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Fragaszy, D., & Visalberghi, E. (2004). Socially biased learning in monkeys. Learn Behav, 32(1), 24–35.
Abstract: We review socially biased learning about food and problem solving in monkeys, relying especially on studies with tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and callitrichid monkeys. Capuchin monkeys most effectively learn to solve a new problem when they can act jointly with an experienced partner in a socially tolerant setting and when the problem can be solved by direct action on an object or substrate, but they do not learn by imitation. Capuchin monkeys are motivated to eat foods, whether familiar or novel, when they are with others that are eating, regardless of what the others are eating. Thus, social bias in learning about foods is indirect and mediated by facilitation of feeding. In most respects, social biases in learning are similar in capuchins and callitrichids, except that callitrichids provide more specific behavioral cues to others about the availability and palatability of foods. Callitrichids generally are more tolerant toward group members and coordinate their activity in space and time more closely than capuchins do. These characteristics support stronger social biases in learning in callitrichids than in capuchins in some situations. On the other hand, callitrichids' more limited range of manipulative behaviors, greater neophobia, and greater sensitivity to the risk of predation restricts what these monkeys learn in comparison with capuchins. We suggest that socially biased learning is always the collective outcome of interacting physical, social, and individual factors, and that differences across populations and species in social bias in learning reflect variations in all these dimensions. Progress in understanding socially biased learning in nonhuman species will be aided by the development of appropriately detailed models of the richly interconnected processes affecting learning.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (1992). Meaning and mind in monkeys. Sci Am, 267(6), 122–128.
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Shettleworth, S. J. (2007). Animal behaviour: planning for breakfast. Nature, 445(7130), 825–826.
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Arnold, K., & Zuberbuhler, K. (2006). Language evolution: semantic combinations in primate calls. Nature, 441(7091), 303.
Abstract: Syntax sets human language apart from other natural communication systems, although its evolutionary origins are obscure. Here we show that free-ranging putty-nosed monkeys combine two vocalizations into different call sequences that are linked to specific external events, such as the presence of a predator and the imminent movement of the group. Our findings indicate that non-human primates can combine calls into higher-order sequences that have a particular meaning.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2001). Cognitive strategies and the representation of social relations by monkeys. Nebr Symp Motiv, 47, 145–177.
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Preston, S. D., & de Waal, F. B. M. (2002). Empathy: Its ultimate and proximate bases. Behav Brain Sci, 25(1), 1–20; discussion 20–71.
Abstract: There is disagreement in the literature about the exact nature of the phenomenon of empathy. There are emotional, cognitive, and conditioning views, applying in varying degrees across species. An adequate description of the ultimate and proximate mechanism can integrate these views. Proximately, the perception of an object's state activates the subject's corresponding representations, which in turn activate somatic and autonomic responses. This mechanism supports basic behaviors (e.g., alarm, social facilitation, vicariousness of emotions, mother-infant responsiveness, and the modeling of competitors and predators) that are crucial for the reproductive success of animals living in groups. The Perception-Action Model (PAM), together with an understanding of how representations change with experience, can explain the major empirical effects in the literature (similarity, familiarity, past experience, explicit teaching, and salience). It can also predict a variety of empathy disorders. The interaction between the PAM and prefrontal functioning can also explain different levels of empathy across species and age groups. This view can advance our evolutionary understanding of empathy beyond inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism and can explain different levels of empathy across individuals, species, stages of development, and situations.
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de Waal, F. B. (1977). The organization of agonistic relations within two captive groups of Java-monkeys (Macaca fascicularis). Z. Tierpsychol., 44(3), 225–282.
Abstract: The paper offers a detailed quantitative descripition of the distribution of agonistic activities over the members of two groups of Java-monkeys (Macaca fascicularis). These groups lived in captivity and were well-established: i.e. they had an extensive network of genealogical relationships. The study pays special attention to agonistic interactions with three or more participants. Its main purpose is an analysis of the way dyadic agonistic relations (e.g. dominance relations) are affected by third group members and the relations among these. The paper presents data on the ontogeny of 'dependent dominance', the 'control role' of the alpha-male, and the functions of different types of alliances.
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