Abstract: REASONS FOR PERFORMING STUDY: Serious injuries to horses and riders in horse trials (HT) and three-day events (3DE) are usually associated with falls of horses, which invariably involve falls of the riders. Many potential causes for these falls have been discussed. OBJECTIVES: The aim of this case-control study was to investigate the risk factors for horse falls on the cross-country phase of horse trials and three-day events. METHODS: Using retrospective data, significant risk factors identified with unvariable analysis (P value <0.2) were entered into a multivariable logistic regression model. Significant risk factors (P value <0.05) were included in the final model. RESULTS: It was revealed that a number of course, obstacle and rider variables were significantly and independently associated with the risk of falling. Falling was associated with obstacles sited downhill (Odds ratio [OR] 8.41) and with obstacles with ditches in front (OR = 5.77). CONCLUSIONS: The relationship between course variables and the risk of falling was characterised and showed a significantly increased risk with increasing numbers of jumps on the course and for jumping efforts later in the course. In contrast, after allowing for the total number of obstacles on the course, an increase in the total number of jumping efforts appeared to have a protective effect. A later cross-country start time was associated with a decreased risk of a horse fall. Amateur event riders were approximately 20 times more likely to fall than professional riders. POTENTIAL CLINICAL RELEVANCE: This study has identified a number of risk factors associated with horse falls and highlights areas that can be altered to improve safety in cross-country competitions.

Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.

Abstract: Generalizations about neural function are often drawn from non-human animal models to human cognition, however, the assumption of cross-species conservation may sometimes be invalid. Humans may use different strategies mediated by alternative structures, or similar structures may operate differently within the context of the human brain. The transitive inference problem, considered a hallmark of logical reasoning, can be solved by non-human species via associative learning rather than logic. We tested whether humans use similar strategies to other species for transitive inference. Results are crucial for evaluating the validity of widely accepted assumptions of similar neural substrates underlying performance in humans and other animals. Here we show that successful transitive inference in humans is unrelated to use of associative learning strategies and is associated with ability to report the hierarchical relationship among stimuli. Our work stipulates that cross-species generalizations must be interpreted cautiously, since performance on the same task may be mediated by different strategies and/or neural systems.