Abstract: Weaning in suckler calves influences performance in a learning task. The aim of the present study was to investigate whether the improved performance after weaning, including relocation, is due to differences in motivation for the reward or in learning abilities. Forty Aubrac calves were used; half of them were weaned from their dams at around eight months, the other half were weaned one month later. After weaning, calves were housed in groups of four in a new setting. From the day after weaning of the last group of calves, the animals were subjected to two tests: (1) an arena test, (2) a T-maze test where one arm led to either a social or a food reward. The T-maze test consisted of three sessions: in Session 1, trials were conducted until the animal acquired the task (i.e. did not take the unrewarded arm on three consecutive trials); in Session 2, the motivation for the reward was assessed via the walking time of the animal to reach the reward; in Session 3, the place of reward was reversed and the animals were trained until they acquired the new task. Calves weaned for one day explored more (P < 0.05) and had lower heart rates during the arena test (P < 0.05) compared to the ones weaned for one month. During the T-maze test, calves weaned for one month versus one day did not differ in their capacities to learn the initial route (Session 1) or in their motivation for either the social or food reward (Session 2). Calves weaned for one day learned significantly faster (P < 0.05) the reversed route (Session 3) than calves weaned for one month. Hence, the better performances at reversal in the T-maze by calves that have just been weaned cannot be accounted for by a higher motivation for the reward. A better cognitive control of their behaviour due to a lower stress state is suggested by our results.

Abstract: We review studies demonstrating the ability of some animals to understand the human pointing gesture. We present a 3-step analysis of the topic. (1) We compare and evaluate current experimental methods (2) We compare available experimental results on performance of different species and investigate the interaction of species differences and other independent variables (3) We evaluate how our present understanding of pointing comprehension answers questions about function, evolution and mechanisms. Recently, a number of different hypotheses have been put forward to account for the presence of this ability in some species and for the lack of such comprehension in others. In our view, there is no convincing evidence for the assumption that the competitive lifestyles of apes would inhibit the utilization of this human gesture. Similarly, domestication as a special evolutionary factor in the case of some species falls short in explaining high levels of pointing comprehension in some non-domestic species. We also disagree with the simplistic view of describing the phenomenon as a simple form of conditioning. We suggest that a more systematic comparative research is needed to understand the emerging communicative representational abilities in animals that provide the background for comprehending the human pointing gesture.

Abstract: A wireless acceleration measurement system was applied to free-moving cows and horses. Sensors were available as a collar and a flat box for measuring leg or trunk movements. Results were transmitted simultaneously by radio or stored in an 8-MB internal memory. As analytical procedures, frequency distributions with standard deviations, spectral analyses, and fractal analyses were applied. Bymeans of the collar sensor, basic behavior patterns (standing, grazing, walking, ruminating, drinking, and hay uptake) could be identified in cows. Lameness could be detected in cows and horses by means of the leg sensor. The portion of basic and harmonic spectral components was reduced; the fractal dimension was reduced. The system can be used for the detection and analysis of even small movements of free-moving humans or animals over several hours. It is convenient for the analysis of basic behaviors, emotional reactions, or events causing flight or fright or for comparing different housing elements, such as floors or fences.

Abstract: This study investigated the ability of chimpanzees, gorillas, orangutans, and bonobos to make inferences by exclusion using the procedure pioneered by Premack and Premack (Cognition 50:347-362, 1994) with chimpanzees. Thirty apes were presented with two different food items (banana vs. grape) on a platform and covered with identical containers. One of the items was removed from the container and placed between the two containers so that subjects could see it. After discarding this item, subjects could select between the two containers. In Experiment 1, apes preferentially selected the container that held the item that the experimenter had not discarded, especially if subjects saw the experimenter remove the item from the container (but without seeing the container empty). Experiment 3 in which the food was removed from one of the containers behind a barrier confirmed these results. In contrast, subjects performed at chance levels when a stimulus (colored plastic chip: Exp. 1; food item: Exp. 2 and Exp. 3) designated the item that had been removed. These results indicated that apes made inferences, not just learned to use a discriminative cue to avoid the empty container. Apes perceived and treated the item discarded by the experimenter as if it were the very one that had been hidden under the container. Results suggested a positive relationship between age and inferential ability independent of memory ability but no species differences.

Abstract: This paper examines the contribution of stimulus processing to animal logics. In the classic functionalist S-O-R view of learning (and cognition), stimuli provide the raw material to which the organism applies its cognitive processes-its logic, which may be taxon-specific. Stimuli may contribute to the logic of the organism's response, and may do so in taxon-specific ways. Firstly, any non-trivial stimulus has an internal organization that may constrain or bias the way that the organism addresses it; since stimuli can only be defined relative to the organism's perceptual apparatus, and this apparatus is taxon-specific, such constraints or biases will often be taxon-specific. Secondly, the representation of a stimulus that the perceptual system builds, and the analysis it makes of this representation, may provide a model for the synthesis and analysis done at a more cognitive level. Such a model is plausible for evolutionary reasons: perceptual analysis was probably perfected before cognitive analysis in the evolutionary history of the vertebrates. Like stimulus-driven analysis, such perceptually modelled cognition may be taxon-specific because of the taxon-specificity of the perceptual apparatus. However, it may also be the case that different taxa are able to free themselves from the stimulus logic, and therefore apply a more abstract logic, to different extents. This thesis is defended with reference to two examples of cases where animals' cognitive logic seems to be isomorphic with perceptual logic, specifically in the case of pigeons' attention to global and local information in visual stimuli, and dogs' failure to comprehend means-end relationships in string-pulling tasks.