Abstract: A tool-throwing task was used to test whether capuchin monkeys understand the difference between functionally appropriate and functionally inappropriate tools. A group of monkeys was trained to obtain a sticky treat from a container outside their enclosure using a projectile attached to one end of an anchored line. Subsequently, these monkeys were given choice tests between functional and nonfunctional versions of tools used in training. A different feature of the tool was varied between alternatives in each choice test. The monkeys chose to use functional tools significantly more often than nonfunctional tools in early exposures to each choice test. A second experiment tested whether these subjects, as well as a second group of minimally trained participants, could distinguish between functional and nonfunctional tools that appeared different from those used in training. A new set of design features was varied between tools in these choice tests. All participants continued to choose functional tools significantly more often than nonfunctional tools, regardless of their tool-throwing experience or the novel appearance of the tools. These results suggest that capuchin monkeys, like chimpanzees studied in similar experiments, are sensitive to a variety of functionally relevant tool features.

Abstract: Cognitive mechanisms are an important part of the organization of the behavior systems of animals. In the wild, animals regularly face problems that they must overcome in order to survive and thrive. Solving such problems often requires animals to process, store, retrieve, and act upon information from the environment--in other words, to use their cognitive skills. For example, animals may have to use navigational, tool-making or cooperative social skills in order to procure their food. However, many enrichment programs for captive animals do not include the integration of these types of cognitive challenges. Thus, foraging enrichments typically are designed to facilitate the physical expression of feeding behaviors such as food-searching and food consumption, but not to facilitate complex problem solving behaviors related to food acquisition. Challenging animals by presenting them with problems is almost certainly a source of frustration and stress. However, we suggest here that this is an important, and even necessary, feature of an enrichment program, as long as animals also possess the skills and resources to effectively solve the problems with which they are presented. We discuss this with reference to theories about the emotional consequences of coping with challenge, the association between lack of challenge and the development of abnormal behavior, and the benefits of stress (arousal) in facilitating learning and memory of relevant skills. Much remains to be done to provide empirical support for these theories. However, they do point the way to a practical approach to improving animal welfare--to design enrichments to facilitate the cognitive mechanisms which underlie the performance of complex behaviors that cannot be performed due to the restrictions inherent to the captive environment.

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Abstract: Primate species differ in their imitative performance, perhaps reflecting differences in imitative capacity. The developmentally earliest form of imitation in humans, neonatal imitation, occurs in early interactions with social partners, and may be a more accurate index of innate capacity than imitation of actions on objects, which requires more cognitive ability. This study assessed imitative capacity in five neonatal chimpanzees, within a narrow age range (7-15 days of age), by testing responses to facial and vocal actions with two different test paradigms (structured and communicative). Imitation of mouth opening was found in both paradigms. In the communicative paradigm, significant agreement was found between infant actions and demonstrations. Additionally, chimpanzees matched the sequence of three actions of the TC model, but only on the second demonstration. Newborn chimpanzees matched more modeled actions in the communicative test than in the structured paradigm. These performances of chimpanzees, at birth, are in agreement with the literature, supporting a conclusion that imitative capacity is not unique to the human species. Developmental histories must be more fully considered in the cross-species study of imitation, as there is a greater degree of innate imitative capacity than previously known. Socialization practices interact with innate and developing competencies to determine the outcome of imitation tests later in life.

Abstract: The trap-tube problem is used to assess whether an individual is able to foresee the outcome of its actions. To solve the task, an animal must use a tool to push a piece of food out of a tube, which has a trap along its length. An animal may learn to avoid the trap through a rule based on associative processes, e.g. using the distance of trap or food as a cue, or by understanding relations between cause and effect. This task has been used to test physical cognition in a number of tool-using species, but never a non-tool-user. We developed an experimental design that enabled us to test non-tool-using rooks, Corvus frugilegus. Our modification of the task removed the cognitive requirements of active tool use but still allowed us to test whether rooks can solve the trap-tube problem, and if so how. Additionally, we developed two new control tasks to determine whether rooks were able to transfer knowledge to similar, but novel problems, thus revealing more about the mechanisms involved in solving the task. We found that three out of seven rooks solved the modified trap-tube problem task, showing that the ability to solve the trap-tube problem is not restricted to tool-using animals. We found no evidence that the birds solved the task using an understanding of its causal properties, given that none of the birds passed the novel transfer tasks.