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Riedel, J., Buttelmann, D., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) use a physical marker to locate hidden food. Anim. Cogn., 9(1), 27–35.
Abstract: Dogs can use the placement of an arbitrary marker to locate hidden food in an object-choice situation. We tested domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) in three studies aimed at pinning down the relative contributions of the human's hand and the marker itself. We baited one of two cups (outside of the dogs' view) and gave the dog a communicative cue to find the food. Study 1 systematically varied dogs' perceptual access to the marker placing event, so that dogs saw either the whole human, the hand only, the marker only, or nothing. Follow-up trials investigated the effect of removing the marker before the dog's choice. Dogs used the marker as a communicative cue even when it had been removed prior to the dog's choice and attached more importance to this cue than to the hand that placed it although the presence of the hand boosted performance when it appeared together with the marker. Study 2 directly contrasted the importance of the hand and the marker and revealed that the effect of the marker diminished if it had been associated with both cups. In contrast touching both cups with the hand had no effect on performance. Study 3 investigated whether the means of marker placement (intentional or accidental) had an effect on dogs' choices. Results showed that dogs did not differentiate intentional and accidental placing of the marker. These results suggest that dogs use the marker as a genuine communicative cue quite independently from the experimenter's actions.
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Lea, S. E. G., Goto, K., Osthaus, B., & Ryan, C. M. E. (2006). The logic of the stimulus. Anim. Cogn., 9(4), 247–256.
Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes-its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.
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Ward, C., & Smuts, B. B. (2007). Quantity-based judgments in the domestic dog (Canis lupus familiaris). Anim. Cogn., 10(1), 71–80.
Abstract: We examined the ability of domestic dogs to choose the larger versus smaller quantity of food in two experiments. In experiment 1, we investigated the ability of 29 dogs (results from 18 dogs were used in the data analysis) to discriminate between two quantities of food presented in eight different combinations. Choices were simultaneously presented and visually available at the time of choice. Overall, subjects chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller quantity, but they found numerically close comparisons more difficult. In experiment 2, we tested two dogs from experiment 1 under three conditions. In condition 1, we used similar methods from experiment 1 and tested the dogs multiple times on the eight combinations from experiment 1 plus one additional combination. In conditions 2 and 3, the food was visually unavailable to the subjects at the time of choice, but in condition 2, food choices were viewed simultaneously before being made visually unavailable, and in condition 3, they were viewed successively. In these last two conditions, and especially in condition 3, the dogs had to keep track of quantities mentally in order to choose optimally. Subjects still chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller quantity when the food was not simultaneously visible at the time of choice. Olfactory cues and inadvertent cuing by the experimenter were excluded as mechanisms for choosing larger quantities. The results suggest that, like apes tested on similar tasks, some dogs can form internal representations and make mental comparisons of quantity.
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Fiset, S., & Leblanc, V. (2007). Invisible displacement understanding in domestic dogs (Canis familiaris): the role of visual cues in search behavior. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 211–224.
Abstract: Recently, (Collier-Baker E, Davis JM, Suddendorf T (2004) J Comp Psychol 118:421-433) suggested that domestic dogs do not understand invisible displacements. In the present study, we further investigated the hypothesis that the search behavior of domestic dogs in invisible displacements is guided by various visual cues inherent to the task rather than by mental representation of an object's past trajectory. Specifically, we examined the role of the experimenter as a function of the final position of the displacement device in the search behavior of domestic dogs. Visible and invisible displacement problems were administered to dogs (N = 11) under two conditions. In the Visible-experimenter condition, the experimenter was visible whereas in the Concealed-experimenter condition, the experimenter was visibly occluded behind a large rigid barrier. Our data supported the conclusion that dogs do not understand invisible displacements but primarily search as a function of the final position of the displacement device and, to a lesser extent, the position of the experimenter.
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Burden, F., & Trawford, A. (2006). Equine interspecies aggression Comment on (Vol. 159).
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Call, J., Brauer, J., Kaminski, J., & Tomasello, M. (2003). Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) are sensitive to the attentional state of humans. J Comp Psychol, 117(3), 257–263.
Abstract: Twelve domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) were given a series of trials in which they were forbidden to take a piece of visible food. In some trials, the human continued to look at the dog throughout the trial (control condition), whereas in others, the human (a) left the room, (b) turned her back, (c) engaged in a distracting activity, or (d) closed her eyes. Dogs behaved in clearly different ways in most of the conditions in which the human did not watch them compared with the control condition, in which she did. In particular, when the human looked at them, dogs retrieved less food, approached it in a more indirect way, and sat (as opposed to laid down) more often than in the other conditions. Results are discussed in terms of domestic dogs' social-cognitive skills and their unique evolutionary and ontogenetic histories.
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Beaver, B. V. (1981). Problems & values associated with dominance. Vet Med Small Anim Clin, 76(8), 1129–1131.
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Morton, D. B. (2000). Self-consciousness and animal suffering. Biologist (London), 47(2), 77–80.
Abstract: Animals with relatively highly developed brains are likely to experience some degree of self-awareness and the ability to think. As well as being interesting in its own right, self-consciousness matters from an ethical point of view, since it can give rise to forms of suffering above and beyond the immediate physical sensations of pain or distress. This article surveys the evidence for animal self-consciousness and its implications for animal welfare.
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B. Agnetta,, B. Hare,, & M. Tomasello,. (2000). Cues to food location that domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) of different ages do and do not use. Anim. Cogn., 3(2), 107–112.
Abstract: Autoren
B. Agnetta, B. Hare, M. Tomasello
Zusammenfassung
The results of three experiments are reported. In the main study, a human experimenter presented domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) with a variety of social cues intended to indicate the location of hidden food. The novel findings of this study were: (1) dogs were able to use successfully several totally novel cues in which they watched a human place a marker in front of the target location; (2) dogs were unable to use the marker by itself with no behavioral cues (suggesting that some form of human behavior directed to the target location was a necessary part of the cue); and (3) there were no significant developments in dogs' skills in these tasks across the age range 4 months to 4 years (arguing against the necessity of extensive learning experiences with humans). In a follow-up study, dogs did not follow human gaze into “empty space” outside of the simulated foraging context. Finally, in a small pilot study, two arctic wolves (Canis lupus) were unable to use human cues to locate hidden food. These results suggest the possibility that domestic dogs have evolved an adaptive specialization for using human-produced directional cues in a goal-directed (especially foraging) context. Exactly how they understand these cues is still an open question.
Schlüsselwörter
Key words Dogs – Arctic wolves – Social cognition – Gaze following – Communication
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Brauer, J., Kaminski, J., Riedel, J., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Making inferences about the location of hidden food: social dog, causal ape. J Comp Psychol, 120(1), 38–47.
Abstract: Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) and great apes from the genus Pan were tested on a series of object choice tasks. In each task, the location of hidden food was indicated for subjects by some kind of communicative, behavioral, or physical cue. On the basis of differences in the ecologies of these 2 genera, as well as on previous research, the authors hypothesized that dogs should be especially skillful in using human communicative cues such as the pointing gesture, whereas apes should be especially skillful in using physical, causal cues such as food in a cup making noise when it is shaken. The overall pattern of performance by the 2 genera strongly supported this social-dog, causal-ape hypothesis. This result is discussed in terms of apes' adaptations for complex, extractive foraging and dogs' adaptations, during the domestication process, for cooperative communication with humans.
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