Abstract: Numerous investigators have argued that early ontogenetic immersion in sociocultural environments facilitates cognitive developmental change in human-reared great apes more characteristic of Homo sapiens than of their own species. Such revamping of core, species-typical psychological systems might be manifest, according to this argument, in the emergence of mental representational competencies, a set of social cognitive skills theoretically consigned to humans alone. Human-reared great apes' capacity to engage in “true imitation,” in which both the means and ends of demonstrated actions are reproduced with fairly high rates of fidelity, and laboratory great apes' failure to do so, has frequently been interpreted as reflecting an emergent understanding of intentionality in the former. Although this epigenetic model of the effects of enculturation on social cognitive systems may be well-founded and theoretically justified in the biological literature, alternative models stressing behavioral as opposed to representational change have been largely overlooked. Here I review some of the controversy surrounding enculturation in great apes, and present an alternative nonmentalistic version of the enculturation hypothesis that can also account for enhanced imitative performance on object-oriented problem-solving tasks in human-reared animals.

Abstract: When novel and familiar faces are viewed simultaneously, humans and monkeys show a preference for looking at the novel face. The facial features attended to in familiar and novel faces, were determined by analyzing the visual exploration patterns, or scanpaths, of four monkeys performing a visual paired comparison task. In this task, the viewer was first familiarized with an image and then it was presented simultaneously with a novel and the familiar image. A looking preference for the novel image indicated that the viewer recognized the familiar image and hence differentiates between the familiar and the novel images. Scanpaths and relative looking preference were compared for four types of images: (1) familiar and novel objects, (2) familiar and novel monkey faces with neutral expressions, (3) familiar and novel inverted monkey faces, and (4) faces from the same monkey with different facial expressions. Looking time was significantly longer for the novel face, whether it was neutral, expressing an emotion, or inverted. Monkeys did not show a preference, or an aversion, for looking at aggressive or affiliative facial expressions. The analysis of scanpaths indicated that the eyes were the most explored facial feature in all faces. When faces expressed emotions such as a fear grimace, then monkeys scanned features of the face, which contributed to the uniqueness of the expression. Inverted facial images were scanned similarly to upright images. Precise measurement of eye movements during the visual paired comparison task, allowed a novel and more quantitative assessment of the perceptual processes involved the spontaneous visual exploration of faces and facial expressions. These studies indicate that non-human primates carry out the visual analysis of complex images such as faces in a characteristic and quantifiable manner.

Abstract: Human subjects represent the location of a point in 2D space using two independent dimensions (x-y in Euclidean or radius-angle in polar space), and encode location in memory along these dimensions using two levels of representation: a fine-grain value and a category. Here we determined whether monkeys possessed the ability to represent location with these two levels of coding. A rhesus monkey was trained to reproduce the location of a dot in a circle by pointing, after a delay period, on the location where a dot was presented. Five different delay periods (0.5-5 s) were used. The results showed that the monkey used a polar coordinate system to represent the fine-grain spatial coding, where the radius and angle of the dots were encoded independently. The variability of the spatial response and reaction time increased with longer delays. Furthermore, the animal was able to form a categorical representation of space that was delay-dependent. The responses avoided the circumference and the center of the circle, defining a categorical radial prototype around one third of the total radial length. This radial category was observed only at delay durations of 3-5 s. Finally, the monkey also formed angular categories with prototypes at the obliques of the quadrants of the circle, avoiding the horizontal and vertical axes. However, these prototypes were only observed at the 5-s delay and on dots lying on the circumference. These results indicate that monkeys may possess spatial cognitive abilities similar to humans.

Abstract: This paper aims to review a long-term research project exploring the chimpanzee mind within historical and ecological contexts. The Ai project began in 1978 and was directly inspired by preceding ape-language studies conducted in Western countries. However, in contrast with the latter, it has focused on the perceptual and cognitive capabilities of chimpanzees rather than communicative skills between humans and chimpanzees. In the original setting, a single chimpanzee faced a computer-controlled apparatus and performed various kinds of matching-to-sample discrimination tasks. Questions regarding the chimpanzee mind can be traced back to Wolfgang Koehler's work in the early part of the 20th century. Yet, Japan has its unique natural and cultural background: it is home to an indigenous primate species, the Japanese snow monkey. This fact has contributed to the emergence of two previous projects in the wild led by the late Kinji Imanishi and his students. First, the Koshima monkey project began in 1948 and became famous for its discovery of the cultural propagation of sweet-potato washing behavior. Second, pioneering work in Africa, starting in 1958, aimed to study great apes in their natural habitat. Thanks to the influence of these intellectual ancestors, the present author also undertook the field study of chimpanzees in the wild, focusing on tool manufacture and use. This work has demonstrated the importance of social and ecological perspectives even for the study of the mind. Combining experimental approaches with a field setting, the Ai project continues to explore cognition and behavior in chimpanzees, while its focus has shifted from the study of a single subject toward that of the community as a whole.

Abstract: We investigated the behavioural and cognitive development of a captive male infant chimpanzee, Ayumu, raised by his mother, Ai. Here we report Ayumu's achievements up to the age of 2 years and 3 months, in the context of complex computer-controlled tasks. From soon after birth, Ayumu had been present during an experiment performed by his mother. The task consisted of two phases, a matching-to-sample task in which she received token rewards, and the insertion of these tokens into a vending machine to obtain food rewards. Ayumu himself received no reward or encouragement from humans for any of the actions he exhibited during the experiment. At the age of 9 months and 3 weeks, Ayumu performed his first matching-to-sample trial. At around 1 year and 3 months, he began to perform them consistently. Also during this period, he frequently stole food rewards from his mother. At 2 years and 3 months, Ayumu succeeded for the first time in inserting a token into the vending machine. Once he had succeeded in using a token, he performed both phases of the task in sequence 20 times consecutively. The infant's behaviour was not shaped by food rewards but by a strong motivation to copy his mother's behaviour. Our observations of Ayumu thus mirror the learning processes shown by wild chimpanzees.