Abstract: Traditionally, dogs have been trained by operant conditioning techniques; that is, dogs make a desired behavioural response and this response is reinforced by a reward such as food. This type of training is very effective in training dogs to perform basic obedience behaviours (e.g. `stay'). However, dogs are social animals and should be predisposed to learn from social stimuli. In the present study, we used a modified version of the model-rival technique that has been extensively used in experiments investigating the cognitive ability of parrots. In this technique, social stimuli are used to create in the animal an interest in the object without the use of food or other rewards. Therefore, the animal learns the name of the object (intrinsic reward) and not that the object's name means food. In this experiment we compared the learning ability of nine pet dogs to solve the same retrieval-selection task having been previously trained using operant conditioning or model-rival techniques. The retrieval-selection task was the dogs had to correctly select the commanded object to bring to the experimenter from a group of three similar objects. The results show no difference in the speeds with which the dogs solved the test--demonstrating the efficacy of the model-rival method. This is the first time that the effectiveness of the model-rival technique has been experimentally demonstrated with dogs. Furthermore, we believe that the methodology reported in this paper has applications in dog training and in experiments into dog cognition.

Abstract: In a recent paper, Kaminski, Call and Fischer report pioneering research on word-learning in a dog. In this commentary we suggest ways of distinguishing referential word use from mere association. We question whether the dog is reasoning by exclusion and, if so, compare three explanations – learned heuristics, default assumptions, and pragmatic reasoning – as they apply to children and might apply to dogs. Kaminski et al.'s work clearly raises important questions about the origins and basis of word learning and social cognition.

Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes-its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.