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Thornton, A., & McAuliffe, K. (2006). Teaching in wild meerkats. Science, 313(5784), 227–229.
Abstract: Despite the obvious benefits of directed mechanisms that facilitate the efficient transfer of skills, there is little critical evidence for teaching in nonhuman animals. Using observational and experimental data, we show that wild meerkats (Suricata suricatta) teach pups prey-handling skills by providing them with opportunities to interact with live prey. In response to changing pup begging calls, helpers alter their prey-provisioning methods as pups grow older, thus accelerating learning without the use of complex cognition. The lack of evidence for teaching in species other than humans may reflect problems in producing unequivocal support for the occurrence of teaching, rather than the absence of teaching.
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Mulcahy, N. J., & Call, J. (2006). Apes save tools for future use. Science, 312(5776), 1038–1040.
Abstract: Planning for future needs, not just current ones, is one of the most formidable human cognitive achievements. Whether this skill is a uniquely human adaptation is a controversial issue. In a study we conducted, bonobos and orangutans selected, transported, and saved appropriate tools above baseline levels to use them 1 hour later (experiment 1). Experiment 2 extended these results to a 14-hour delay between collecting and using the tools. Experiment 3 showed that seeing the apparatus during tool selection was not necessary to succeed. These findings suggest that the precursor skills for planning for the future evolved in great apes before 14 million years ago, when all extant great ape species shared a common ancestor.
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Pennisi, E. (2006). Animal cognition. Social animals prove their smarts (Vol. 312).
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Blaisdell, A. P., Sawa, K., Leising, K. J., & Waldmann, M. R. (2006). Causal reasoning in rats. Science, 311(5763), 1020–1022.
Abstract: Empirical research with nonhuman primates appears to support the view that causal reasoning is a key cognitive faculty that divides humans from animals. The claim is that animals approximate causal learning using associative processes. The present results cast doubt on that conclusion. Rats made causal inferences in a basic task that taps into core features of causal reasoning without requiring complex physical knowledge. They derived predictions of the outcomes of interventions after passive observational learning of different kinds of causal models. These competencies cannot be explained by current associative theories but are consistent with causal Bayes net theories.
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Subiaul, F., Cantlon, J. F., Holloway, R. L., & Terrace, H. S. (2004). Cognitive imitation in rhesus macaques. Science, 305(5682), 407–410.
Abstract: Experiments on imitation typically evaluate a student's ability to copy some feature of an expert's motor behavior. Here, we describe a type of observational learning in which a student copies a cognitive rule rather than a specific motor action. Two rhesus macaques were trained to respond, in a prescribed order, to different sets of photographs that were displayed on a touch-sensitive monitor. Because the position of the photographs varied randomly from trial to trial, sequences could not be learned by motor imitation. Both monkeys learned new sequences more rapidly after observing an expert execute those sequences than when they had to learn new sequences entirely by trial and error.
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Bloom, P. (2004). Behavior. Can a dog learn a word? Science, 304(5677), 1605–1606.
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Crook, J. H. (1983). On attributing consciousness to animals. Nature, 303(5912), 11–14.
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Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2006). Mirrors of the mind. Sci Am, 295(5), 54–61.
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Leadbeater, E. (2015). What evolves in the evolution of social learning? J Zool, 295(1), 4–11.
Abstract: Social learning is fundamental to social life across the animal kingdom, but we still know little about how natural selection has shaped social learning abilities on a proximate level. Sometimes, complex social learning phenomena can be entirely explained by Pavlovian processes that have little to do with the evolution of sociality. This implies that the ability to learn socially could be an exaptation, not an adaptation, to social life but not that social learning abilities have been left untouched by natural selection. I discuss new empirical evidence for associative learning in social information use, explain how natural selection might facilitate the associative learning process and discuss why such studies are changing the way that we think about social learning.
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Van Schaik, C. (2006). Why are some animals so smart? Sci Am, 294(4), 64–71.
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