Abstract: A. Whiten, D. M. Custance, J.-C. Gomez, P. Teixidor, and K. A. Bard (1996) tested chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) and human children's (Homo sapiens) skills at imitation with a 2-action test on an “artificial fruit.” Chimpanzees imitated to a restricted degree; children were more thoroughly imitative. Such results prompted some to assert that the difference in imitation indicates a difference in the subjects' understanding of the intentions of the demonstrator (M. Tomasello, 1996). In this experiment, 37 adult human subjects were tested with the artificial fruit. Far from being perfect imitators, the adults were less imitative than the children. These results cast doubt on the inference from imitative performance to an ability to understand others' intentions. The results also demonstrate how any test of imitation requires a control group and attention to the level of behavioral analysis.

Abstract: Both white-tailed deer, Odocoileus virginianus, and mule deer, O. hemionus, females defend fawns against coyotes, Canis latrans, but only mule deer defend nonoffspring conspecific and heterospecific fawns. During a predator attack, females may have to decide whether to defend a fawn while having imperfect information on its identity obtained from hearing a few distress calls. Although imperfect recognition can influence altruistic behaviour, few empirical studies have considered this point when testing functional explanations for altruism. We designed a series of playback experiments with fawn distress calls to test alternative hypotheses (by-product of parental care, kin selection, reciprocal altruism) for the mule deer's defence of nonoffspring, specifically allowing for the possibility that females mistake these fawns for their own. White-tailed deer females approached the speaker only when distress calls of white-tailed deer fawns were played and when their own fawn was hidden, suggesting that fawn defence was strictly a matter of parental care in this species. In contrast, mule deer females responded similarly and strongly, regardless of the caller's identity, the female's reproductive state (mother or nonmother) or the presence of their own offspring. The failure of mule deer females to adjust their responses to these conditions suggests that they do not defend nonoffspring because they mistake them for their own fawns. The lack of behavioural discrimination also suggests that kin selection, reciprocal altruism and defence of the offspring's area are unlikely to explain the mule deer's defence of nonoffspring. We identify causal and functional questions that still need to be addressed to understand why mule deer defend fawns so indiscriminately.

Abstract: Both humans and group-living animals associate and behave affiliatively more with some individuals than others. Human friendship has long been acknowledged, and recently scientists studying animal behaviour have started using the term friendship for close social associates in animals. Yet, while biologists describe friends as social tools to enhance fitness, social scientists describe human friendship as unconditional. We investigate whether these different descriptions reflect true differences in human friendship and animal close social associations or are a by-product of different research approaches: namely social scientists focussing on proximate and biologists on ultimate explanations. We first stress the importance of similar measures to determine close social associations, thereafter examine their ultimate benefits and proximate motivations, and discuss the latest findings on the central-neural regulation of social bonds. We conclude that both human friendship and animal close social associations are ultimately beneficial. On the proximate level, motivations for friendship in humans and for close social associations in animals are not necessarily based on benefits and are often unconditional. Moreover, humans share with many animals a similar physiological basis of sociality. Therefore, biologists and social scientist describe the same phenomenon, and the use of the term friendship for animals seems justified.

Abstract: Cognitive mechanisms are an important part of the organization of the behavior systems of animals. In the wild, animals regularly face problems that they must overcome in order to survive and thrive. Solving such problems often requires animals to process, store, retrieve, and act upon information from the environment--in other words, to use their cognitive skills. For example, animals may have to use navigational, tool-making or cooperative social skills in order to procure their food. However, many enrichment programs for captive animals do not include the integration of these types of cognitive challenges. Thus, foraging enrichments typically are designed to facilitate the physical expression of feeding behaviors such as food-searching and food consumption, but not to facilitate complex problem solving behaviors related to food acquisition. Challenging animals by presenting them with problems is almost certainly a source of frustration and stress. However, we suggest here that this is an important, and even necessary, feature of an enrichment program, as long as animals also possess the skills and resources to effectively solve the problems with which they are presented. We discuss this with reference to theories about the emotional consequences of coping with challenge, the association between lack of challenge and the development of abnormal behavior, and the benefits of stress (arousal) in facilitating learning and memory of relevant skills. Much remains to be done to provide empirical support for these theories. However, they do point the way to a practical approach to improving animal welfare--to design enrichments to facilitate the cognitive mechanisms which underlie the performance of complex behaviors that cannot be performed due to the restrictions inherent to the captive environment.

Abstract: Domestic hens were trained to run a Y-maze and make an association between differently coloured doorways and access to food pellets or sand. The hens were tested for their choice of doorway when the goals were not visible from the choice point and when they were food or sand deprived. Hens made the choice appropriate to their deprivation state (correct choice) significantly more often for food than sand and were faster at choosing and entering the goal box when food deprived. In a follow up experiment, the goals were visible from the choice point. Again the hens chose correctly significantly more often when food than sand deprived and made the choice and entered the goal box faster when food deprived. Thus, failure to choose sand in the first experiment was not due to an inability to learn the association, but appears to result from a strong motivation to feed in the Y-maze, even when not food deprived, and a weak motivation to dustbathe or forage, even when sand deprived.