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Milgram, N. W., Head, E., Muggenburg, B., Holowachuk, D., Murphey, H., Estrada, J., et al. (2002). Landmark discrimination learning in the dog: effects of age, an antioxidant fortified food, and cognitive strategy. Neurosci Biobehav Rev, 26(6), 679–695.
Abstract: The landmark discrimination learning test can be used to assess the ability to utilize allocentric spatial information to locate targets. The present experiments examined the role of various factors on performance of a landmark discrimination learning task in beagle dogs. Experiments 1 and 2 looked at the effects of age and food composition. Experiments 3 and 4 were aimed at characterizing the cognitive strategies used in performance on this task and in long-term retention. Cognitively equivalent groups of old and young dogs were placed into either a test group maintained on food enriched with a broad-spectrum of antioxidants and mitochondrial cofactors, or a control group maintained on a complete and balanced food formulated for adult dogs. Following a wash-in period, the dogs were tested on a series of problems, in which reward was obtained when the animal responded selectively to the object closest to a thin wooden block, which served as a landmark. In Experiment 1, dogs were first trained to respond to a landmark placed directly on top of coaster, landmark 0 (L0). In the next phase of testing, the landmark was moved at successively greater distances (1, 4 or 10 cm) away from the reward object. Learning varied as a function of age group, food group, and task. The young dogs learned all of the tasks more quickly than the old dogs. The aged dogs on the enriched food learned L0 significantly more rapidly than aged dogs on control food. A higher proportion of dogs on the enriched food learned the task, when the distance was increased to 1cm. Experiment 2 showed that accuracy decreased with increased distance between the reward object and landmark, and this effect was greater in old animals. Experiment 3 showed stability of performance, despite using a novel landmark, and new locations, indicating that dogs learned the landmark concept. Experiment 4 found age impaired long-term retention of the landmark task. These results indicate that allocentric spatial learning is impaired in an age-dependent manner in dogs, and that age also affects performance when the distance between the landmark and target is increased. In addition, these results both support a role of oxidative damage in the development of age-associated cognitive dysfunction and indicate that short-term administration of a food enriched with supplemental antioxidants and mitochondrial cofactors can partially reverse the deleterious effects of aging on cognition.
Keywords: Age Factors; Aging/*physiology; Analysis of Variance; Animals; Antioxidants/*pharmacology; Blood Chemical Analysis/methods; Cognition/*physiology; *Diet; Discrimination Learning/*drug effects/*physiology; Distance Perception/drug effects/physiology; Dogs/physiology; Female; Male; Psychomotor Performance/physiology; Retention (Psychology)/drug effects/physiology; Spatial Behavior/*drug effects/*physiology; Task Performance and Analysis; Time Factors; Vitamin E/blood
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Dunbar, R. I. M., McAdam, M. R., & O'connell, S. (2005). Mental rehearsal in great apes (Pan troglodytes and Pongo pygmaeus) and children. Behav. Process., 69(3), 323–330.
Abstract: The ability to rehearse possible future courses of action in the mind is an important feature of advanced social cognition in humans, and the “social brain” hypothesis implies that it might also be a feature of primate social cognition. We tested two chimpanzees, six orangutans and 63 children aged 3-7 years on a set of four puzzle boxes, half of which were presented with an opportunity to observe the box before being allowed to open it (“prior view”), the others being given without an opportunity to examine the boxes before handling them (“no prior view”). When learning effects are partialled out, puzzle boxes in the “prior view” condition were opened significantly faster than boxes given in the “no prior view” condition by the children, but not by either of the great apes. The three species differ significantly in the speed with which they opened boxes in the “no prior view” condition. The three species' performance on this task was a function of relative frontal lobe volume, suggesting that it may be possible to identify quantitative neuropsychological differences between species.
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Parr, L. A., Hopkins, W. D., & de Waal, F. B. (1997). Haptic discrimination in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella): evidence of manual specialization. Neuropsychologia, 35(2), 143–152.
Abstract: Two experiments investigated the effects of haptic and visual discrimination on hand preference in 22 brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). The percentage of left-handed subjects in Experiment 1 were 63.6%, 45.5%, and 18.2% for haptic, bipedal, and quadrupedal reaching, respectively. In Experiment 2, the haptic demands of the task were manipulated by using additional food types and another tactile medium. Left-hand preferences were further strengthened when reaching into water compared to pineshavings in Experiment 1. Reaching with no tactile interference resulted in equal numbers of lateralized and nonlateralized subjects. These results show that when reaching demands the use of haptic cues, as opposed to visual ones, monkeys shift towards greater left hand use. This is consistent with what is known about right hemisphere superiority for haptic discrimination in humans.
