikely to explain the mule deer's defence of nonoffspring. We identify causal and functional questions that still need to be addressed to understand why mule deer defend fawns so indiscriminately.
|
|
|
Macphail, E. M., & Boldhuis, J. J. (2001). The evolution of intelligence: adaptive specializations versusgeneral process. Biological Reviews, 76(3), 341–364.
Abstract: Darwin argued that between-species differences in intelligence were differences of degree, not of kind. The contemporary ecological approach to animal cognition argues that animals have evolved species-specific and problem-specific processes to solve problems associated with their particular ecological niches: thus different species use different processes, and within a species, different processes are used to tackle problems involving different inputs. This approach contrasts both with Darwin's view and with the general process view, according to which the same central processes of learning and memory are used across an extensive range of problems involving very different inputs. We review evidence relevant to the claim that the learning and memory performance of non-human animals varies according to the nature of the stimuli involved. We first discuss the resource distribution hypothesis, olfactory learning-set formation, and the 'biological constraints' literature, but find no convincing support from these topics for the ecological account of cognition. We then discuss the claim that the performance of birds in spatial tasks of learning and memory is superior in species that depend heavily upon stored food compared to species that either show less dependence upon stored food or do not store food. If it could be shown that storing species enjoy a superiority specifically in spatial (and not non-spatial) tasks, this would argue that spatial tasks are indeed solved using different processes from those used in non-spatial tasks. Our review of this literature does not find a consistent superiority of storing over non-storing birds in spatial tasks, and, in particular, no evidence of enhanced superiority of storing species when the task demands are increased, by, for example, increasing the number of items to be recalled or the duration of the retention period. We discuss also the observation that the hippocampus of storing birds is larger than that of non-storing birds, and find evidence contrary to the view that hippocampal enlargement is associated with enhanced spatial memory; we are, however, unable to suggest a convincing alternative explanation for hippocampal enlargement. The failure to find solid support for the ecological view supports the view that there are no qualitative differences in cognition between animal species in the processes of learning and memory. We also argue that our review supports our contention that speculation about the phylogenetic development and function of behavioural processes does not provide a solid basis for gaining insight into the nature of those processes. We end by confessing to a belief in one major qualitative difference in cognition in animals: we believe that humans alone are capable of acquiring language, and that it is this capacity that divides our intelligence so sharply from non-human intelligence.
|
|
|
Marino, L. (2002). Convergence of complex cognitive abilities in cetaceans and primates. Brain Behav Evol, 59(1-2), 21–32.
Abstract: What examples of convergence in higher-level complex cognitive characteristics exist in the animal kingdom? In this paper I will provide evidence that convergent intelligence has occurred in two distantly related mammalian taxa. One of these is the order Cetacea (dolphins, whales and porpoises) and the other is our own order Primates, and in particular the suborder anthropoid primates (monkeys, apes, and humans). Despite a deep evolutionary divergence, adaptation to physically dissimilar environments, and very different neuroanatomical organization, some primates and cetaceans show striking convergence in social behavior, artificial 'language' comprehension, and self-recognition ability. Taken together, these findings have important implications for understanding the generality and specificity of those processes that underlie cognition in different species and the nature of the evolution of intelligence.
|
|
|
Marinsek, N. L., Gazzaniga, M. S., & Miller, M. B. (2016). Chapter 17 – Split-Brain, Split-Mind. In S. Laureys, O. Gosseries, & G. Tononi (Eds.), The Neurology of Conciousness (Second Edition) (pp. 271–279). San Diego: Academic Press.
Abstract: The corpus callosum anatomically and functionally connects the two cerebral hemispheres. Despite its important role in interhemispheric communication however, severing the corpus callosum produces few--if any--noticeable cognitive or behavioral abnormalities. Incredibly, split-brain patients do not report any drastic changes in their conscious experience even though nearly all interhemispheric communication ceases after surgery. Extensive research has shown that both hemispheres remain conscious following disconnection and the conscious experience of each hemisphere is private and independent of the other. Additionally, the conscious experiences of the hemispheres appear to be qualitatively different, such that the consciousness of the left hemisphere is more enriched than the right. In this chapter, we offer explanations as to why split-brain patients feel unified despite possessing dual conscious experiences and discuss how the divided consciousness of split-brain patients can inform current theories of consciousness.
|
|
|
Mateo, J. M., & Johnston, R. E. (2003). Kin recognition by self-referent phenotype matching: weighing the evidence. Anim. Cogn., 6(1), 73–76.
|
|
|
Matsushima, T., Izawa, E. - I., Aoki, N., & Yanagihara, S. (2003). The mind through chick eyes: memory, cognition and anticipation. Zoolog Sci, 20(4), 395–408.
