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Plotnik, J. M., de Waal, F. B. M., & Reiss, D. (2006). Self-recognition in an Asian elephant. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 103(45), 17053–17057.
Abstract: Considered an indicator of self-awareness, mirror self-recognition (MSR) has long seemed limited to humans and apes. In both phylogeny and human ontogeny, MSR is thought to correlate with higher forms of empathy and altruistic behavior. Apart from humans and apes, dolphins and elephants are also known for such capacities. After the recent discovery of MSR in dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), elephants thus were the next logical candidate species. We exposed three Asian elephants (Elephas maximus) to a large mirror to investigate their responses. Animals that possess MSR typically progress through four stages of behavior when facing a mirror: (i) social responses, (ii) physical inspection (e.g., looking behind the mirror), (iii) repetitive mirror-testing behavior, and (iv) realization of seeing themselves. Visible marks and invisible sham-marks were applied to the elephants' heads to test whether they would pass the litmus “mark test” for MSR in which an individual spontaneously uses a mirror to touch an otherwise imperceptible mark on its own body. Here, we report a successful MSR elephant study and report striking parallels in the progression of responses to mirrors among apes, dolphins, and elephants. These parallels suggest convergent cognitive evolution most likely related to complex sociality and cooperation.
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Seyfarth, R. M., & Cheney, D. L. (2015). Social cognition. Animal Behaviour, 103, 191–202.
Abstract: The social intelligence hypothesis argues that competition and cooperation among individuals have shaped the evolution of cognition in animals. What do we mean by social cognition? Here we suggest that the building blocks of social cognition are a suite of skills, ordered roughly according to the cognitive demands they place upon individuals. These skills allow an animal to recognize others by various means; to recognize and remember other animals' relationships; and, perhaps, to attribute mental states to them. Some skills are elementary and virtually ubiquitous in the animal kingdom; others are more limited in their taxonomic distribution. We treat these skills as the targets of selection, and assume that more complex levels of social cognition evolve only when simpler methods are inadequate. As a result, more complex levels of social cognition indicate greater selective pressures in the past. The presence of each skill can be tested directly through field observations and experiments. In addition, the same methods that have been used to compare social cognition across species can also be used to measure individual differences within species and to test the hypothesis that individual differences in social cognition are linked to differences in reproductive success.
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de Waal, F. B. M., Dindo, M., Freeman, C. A., & Hall, M. J. (2005). The monkey in the mirror: hardly a stranger. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 102(32), 11140–11147.
Abstract: It is widely assumed that monkeys see a stranger in the mirror, whereas apes and humans recognize themselves. In this study, we question the former assumption by using a detailed comparison of how monkeys respond to mirrors versus live individuals. Eight adult female and six adult male brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) were exposed twice to three conditions: (i) a familiar same-sex partner, (ii) an unfamiliar same-sex partner, and (iii) a mirror. Females showed more eye contact and friendly behavior and fewer signs of anxiety in front of a mirror than they did when exposed to an unfamiliar partner. Males showed greater ambiguity, but they too reacted differently to mirrors and strangers. Discrimination between conditions was immediate, and blind coders were able to tell the difference between monkeys under the three conditions. Capuchins thus seem to recognize their reflection in the mirror as special, and they may not confuse it with an actual conspecific. Possibly, they reach a level of self-other distinction intermediate between seeing their mirror image as other and recognizing it as self.
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Meehan, C. L., & Mench, J. A. (2007). The challenge of challenge: Can problem solving opportunities enhance animal welfare? Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 102(3-4), 246–261.
Abstract: Cognitive mechanisms are an important part of the organization of the behavior systems of animals. In the wild, animals regularly face problems that they must overcome in order to survive and thrive. Solving such problems often requires animals to process, store, retrieve, and act upon information from the environment--in other words, to use their cognitive skills. For example, animals may have to use navigational, tool-making or cooperative social skills in order to procure their food. However, many enrichment programs for captive animals do not include the integration of these types of cognitive challenges. Thus, foraging enrichments typically are designed to facilitate the physical expression of feeding behaviors such as food-searching and food consumption, but not to facilitate complex problem solving behaviors related to food acquisition. Challenging animals by presenting them with problems is almost certainly a source of frustration and stress. However, we suggest here that this is an important, and even necessary, feature of an enrichment program, as long as animals also possess the skills and resources to effectively solve the problems with which they are presented. We discuss this with reference to theories about the emotional consequences of coping with challenge, the association between lack of challenge and the development of abnormal behavior, and the benefits of stress (arousal) in facilitating learning and memory of relevant skills. Much remains to be done to provide empirical support for these theories. However, they do point the way to a practical approach to improving animal welfare--to design enrichments to facilitate the cognitive mechanisms which underlie the performance of complex behaviors that cannot be performed due to the restrictions inherent to the captive environment.
