Abstract: An ultrasonic flow probe was implanted around a branch of the left renal artery in five horses. The effects of dopamine were studied in the unsedated horses 10 days after surgery. Three experiments, separated by at least two days, were performed in random order on each horse. In two experiments, dopamine was infused intravenously for 60 mins at either 2.5 and 5.0 micrograms/kg bodyweight (bwt)/min. Saline was infused for 60 mins before and after each infusion, and for 180 mins in the third experiment as a control. Renal blood flow increased during administration of dopamine at both dose rates (P = 0.0001). Urine volume increased (P = 0.055), and osmolality decreased (P < 0.05), with infusion of dopamine at 5.0 micrograms/kg bwt/min. Arterial blood pressure and heart rate were not significantly affected. Fractional excretions of sodium and potassium were not significantly changed with dopamine infusion. The higher dopamine dose rate was accompanied by dysrhythmias in some horses.

Abstract: OBJECTIVE: To assess the effects of a single intravenous dose of butorphanol (0.1 mg kg(-1)) on the nociceptive withdrawal reflex (NWR) using threshold, suprathreshold and repeated subthreshold electrical stimuli in conscious horses. STUDY DESIGN: 'Unblinded', prospective experimental study. ANIMALS: Ten adult horses, five geldings and five mares, mean body mass 517 kg (range 487-569 kg). METHODS: The NWR was elicited using single transcutaneous electrical stimulation of the palmar digital nerve. Repeated stimulations were applied to evoke temporal summation. Surface electromyography was performed to record and quantify the responses of the common digital extensor muscle to stimulation and behavioural reactions were scored. Before butorphanol administration and at fixed time points up to 2 hours after injection, baseline threshold intensities for NWR and temporal summation were defined and single suprathreshold stimulations applied. Friedman repeated-measures analysis of variance on ranks and Wilcoxon signed-rank test were used with the Student-Newman-Keul's method applied post-hoc. The level of significance (alpha) was set at 0.05. RESULTS: Butorphanol did not modify either the thresholds for NWR and temporal summation or the reaction scores, but the difference between suprathreshold and threshold reflex amplitudes was reduced when single stimulation was applied. Upon repeated stimulation after butorphanol administration, a significant decrease in the relative amplitude was calculated for both the 30-80 and the 80-200 millisecond intervals after each stimulus, and for the whole post-stimulation interval in the right thoracic limb. In the left thoracic limb a decrease in the relative amplitude was found only in the 30-80 millisecond epoch. CONCLUSION: Butorphanol at 0.1 mg kg(-1) has no direct action on spinal Adelta nociceptive activity but may have some supraspinal effects that reduce the gain of the nociceptive system. CLINICAL RELEVANCE: Butorphanol has minimal effect on sharp immediate Adelta-mediated pain but may alter spinal processing and decrease the delayed sensations of pain.

Abstract: To study nutrition and metabolism in the fetal pig, a chronic catheterization method was developed that allows blood sampling in arteries and veins, at both the umbilical and uterine sources, in the conscious, unstressed animal. A catheter was inserted in the fetal aorta through a femoral artery, and another one was introduced in the umbilical vein. A catheter was put in a femoral artery of the sow so that its end was in the abdominal aorta. A fourth catheter was placed in a uterine vein draining the fetoplacental unit studied. This procedure was applied to 18 Large White primiparous sows at 99 d of gestation. Blood samples were drawn simultaneously using the four catheters before a meal at 103 d of pregnancy, and glucose, insulin, lactate, and fructose were determinated. Glycemia was 2.5 times higher in the sow than in the fetus. The extraction coefficient of glucose by the fetus amounted to 14% of the umbilical supply. The insulin level in the fetal pig was very low ( < 5 microU/mL). Lactate and fructose seemed to originate from the placenta. Blood lactate was 2.6 times lower in the sow than in the fetus, and its extraction coefficient by the fetus amounted to 8%. Fructose in the fetal blood was 2.3 times higher than that of glucose. Fructose was not utilized by the pig fetus. The present results obtained in the fetal pig are comparable to the conclusions drawn from studies with other species.

Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.

Abstract: The corpus callosum anatomically and functionally connects the two cerebral hemispheres. Despite its important role in interhemispheric communication however, severing the corpus callosum produces few--if any--noticeable cognitive or behavioral abnormalities. Incredibly, split-brain patients do not report any drastic changes in their conscious experience even though nearly all interhemispheric communication ceases after surgery. Extensive research has shown that both hemispheres remain conscious following disconnection and the conscious experience of each hemisphere is private and independent of the other. Additionally, the conscious experiences of the hemispheres appear to be qualitatively different, such that the consciousness of the left hemisphere is more enriched than the right. In this chapter, we offer explanations as to why split-brain patients feel unified despite possessing dual conscious experiences and discuss how the divided consciousness of split-brain patients can inform current theories of consciousness.