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Hampton, R. R. (2001). Rhesus monkeys know when they remember. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 98(9), 5359–5362.
Abstract: Humans are consciously aware of some memories and can make verbal reports about these memories. Other memories cannot be brought to consciousness, even though they influence behavior. This conspicuous difference in access to memories is central in taxonomies of human memory systems but has been difficult to document in animal studies, suggesting that some forms of memory may be unique to humans. Here I show that rhesus macaque monkeys can report the presence or absence of memory. Although it is probably impossible to document subjective, conscious properties of memory in nonverbal animals, this result objectively demonstrates an important functional parallel with human conscious memory. Animals able to discern the presence and absence of memory should improve accuracy if allowed to decline memory tests when they have forgotten, and should decline tests most frequently when memory is attenuated experimentally. One of two monkeys examined unequivocally met these criteria under all test conditions, whereas the second monkey met them in all but one case. Probe tests were used to rule out “cueing” by a wide variety of environmental and behavioral stimuli, leaving detection of the absence of memory per se as the most likely mechanism underlying the monkeys' abilities to selectively decline memory tests when they had forgotten.
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Hampton, R. R., Zivin, A., & Murray, E. A. (2004). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) discriminate between knowing and not knowing and collect information as needed before acting. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 239–246.
Abstract: Humans use memory awareness to determine whether relevant knowledge is available before acting, as when we determine whether we know a phone number before dialing. Such metacognition, or thinking about thinking, can improve selection of appropriate behavior. We investigated whether rhesus monkeys ( Macaca mulatta) are capable of a simple form of metacognitive access to the contents of short-term memory. Monkeys chose among four opaque tubes, one of which concealed food. The tube containing the reward varied randomly from trial to trial. On half the trials the monkeys observed the experimenter baiting the tube, whereas on the remaining trials their view of the baiting was blocked. On each trial, monkeys were allowed a single chance to select the tube containing the reward. During the choice period the monkeys had the opportunity to look down the length of each tube, to determine if it contained food. When they knew the location of the reward, most monkeys chose without looking. In contrast, when ignorant, monkeys often made the effort required to look, thereby learning the location of the reward before choosing. Looking improved accuracy on trials on which monkeys had not observed the baiting. The difference in looking behavior between trials on which the monkeys knew, and trials on which they were ignorant, suggests that rhesus monkeys discriminate between knowing and not knowing. This result extends similar observations made of children and apes to a species of Old World monkey, suggesting that the underlying cognitive capacities may be widely distributed among primates.
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Herrmann, E., Melis, A. P., & Tomasello, M. (2006). Apes' use of iconic cues in the object-choice task. Anim. Cogn., 9(2), 118–130.
Abstract: In previous studies great apes have shown little ability to locate hidden food using a physical marker placed by a human directly on the target location. In this study, we hypothesized that the perceptual similarity between an iconic cue and the hidden reward (baited container) would help apes to infer the location of the food. In the first two experiments, we found that if an iconic cue is given in addition to a spatial/indexical cue – e.g., picture or replica of a banana placed on the target location – apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, gorillas) as a group performed above chance. However, we also found in two further experiments that when iconic cues were given on their own without spatial/indexical information (iconic cue held up by human with no diagnostic spatial/indexical information), the apes were back to chance performance. Our overall conclusion is that although iconic information helps apes in the process of searching hidden food, the poor performance found in the last two experiments is due to apes' lack of understanding of the informative (cooperative) communicative intention of the experimenter.
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Hill, S. E., & Ryan, M. J. (2006). The role of model female quality in the mate choice copying behaviour of sailfin mollies. Biol Lett, 2(2), 203–205.
Abstract: Female mate choice copying is a socially mediated mate choice behaviour, in which a male's attractiveness to females increases if he was previously chosen by another female as a mate. Although copying has been demonstrated in numerous species, little is known about the specific benefits it confers to copying females. Here we demonstrate that the mate choice behaviour of female sailfin mollies (Poecilia latipinna) is influenced by the phenotypic quality of model females with whom males are observed consorting. Test females choosing between two males of similar body length were found to significantly increase time spent with previously non-preferred males after having observed them with a relatively high-quality female. Conversely, females were found to significantly decrease time spent with previously preferred males after having observed them with a relatively low-quality female. Female mate choice copying might be maintained by selection based on the heuristic value it provides females choosing between males whose quality differences are not easily distinguishable.
Keywords: Animals; *Choice Behavior; Female; Male; *Mating Preference, Animal; Poecilia/*physiology
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Jackson, R. R., & Li, D. (2004). One-encounter search-image formation by araneophagic spiders. Anim. Cogn., 7(4), 247–254.
Abstract: An experimental study of search-image use by araneophagic jumping spiders (i.e., salticid spiders that prey routinely on other spiders) supports five conclusions. First, araneophagic salticids have an innate predisposition to form search images for specific prey from their preferred prey category (spiders) rather than for prey from a non-preferred category (insects). Second, single encounters are sufficient for forming search images. Third, search images are based on selective attention specifically to optical cues. Fourth, there are trade-offs in attention during search-image use (i.e., forming a search image for one type of spider diminishes the araneophagic salticid's attention to other spiders). Fifth, the araneophagic salticid's adoption of search images is costly to the prey (i.e., when the araneophagic salticid adopts a search, the prey's prospects for surviving encounters with the araneophagic salticid are diminished). Cognitive and ecological implications of search-image use are discussed.
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Martin, T. I., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). Post-choice information processing by pigeons. Anim. Cogn., 8(4), 273–278.
