Abstract: Primates give alarm calls in response to the presence of predators. In some species, such as the Thomas langur (Presbytis thomasi), males only emit alarm calls if there is an audience. An unanswered question is whether the audience's behaviour influences how long the male will continue his alarm calling. We tested three hypotheses that might explain the alarm calling duration of male Thomas langurs: the fatigue, group size and group member behaviour hypotheses. Fatigue and group size did not influence male alarm calling duration. We found that males only ceased calling shortly after all individuals in his group had given at least one alarm call. This shows that males keep track of and thus remember which group members have called.

Abstract: Individual recognition is an essential component of interactions in many social systems, but insects are often thought incapable of the sophistication necessary to recognize individuals. If this were true, it would impose limits on the societies that insects could form. For example, queens and workers of the paper wasp Polistes fuscatus form a linear dominance hierarchy that determines how food, work and reproduction are divided within the colony. Such a stable hierarchy would be facilitated if individuals of different ranks have some degree of recognition. P. fuscatus wasps have, to our knowledge, previously undocumented variability in their yellow facial and abdominal markings that are intriguing candidates for signals of individual identity. Here, I describe these highly variable markings and experimentally test whether P. fuscatus queens and workers use these markings to identify individual nest-mates visually. I demonstrate that individuals whose yellow markings are experimentally altered with paint receive more aggression than control wasps who are painted in a way that does not alter their markings. Further, aggression declines towards wasps with experimentally altered markings as these novel markings become familiar to their nestmates. This evidence for individual recognition in P. fuscatus indicates that interactions between insects may be even more complex than previously anticipated.
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Abstract: Animals process sensory information according to specific computational rules and, subsequently, form representations of their environments that form the basis for decisions and choices. The specific computational rules used by organisms will often be evolutionarily adaptive by generating higher probabilities of survival, reproduction, and resource acquisition. Experiments with enclosed colonies of bumblebees constrained to foraging on artificial flowers suggest that the bumblebee's cognitive architecture is designed to efficiently exploit floral resources from spatially structured environments given limits on memory and the neuronal processing of information. A non-linear relationship between the biomechanics of nectar extraction and rates of net energetic gain by individual bees may account for sensitivities to both the arithmetic mean and variance in reward distributions in flowers. Heuristic rules that lead to efficient resource exploitation may also lead to subjective misperception of likelihoods. Subjective probability formation may then be viewed as a problem in pattern recognition subject to specific sampling schemes and memory constraints.

Abstract: Complex social relationships among nonhuman primates appear to contribute to individual reproductive success. Experiments with and behavioral observations of natural populations suggest that sophisticated cognitive mechanisms may underlie primate social relationships. Similar capacities are usually less apparent in the nonsocial realm, supporting the view that at least some aspects of primate intelligence evolved to solve the challenges of interacting with conspecifics.

Abstract: Drawing on studies of humans, rodents, birds and arthropods, I show that 'cognitive maps' have been used to describe a wide variety of spatial concepts. There are, however, two main definitions. One, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, is that a cognitive map is a powerful memory of landmarks which allows novel short-cutting to occur. The other, sensu Gallistel, is that a cognitive map is any representation of space held by an animal. Other definitions with quite different meanings are also summarised. I argue that no animal has been conclusively shown to have a cognitive map, sensu Tolman, O'Keefe and Nadel, because simpler explanations of the crucial novel short-cutting results are invariably possible. Owing to the repeated inability of experimenters to eliminate these simpler explanations over at least 15 years, and the confusion caused by the numerous contradictory definitions of a cognitive map, I argue that the cognitive map is no longer a useful hypothesis for elucidating the spatial behaviour of animals and that use of the term should be avoided.