Abstract: To understand the animal mind, we have to reconstruct how animals recognize the external world through their own eyes. For the reconstruction to be realistic, explanations must be made both in their proximate causes (brain mechanisms) as well as ultimate causes (evolutionary backgrounds). Here, we review recent advances in the behavioral, psychological, and system-neuroscience studies accomplished using the domestic chick as subjects. Diverse behavioral paradigms are compared (such as filial imprinting, sexual imprinting, one-trial passive avoidance learning, and reinforcement operant conditioning) in their behavioral characterizations (development, sensory and motor aspects of functions, fitness gains) and relevant brain mechanisms. We will stress that common brain regions are shared by these distinct paradigms, particularly those in the ventral telencephalic structures such as AIv (in the archistriatum) and LPO (in the medial striatum). Neuronal ensembles in these regions could code the chick's anticipation for forthcoming events, particularly the quality/quantity and the temporal proximity of rewards. Without the internal representation of the anticipated proximity in LPO, behavioral tolerance will be lost, and the chick makes impulsive choice for a less optimized option. Functional roles of these regions proved compatible with their anatomical counterparts in the mammalian brain, thus suggesting that the neural systems linking between the memorized past and the anticipated future have remained highly conservative through the evolution of the amniotic vertebrates during the last 300 million years. With the conservative nature in mind, research efforts should be oriented toward a unifying theory, which could explain behavioral deviations from optimized foraging, such as “naive curiosity,” “contra-freeloading,” “Concorde fallacy,” and “altruism.”
|
|
|
McGreevy, P. D., & McLean, A. N. (2009). Punishment in horse-training and the concept of ethical equitation. J. Vet. Behav., 4(5), 193–197.
Abstract: By definition, punishment makes a response less likely in the future. Because horses are largely trained by negative reinforcement, they are susceptible to inadvertent punishment. Delays in the release of pressure can make desirable responses less likely and thus punish them. This study examines the correct use of negative reinforcement and identifies a continuum between poorly timed negative reinforcement and punishment. It explores some of the problems of non-contingent punishment and the prospect of learned helplessness and experimental neurosis. It concludes by introducing the concept of ethical equitation.
|
|
|
McGreevy, P. D., & McLean, A. N. (2007). Roles of learning theory and ethology in equitation. Journal of Veterinary Behavior: Clinical Applications and Research, 2(4), 108–118.
Abstract: By definition, ethology is primarily the scientific study of animal behavior, especially as it occurs in a natural environment; applied ethology being the study of animal behavior in the human domain. The terms equine ethology and ethological training are becoming commonplace in the equestrian domain, yet they seem to be used with a conspicuous lack of clarity and with no mention of learning theory. Most of what we do to train horses runs counter to their innate preferences. This article summarizes the ethological challenges encountered by working horses and considers the merits and limitations of ethological solutions. It also questions the use of terms such as “alpha” and “leader” and examines aspects of learning theory, equine cognition, and ethology as applied to horse training and clinical behavior modification. We propose 7 training principles that optimally account for the horse's ethological and learning abilities and maintain maximal responsivity in the trained horse. These principles can be summarized as: (1) use learning theory appropriately; (2) train easy-to-discriminate signals; (3) train and subsequently elicit responses singularly; (4) train only one response per signal; (5) train all responses to be initiated and subsequently completed within a consistent structure; (6) train persistence of current operantly conditioned responses; and (7) avoid and disassociate flight responses. Adherence to these principles and incorporating them into all horse training methodologies should accelerate training success, reduce behavioral wastage of horses, and improve safety for both humans and horses.
|
|
|
McGreevy, P. D., Oddie, C., Burton, F. L., & McLean, A. N. (2009). The horse–human dyad: Can we align horse training and handling activities with the equid social ethogram? Special Issue: Equitation Science, 181(1), 12–18.
Abstract: This article examines the recently completed equid ethogram and shows how analogues of social interactions between horses may occur in various human–horse interactions. It discusses how some specific horse–horse interactions have a corresponding horse–human interaction – some of which may be directly beneficial for the horse while others may be unusual or even abnormal. It also shows how correspondent behaviours sometimes become inappropriate because of their duration, consistency or context. One analogue is unlikely to hold true for all horse–human contexts, so when applying any model from horse–horse interactions to human–horse interactions, the limitations of the model may eclipse the intended outcome of the intervention. These limitations are especially likely when the horse is being ridden. Such analyses may help to determine the validity of extrapolating intra-specific interactions to the inter-specific setting, as is advocated by some popular horse-training methods, and highlight the subsequent limitations where humans play the role of the ‘alpha mare’ or leader in horse handling and training. This examination provides a constructive framework for further informed debate and empirical investigation of the critical features of successful intra-specific interactions.
|
|