Abstract: In a conditional discrimination (matching-to-sample), a sample is followed by two comparison stimuli, one of which is correct, depending on the sample. Evidence from previous research suggests that if the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect response (the so-called penalty-time procedure), acquisition by pigeons is facilitated. The present research tested the hypothesis that the penalty-time procedure allows the pigeons to review and learn from the maintained stimulus display following an incorrect choice. It did so by including a penalty-time group for which, following an incorrect choice, the sample changed to match the incorrect comparison, thus providing the pigeons with post-choice 'misinformation.' This misinformation group acquired the matching task significantly slower than the standard penalty-time group (that had no change in the sample following an error). Furthermore, acquisition of matching by a control group that received no penalty time fell midway between the other two groups, suggesting that the pigeons did not merely take more care in making choices because of the aversiveness of penalty-time. Thus, it appears that in the acquisition of matching-to-sample, when the stimulus display is maintained following an incorrect choice, the pigeons can review or acquire information from the display. This is the first time that such an effect has been reported for a nonhuman species.
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Naug, D., & Arathi, H. S. (2007). Sampling and decision rules used by honey bees in a foraging arena. Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 117–124.
Abstract: Animals must continuously choose among various available options to exploit the most profitable resource. They also need to keep themselves updated about the values of all available options, since their relative values can change quickly due to depletion or exploitation by competitors. While the sampling and decision rules by which foragers profitably exploit a flower patch have attracted a great deal of attention in theory and experiments with bumble bees, similar rules for honey bee foragers, which face similar foraging challenges, are not as well studied. By presenting foragers of the honey bee Apis cerana with choice tests in a foraging arena and recording their behavior, we investigate possible sampling and decision rules that the foragers use to choose one option over another and to track other options. We show that a large part of the sampling and decision-making process of a foraging honey bee can be explained by decomposing the choice behavior into dichotomous decision points and incorporating the cost of sampling. The results suggest that a honey bee forager, by using a few simple rules as part of a Bayesian inference process, is able to effectively deal with the complex task of successfully exploiting foraging patches that consist of dynamic and multiple options.
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Neuringer, A. (2004). Reinforced variability in animals and people: implications for adaptive action. Am Psychol, 59(9), 891–906.
Abstract: Although reinforcement often leads to repetitive, even stereotyped responding, that is not a necessary outcome. When it depends on variations, reinforcement results in responding that is diverse, novel, indeed unpredictable, with distributions sometimes approaching those of a random process. This article reviews evidence for the powerful and precise control by reinforcement over behavioral variability, evidence obtained from human and animal-model studies, and implications of such control. For example, reinforcement of variability facilitates learning of complex new responses, aids problem solving, and may contribute to creativity. Depression and autism are characterized by abnormally repetitive behaviors, but individuals afflicted with such psychopathologies can learn to vary their behaviors when reinforced for so doing. And reinforced variability may help to solve a basic puzzle concerning the nature of voluntary action.
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Nyman, S., & Dahlborn, K. (2001). Effect of water supply method and flow rate on drinking behavior and fluid balance in horses. Physiol. Behav., 73(1-2), 1–8.
Abstract: This study investigated three methods of water supply on drinking preference and behavior in six Standardbred geldings (2-9 years, 505+/-9 kg). The water sources were buckets (B), pressure valve (PV), and float valve (FV) bowls. In an initial drinking preference test, PV was tested at three flow rates: 3, 8, and 16 l/min (PV3, PV8, and PV16), and FV at 3 l/min (FV3). Water intake was measured in l and presented as the percentage of the total daily water intake from each of two simultaneously presented alternatives. The intake from PV8 was greater than from both PV3 (72+/-11% vs. 28+/-11%) and PV16 (90+/-4% vs. 10+/-4%). All horses showed a strong preference for B, 98+/-1% of the intake compared to 2+/-1% from PV8. Individual variation in the data gave no significant difference in preference between the two automatic bowls. In the second part of the study, drinking behavior and fluid balance were investigated when the horses drank from FV3, PV8, and B for 7 consecutive days in a changeover design. Despite a tendency for an increase in total daily drinking time from FV3, the daily water intake was significantly lower (43+/-3 ml/kg) than from PV8 (54+/-2 ml/kg) and B (58+/-3 ml/kg). Daily net water gain [intake-(fecal+urinary output)] was only 0.5+/-3 ml/kg with FV3, resulting in a negative fluid balance if insensible losses are included. These results show that the water supply method can affect both drinking behavior and fluid balance in the horse.
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Real, L. A. (1991). Animal choice behavior and the evolution of cognitive architecture. Science, 253(5023), 980–986.
Abstract: Animals process sensory information according to specific computational rules and, subsequently, form representations of their environments that form the basis for decisions and choices. The specific computational rules used by organisms will often be evolutionarily adaptive by generating higher probabilities of survival, reproduction, and resource acquisition. Experiments with enclosed colonies of bumblebees constrained to foraging on artificial flowers suggest that the bumblebee's cognitive architecture is designed to efficiently exploit floral resources from spatially structured environments given limits on memory and the neuronal processing of information. A non-linear relationship between the biomechanics of nectar extraction and rates of net energetic gain by individual bees may account for sensitivities to both the arithmetic mean and variance in reward distributions in flowers. Heuristic rules that lead to efficient resource exploitation may also lead to subjective misperception of likelihoods. Subjective probability formation may then be viewed as a problem in pattern recognition subject to specific sampling schemes and memory constraints.
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