Abstract: OBJECTIVE: To quantify variation in the jumping technique within and among young horses with little jumping experience, establish relationships between kinetic and kinematic variables, and identify a limited set of variables characteristic for detecting differences in jumping performance among horses. ANIMALS: Fifteen 4-year-old Dutch Warmblood horses. PROCEDURE: The horses were raised under standardized conditions and trained in accordance with a fixed protocol for a short period. Subsequently, horses were analyzed kinematically during free jumping over a fence with a height of 1.05 m. RESULTS: Within-horse variation in all variables that quantified jumping technique was smaller than variation among horses. However, some horses had less variation than others. Height of the center of gravity (CG) at the apex of the jump ranged from 1.80 to 2.01 m among horses; this variation could be explained by the variation in vertical velocity of the CG at takeoff (r, 0.78). Horses that had higher vertical velocity at takeoff left the ground and landed again farther from the fence, had shorter push-off phases for the forelimbs and hind limbs, and generated greater vertical acceleration of the CG primarily during the hind limb push-off. However, all horses cleared the fence successfully, independent of jumping technique. CONCLUSIONS AND CLINICAL RELEVANCE: Each horse had its own jumping technique. Differences among techniques were characterized by variations in the vertical velocity of the CG at takeoff. It must be determined whether jumping performance later in life can be predicted from observing free jumps of young horses.

Abstract: Conflict management is one of the primary requirements for social complexity. Of the many forms of conflict management, one of the rarest and most interesting is third-party policing, or intervening impartially to control conflict. Third-party policing should be hard to evolve because policers personally pay a cost for intervening, while the benefits are diffused over the whole group. In this study we investigate the incidence and costs of policing in a primate society. We report quantitative evidence of non-kin policing in the nonhuman primate, the pigtailed macaque. We find that policing is effective at reducing the intensity of or terminating conflict when performed by the most powerful individuals. We define a measure, social power consensus, that predicts effective low-cost interventions by powerful individuals and ineffective, relatively costly interventions by low-power individuals. Finally, we develop a simple probabilistic model to explore whether the degree to which policing can effectively reduce the societal cost of conflict is dependent on variance in the distribution of power. Our data and simple model suggest that third-party policing effectiveness and cost are dependent on power structure and might emerge only in societies with high variance in power.

Abstract: Hawk-dove games have been extensively used to predict the conditions under which group-living animals should defend their resources against potential usurpers. Typically, game-theoretic models on aggression consider that resource defense may entail energetic and injury costs. However, intruders may also take advantage of owners who are busy fighting to sneak access to unguarded resources, imposing thereby an additional cost on the use of the escalated hawk strategy. In this article we modify the two-strategy hawk-dove game into a three-strategy hawk-dove-sneaker game that incorporates a distraction-sneaking tactic, allowing us to explore its consequences on the expected level of aggression within groups. Our model predicts a lower proportion of hawks and hence lower frequencies of aggressive interactions within groups than do previous two-strategy hawk-dove games. The extent to which distraction sneakers decrease the frequency of aggression within groups, however, depends on whether they search only for opportunities to join resources uncovered by other group members or for both unchallenged resources and opportunities to usurp.

Abstract: Methods to describe dominance hierarchies are a key tool in primatology studies. Most current methods are appropriate for analyzing linear and near-linear hierarchies; however, more complex structures are common in primate groups. We propose a method termed “dominance-directed tree.” This method is based on graph theory and set theory to analyze dominance relationships in social groups. The method constructs a transitive matrix by imposing transitivity to the dominance matrix and produces a graphical representation of the dominance relationships, which allows an easy visualization of the hierarchical position of the individuals, or subsets of individuals. The method is also able to detect partial and complete hierarchies, and to describe situations in which hierarchical and nonhierarchical principles operate. To illustrate the method, we apply a dominance tree analysis to artificial data and empirical data from a group of Cebus apella.

Abstract: Recent evidence in natural and semi-natural settings has revealed a variety of left-right perceptual asymmetries among vertebrates. These include preferential use of the left or right visual hemifield during activities such as searching for food, agonistic responses, or escape from predators in animals as different as fish, amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals. There are obvious disadvantages in showing such directional asymmetries because relevant stimuli may be located to the animal's left or right at random; there is no a priori association between the meaning of a stimulus (e.g., its being a predator or a food item) and its being located to the animal's left or right. Moreover, other organisms (e.g., predators) could exploit the predictability of behavior that arises from population-level lateral biases. It might be argued that lateralization of function enhances cognitive capacity and efficiency of the brain, thus counteracting the ecological disadvantages of lateral biases in behavior. However, such an increase in brain efficiency could be obtained by each individual being lateralized without any need to align the direction of the asymmetry in the majority of the individuals of the population. Here we argue that the alignment of the direction of behavioral asymmetries at the population level arises as an “evolutionarily stable strategy” under “social” pressures occurring when individually asymmetrical organisms must coordinate their behavior with the behavior of other asymmetrical organisms of the same or different species.