Abstract: West Nile (WN) virus is a mosquito-borne flavivirus that is native to Africa, Europe, and Western Asia. It mainly circulates among birds, but can infect many species of mammals, as well as amphibians and reptiles. Epidemics can occur in rural as well as urban areas. Transmission of WN virus, sometimes involving significant mortality in humans and horses, has been documented at erratic intervals in many countries, but never in the New World until it appeared in New York City in 1999. During the next four summers it spread with incredible speed to large portions of 46 US states, and to Canada, Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. In many respects, WN virus is an outstanding example of a zoonotic pathogen that has leaped geographical barriers and can cause severe disease in human and equine. In Europe, in the past two decades there have been a number of significant outbreaks in several countries. However, very little is known of the ecology and natural history of WN virus transmission in Europe and most WN outbreaks in humans and animals remain unpredictable and difficult to control.

Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.

Abstract: Marten and Psarakos have presented some evidence which suggests that objective self-awareness and possibly representations of self may characterize the dolphins' experience of self. Their research demonstrates the possibility of similarities in the sense of self between primate species and dolphins, although whether dolphins have subjective self-awareness, personal memories, and theories of self--all important facets of the sense of self in humans--was not examined. Clearly, even this limited evidence was difficult to achieve; the difficulties in adapting methods and coding behavior are quite apparent in their report. Future progress, however, may depend upon clarification of what are the necessary components for a sense of self and an explication of how these might be reflected in dolphin behavior. We are mindful of the authors' point (pp. 219 and 220) that the dolphin lives more in an acoustic than a visual environment. Thus, while tasks relying upon vision may reveal the presence or absence of the sense of self in primates, it might well be the case that in dolphins self-related experiences might be better revealed in auditory tasks. But then, what is the nature of human self-awareness in terms of audition? While both conceptual and methodological hurdles remain, Marten and Psarakos have demonstrated that important questions can be asked about the minds and phenomenal worlds of nonanthropoid species.

Abstract: Gene expression affects social behavior only through changes in the excitabilities of neural circuits that govern the release of the relevant motor programs. In turn, social behavior affects gene expression only through patterns of sensory stimulation that produce significant activation of relevant portions of the nervous system. In crayfish, social interactions between pairs of animals lead to changes in behavior that mark the formation of a dominance hierarchy. Those changes in behavior result from changes in the excitability of specific neural circuits. In the new subordinate, circuits for offensive behavior become less excitable and those for defensive behavior become more excitable. Serotonin, which is implicated in mechanisms for social dominance in many animals, modulates circuits for escape and avoidance responses in crayfish. The modulatory effects of serotonin on the escape circuits have been found to change with social dominance, becoming excitatory in dominant crayfish and inhibitory in subordinates. These changes in serotonin's effects on escape affect the synaptic response to sensory input of a single cell, the lateral giant (LG) command neuron for escape. Moreover, these changes occur over a 2-week period and for the subordinate are reversible at any time following a reversal of the animal's status. The results have suggested that a persistent change in social status leads to a gradual change in the expression of serotonin receptors to a pattern that is more appropriate for the new status. To test that hypothesis, the expression patterns of crayfish serotonin receptors must be compared in dominant and subordinate animals. Two of potentially five serotonin receptors in crayfish have been cloned, sequenced, and pharmacologically characterized. Measurements of receptor expression in the whole CNS of dominant and subordinate crayfish have produced inconclusive results, probably because each receptor is widespread in the nervous system and is likely to experience opposite expression changes in different areas of the CNS. Both receptors have recently been found in identified neurons that mediate escape responses, and so the next step will be to measure their expression in these identified cells in dominant and subordinate animals.