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Lensink, J., Veissier, I., & Boissy, A. (2006). Enhancement of performances in a learning task in suckler calves after weaning and relocation: Motivational versus cognitive control?: A pilot study. Appl. Anim. Behav. Sci., 100(3-4), 171–181.
Abstract: Weaning in suckler calves influences performance in a learning task. The aim of the present study was to investigate whether the improved performance after weaning, including relocation, is due to differences in motivation for the reward or in learning abilities. Forty Aubrac calves were used; half of them were weaned from their dams at around eight months, the other half were weaned one month later. After weaning, calves were housed in groups of four in a new setting. From the day after weaning of the last group of calves, the animals were subjected to two tests: (1) an arena test, (2) a T-maze test where one arm led to either a social or a food reward. The T-maze test consisted of three sessions: in Session 1, trials were conducted until the animal acquired the task (i.e. did not take the unrewarded arm on three consecutive trials); in Session 2, the motivation for the reward was assessed via the walking time of the animal to reach the reward; in Session 3, the place of reward was reversed and the animals were trained until they acquired the new task. Calves weaned for one day explored more (P < 0.05) and had lower heart rates during the arena test (P < 0.05) compared to the ones weaned for one month. During the T-maze test, calves weaned for one month versus one day did not differ in their capacities to learn the initial route (Session 1) or in their motivation for either the social or food reward (Session 2). Calves weaned for one day learned significantly faster (P < 0.05) the reversed route (Session 3) than calves weaned for one month. Hence, the better performances at reversal in the T-maze by calves that have just been weaned cannot be accounted for by a higher motivation for the reward. A better cognitive control of their behaviour due to a lower stress state is suggested by our results.
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Reiss, D., & Marino, L. (2001). Mirror self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: a case of cognitive convergence. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(10), 5937–5942.
Abstract: The ability to recognize oneself in a mirror is an exceedingly rare capacity in the animal kingdom. To date, only humans and great apes have shown convincing evidence of mirror self-recognition. Two dolphins were exposed to reflective surfaces, and both demonstrated responses consistent with the use of the mirror to investigate marked parts of the body. This ability to use a mirror to inspect parts of the body is a striking example of evolutionary convergence with great apes and humans.
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Griffin, D. R. (2001). Animals know more than we used to think (Vol. 98).
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Hampton, R. R. (2001). Rhesus monkeys know when they remember. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(9), 5359–5362.
Abstract: Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.
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Thor, D. H., & Holloway, W. R. (1982). Social memory of the male laboratory rat. J. Comp. Physiol. Psychol., 96(6), 1000–1006.
Abstract: Used duration of social-investigatory behavior by 36 mature male Long-Evans rats as a measure of individual recognition in 5 experiments to assess social memory. In Exp I, the duration of social investigation during a 2nd exposure to the same juvenile (n[en space]=[en space]12) was directly related to the length of the interexposure interval. In Exp II, Ss were exposed to the same or different juvenile 10 min after an initial 5-min exposure to a novel juvenile; reexposure to the same juvenile elicited significantly less social investigation than an exposure to a different juvenile. Exps III and IV demonstrated that following a 5-min introductory exposure, social memory of the juvenile was relatively brief in comparison with that of mature Ss. Exp V revealed a retroactive interference effect on recently acquired memory for an individual: 12 mature Ss exposed to interpolated social experience engaged in significantly longer investigation of a juvenile than those with no interpolated social experience. The combined results suggest that (1) the rat normally engages in spontaneous learning of individual identity and (2) social memory may be a significant aspect of complex social interactions. (16 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved)
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De Boyer Des Roches, A., Richard-Yris, M. - A., Henry, S., Ezzaouia, M., & Hausberger, M. (2008). Laterality and emotions: visual laterality in the domestic horse (Equus caballus) differs with objects' emotional value. Physiol. Behav., 94(3), 487–490.
Abstract: Lateralization of emotions has received great attention in the last decades, both in humans and animals, but little interest has been given to side bias in perceptual processing. Here, we investigated the influence of the emotional valence of stimuli on visual and olfactory explorations by horses, a large mammalian species with two large monocular visual fields and almost complete decussation of optic fibres. We confronted 38 Arab mares to three objects with either a positive, negative or neutral emotional valence (novel object). The results revealed a gradient of exploration of the 3 objects according to their emotional value and a clear asymmetry in visual exploration. When exploring the novel object, mares used preferentially their right eyes, while they showed a slight tendency to use their left eyes for the negative object. No asymmetry was evidenced for the object with the positive valence. A trend for an asymmetry in olfactory investigation was also observed. Our data confirm the role of the left hemisphere in assessing novelty in horses like in many vertebrate species and the possible role of the right hemisphere in processing negative emotional responses. Our findings also suggest the importance of both hemispheres in the processing positive emotions. This study is, to our knowledge, the first to demonstrate clearly that the emotional valence of a stimulus induces a specific visual lateralization pattern.
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