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Gomez, J. - C. (2005). Species comparative studies and cognitive development. Trends. Cognit. Sci., 9(3), 118–125.
Abstract: The comparative study of infant development and animal cognition brings to cognitive science the promise of insights into the nature and origins of cognitive skills. In this article, I review a recent wave of comparative studies conducted with similar methodologies and similar theoretical frameworks on how two core components of human cognition--object permanence and gaze following--develop in different species. These comparative findings call for an integration of current competing accounts of developmental change. They further suggest that evolution has produced developmental devices capable at the same time of preserving core adaptive components, and opening themselves up to further adaptive change, not only in interaction with the external environment, but also in interaction with other co-developing cognitive systems.
Keywords: Animals; Attention/physiology; Brain/*growth & development; Child, Preschool; Cognition/*physiology; Concept Formation/physiology; Dogs; Evolution; Fixation, Ocular; Gorilla gorilla; Humans; Infant; Learning/*physiology; Macaca mulatta; Mental Recall/physiology; Personal Construct Theory; Psychomotor Performance/physiology; Species Specificity
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Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). In search of king Solomon's ring: cognitive and communicative studies of Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus). Brain Behav Evol, 59(1-2), 54–67.
Abstract: During the past 24 years, I have used a modeling technique (M/R procedure) to train Grey parrots to use an allospecific code (English speech) referentially; I then use the code to test their cognitive abilities. The oldest bird, Alex, labels more than 50 different objects, 7 colors, 5 shapes, quantities to 6, 3 categories (color, shape, material) and uses 'no', 'come here', wanna go X' and 'want Y' (X and Y are appropriate location or item labels). He combines labels to identify, request, comment upon or refuse more than 100 items and to alter his environment. He processes queries to judge category, relative size, quantity, presence or absence of similarity/difference in attributes, and show label comprehension. He semantically separates labeling from requesting. He thus exhibits capacities once presumed limited to humans or nonhuman primates. Studies on this and other Greys show that parrots given training that lacks some aspect of input present in M/R protocols (reference, functionality, social interaction) fail to acquire referential English speech. Examining how input affects the extent to which parrots acquire an allospecific code may elucidate mechanisms of other forms of exceptional learning: learning unlikely in the normal course of development but that can occur under certain conditions.
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Acuna, B. D., Sanes, J. N., & Donoghue, J. P. (2002). Cognitive mechanisms of transitive inference. Exp Brain Res, 146(1), 1–10.
Abstract: We examined how the brain organizes interrelated facts during learning and how the facts are subsequently manipulated in a transitive inference (TI) paradigm (e.g., if A<B and B<C, then A<C). This task determined features such as learned facts and behavioral goals, but the learned facts could be organized in any of several ways. For example, if one learns a list by operating on paired items, the pairs may be stored individually as separate facts and reaction time (RT) should decrease with learning. Alternatively, the pairs may be stored as a single, unified list, which may yield a different RT pattern. We characterized RT patterns that occurred as participants learned, by trial and error, the predetermined order of 11 shapes. The task goal was to choose the shape occurring closer to the end of the list, and feedback about correctness was provided during this phase. RT increased even as its variance decreased during learning, suggesting that the learnt knowledge became progressively unified into a single representation, requiring more time to manipulate as participants acquired relational knowledge. After learning, non-adjacent (NA) list items were presented to examine how participants reasoned in a TI task. The task goal also required choosing from each presented pair the item occurring closer to the list end, but without feedback. Participants could solve the TI problems by applying formal logic to the previously learnt pairs of adjacent items; alternatively, they could manipulate a single, unified representation of the list. Shorter RT occurred for NA pairs having more intervening items, supporting the hypothesis that humans employ unified mental representations during TI. The response pattern does not support mental logic solutions of applying inference rules sequentially, which would predict longer RT with more intervening items. We conclude that the brain organizes information in such a way that reflects the relations among the items, even if the facts were learned in an arbitrary order, and that this representation is subsequently used to make inferences.
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