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Pérez-Barbería, F. J., Shultz, S., Dunbar, R. I. M., & Janis, C. (2007). Evidence For Coevolution Of Sociality And Relative Brain Size In Three Orders Of Mammals. Evolution, 61(12), 2811–2821.
Abstract: Abstract
As the brain is responsible for managing an individual's behavioral response to its environment, we should expect that large relative brain size is an evolutionary response to cognitively challenging behaviors. The “social brain hypothesis” argues that maintaining group cohesion is cognitively demanding as individuals living in groups need to be able to resolve conflicts that impact on their ability to meet resource requirements. If sociality does impose cognitive demands, we expect changes in relative brain size and sociality to be coupled over evolutionary time. In this study, we analyze data on sociality and relative brain size for 206 species of ungulates, carnivores, and primates and provide, for the first time, evidence that changes in sociality and relative brain size are closely correlated over evolutionary time for all three mammalian orders. This suggests a process of coevolution and provides support for the social brain theory. However, differences between taxonomic orders in the stability of the transition between small-brained/nonsocial and large-brained/social imply that, although sociality is cognitively demanding, sociality and relative brain size can become decoupled in some cases. Carnivores seem to have been especially prone to this.
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Reader, S. M., & Laland, K. N. (2002). Social intelligence, innovation, and enhanced brain size in primates. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 99(7), 4436–4441.
Abstract: Despite considerable current interest in the evolution of intelligence, the intuitively appealing notion that brain volume and “intelligence” are linked remains untested. Here, we use ecologically relevant measures of cognitive ability, the reported incidence of behavioral innovation, social learning, and tool use, to show that brain size and cognitive capacity are indeed correlated. A comparative analysis of 533 instances of innovation, 445 observations of social learning, and 607 episodes of tool use established that social learning, innovation, and tool use frequencies are positively correlated with species' relative and absolute “executive” brain volumes, after controlling for phylogeny and research effort. Moreover, innovation and social learning frequencies covary across species, in conflict with the view that there is an evolutionary tradeoff between reliance on individual experience and social cues. These findings provide an empirical link between behavioral innovation, social learning capacities, and brain size in mammals. The ability to learn from others, invent new behaviors, and use tools may have played pivotal roles in primate brain evolution.
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Russon, A. E., & Galdikas, B. M. F. (1995). Constraints on great apes' imitation: Model and action selectivity in rehabilitant orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus) imitation. J. Comp. Psychol., 109(1), 5–17.
Abstract: We discuss selectivity in great ape imitation, on the basis of an observational study of spontaneous imitation in free-ranging rehabilitant orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus). Research on great ape imitation has neglected selectivity, although comparative evidence suggests it may be important. We observed orangutans in central Indonesian Borneo and assessed patterns in the models and actions they spontaneously imitated. The patterns we found resembled those reported in humans. Orangutans preferred models with whom they had positive affective relationships (e.g., important caregiver or older sibling) and actions that reflected their current competence, were receptively familiar, and were relevant to tasks that faced them. Both developmental and individual variability were found. We discuss the probable functions of imitation for great apes and the role of selectivity in directing it. We also make suggestions for more effective elicitation of imitation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
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Sawaguchi, T., & Kudo, H. (1990). Neocortical development and social structure in primates. Primates, 31(2), 283–289.
Abstract: Abstract  The relationships between the relative size of the neocortex and differences in social structures were examined in prosimians and anthropoids. The relative size of the neocortex (RSN) of a given congeneric group in each superfamily of primates was measured based on the allometric relationships between neocortical volume and brain weight for each superfamily, to control phylogenetic affinity and the effects of brain size. In prosimians, “troop-making” congeneric groups (N=3) revealed a significantly larger RSN than solitary groups (N=6), and there was a significant, positive correlation between RSN and troop size. In the case of anthropoids, polygynous/frugivorous groups (N=5) revealed a significantly larger RSN than monogynous/frugivorous groups (N=8). Furthermore, a significant, positive correlation between RSN and troop size was found for frugivorous congeneric groups of the Ceboidea. These results suggest that neocortical development is associated with differences in social structure among primates.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2001). Cognitive strategies and the representation of social relations by monkeys. Nebr Symp Motiv, 47, 145–177.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2002). What are big brains for? Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 99(7), 4141–4142.
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Swartz, K. B. (1997). What is mirror self-recognition in nonhuman primates, and what is it not? Ann N Y Acad Sci, 818, 64–71.
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Whiten, A. (2000). Social complexity and social intelligence. In Novartis Foundation Symposium (Vol. 233, pp. 185–96; discussion pp. 196–201).
Abstract: When we talk of the 'nature of intelligence', or any other attribute, we may be referring to its essential structure, or to its place in nature, particularly the function it has evolved to serve. Here I examine both, from the perspective of the evolution of intelligence in primates. Over the last 20 years, the Social (or 'Machiavellian') Intelligence Hypothesis has gained empirical support. Its core claim is that the intelligence of primates is primarily an adaptation to the special complexities of primate social life. In addition to this hypothesis about the function of intellect, a secondary claim is that the very structure of intelligence has been moulded to be 'social' in character, an idea that presents a challenge to orthodox views of intelligence as a general-purpose capacity. I shall outline the principal components of social intelligence and the environment of social complexity it engages with. This raises the question of whether domain specificity is an appropriate characterization of social intelligence and its subcomponents, like theory of mind. As a counter-argument to such specificity I consider the hypothesis that great apes exhibit a cluster of advanced cognitive abilities that rest on a shared capacity for second-order mental representation.
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