Abstract: Traditionally, dogs have been trained by operant conditioning techniques; that is, dogs make a desired behavioural response and this response is reinforced by a reward such as food. This type of training is very effective in training dogs to perform basic obedience behaviours (e.g. `stay'). However, dogs are social animals and should be predisposed to learn from social stimuli. In the present study, we used a modified version of the model-rival technique that has been extensively used in experiments investigating the cognitive ability of parrots. In this technique, social stimuli are used to create in the animal an interest in the object without the use of food or other rewards. Therefore, the animal learns the name of the object (intrinsic reward) and not that the object's name means food. In this experiment we compared the learning ability of nine pet dogs to solve the same retrieval-selection task having been previously trained using operant conditioning or model-rival techniques. The retrieval-selection task was the dogs had to correctly select the commanded object to bring to the experimenter from a group of three similar objects. The results show no difference in the speeds with which the dogs solved the test--demonstrating the efficacy of the model-rival method. This is the first time that the effectiveness of the model-rival technique has been experimentally demonstrated with dogs. Furthermore, we believe that the methodology reported in this paper has applications in dog training and in experiments into dog cognition.

Abstract: Marsh tits (Parus palustris) store single food items in scattered locations and recover them hours or days later. Some properties of the spatial memory involved were analyzed in two laboratory experiments. In the first, marsh tits were offered 97 sites for storing 12 seeds. They recovered a median of 65% of them 2-3 hr later, making only two errors per seed while doing so. Over trials, they used some sites more often than others, but during recovery they were more likely to visit a site of any preference value if they had stored a seed there that day than if they had not. Recovery performance was much worse if the experimenters moved the seeds between storage and recovery. A fixed search strategy that had some of the same average properties as the tits' search behavior also did worse than the real birds. In Experiment 2, any tendency to visit the same sites on successive daily tests in the aviary was placed in opposition to memory for storage sites by allowing the tits to store more seeds 2 hr after storing a first batch. They tended to avoid individual storage sites holding seeds from the first batch. When the tits searched for all the seeds 2 hr later, they tended to recover more seeds from the second batch than from the first, i.e., there was a recency effect.

Abstract: Three avian species, a seed-caching corvid (Clark's nutcrackers; Nucifraga columbiana), a non-seed-caching corvid (jackdaws; Corvus monedula), and a non-seed-caching columbid (pigeons; Columba livia), were tested for ability to learn to find a goal halfway between 2 landmarks when distance between the landmarks varied during training. All 3 species learned, but jackdaws took much longer than either pigeons or nutcrackers. The nutcrackers searched more accurately than either pigeons or jackdaws. Both nutcrackers and pigeons showed good transfer to novel landmark arrays in which interlandmark distances were novel, but inconclusive results were obtained from jackdaws. Species differences in this spatial task appear quantitative rather than qualitative and are associated with differences in natural history rather than phylogeny.

Abstract: Darwin argued that between-species differences in intelligence were differences of degree, not of kind. The contemporary ecological approach to animal cognition argues that animals have evolved species-specific and problem-specific processes to solve problems associated with their particular ecological niches: thus different species use different processes, and within a species, different processes are used to tackle problems involving different inputs. This approach contrasts both with Darwin's view and with the general process view, according to which the same central processes of learning and memory are used across an extensive range of problems involving very different inputs. We review evidence relevant to the claim that the learning and memory performance of non-human animals varies according to the nature of the stimuli involved. We first discuss the resource distribution hypothesis, olfactory learning-set formation, and the 'biological constraints' literature, but find no convincing support from these topics for the ecological account of cognition. We then discuss the claim that the performance of birds in spatial tasks of learning and memory is superior in species that depend heavily upon stored food compared to species that either show less dependence upon stored food or do not store food. If it could be shown that storing species enjoy a superiority specifically in spatial (and not non-spatial) tasks, this would argue that spatial tasks are indeed solved using different processes from those used in non-spatial tasks. Our review of this literature does not find a consistent superiority of storing over non-storing birds in spatial tasks, and, in particular, no evidence of enhanced superiority of storing species when the task demands are increased, by, for example, increasing the number of items to be recalled or the duration of the retention period. We discuss also the observation that the hippocampus of storing birds is larger than that of non-storing birds, and find evidence contrary to the view that hippocampal enlargement is associated with enhanced spatial memory; we are, however, unable to suggest a convincing alternative explanation for hippocampal enlargement. The failure to find solid support for the ecological view supports the view that there are no qualitative differences in cognition between animal species in the processes of learning and memory. We also argue that our review supports our contention that speculation about the phylogenetic development and function of behavioural processes does not provide a solid basis for gaining insight into the nature of those processes. We end by confessing to a belief in one major qualitative difference in cognition in animals: we believe that humans alone are capable of acquiring language, and that it is this capacity that divides our intelligence so sharply from non-human intelligence.

Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.