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Ayres, C. M., Davey, L. M., & German, W. J. (1963). Cerebral Hydatidosis. Clinical Case Report With A Review Of Pathogenesis. J Neurosurg, 20, 371–377.
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Menges, R. W., Furcolow, M. L., Selby, L. A., Habermann, R. T., & Smith, C. D. (1967). Ecologic studies of histoplasmosis. Am J Epidemiol, 85(1), 108–119.
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Manning, G. S., & Ratanarat, C. (1970). Fasciolopsis buski (Lankester, 1857) in Thailand. Am J Trop Med Hyg, 19(4), 613–619.
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Yamada, T., Rojanasuphot, S., Takagi, M., Wungkobkiat, S., & Hirota, T. (1971). Studies on an epidemic of Japanese encephalitis in the northern region of Thailand in 1969 and 1970. Biken J, 14(3), 267–296.
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Sabattini, M. S., Monath, T. P., Mitchell, C. J., Daffner, J. F., Bowen, G. S., Pauli, R., et al. (1985). Arbovirus investigations in Argentina, 1977-1980. I. Historical aspects and description of study sites. Am J Trop Med Hyg, 34(5), 937–944.
Abstract: This is the introductory paper to a series on the ecology of arboviruses in Argentina. Epizootics of equine encephalitis have occurred since at least 1908, principally in the Pampa and Espinal biogeographic zones, with significant economic losses; human cases of encephalitis have been rare or absent. Both western equine and eastern equine encephalitis viruses have been isolated from horses during these epizootics, but the mosquitoes responsible for transmission have not been identified. A number of isolations of Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus were reported between 1936 and 1958 in Argentina, but the validity of these findings has been seriously questioned. Nevertheless, serological evidence exists for human infections with a member of the VEE virus complex. Serological surveys conducted in the 1960s indicate a high prevalence of infection of humans and domestic animals with St. Louis encephalitis (SLE), and 2 SLE virus strains have been isolated from rodents. Human disease, however, has rarely been associated with SLE infection. Only 7 isolations of other arboviruses have been described (3 of Maguari, 1 of Aura, 2 of Una, and 1 of an untyped Bunyamwera group virus). In 1977, we began longitudinal field studies in Santa Fe Province, the epicenter of previous equine epizootics, and in 1980 we extended these studies to Chaco and Corrientes provinces. The study sites are described in this paper.
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Virányi, Z., Topál, J., Miklósi, Á., & Csányi, V. (2006). A nonverbal test of knowledge attribution: a comparative study on dogs and children. Anim. Cogn., 9(1), 13–26.
Abstract: The sensitivity of eleven pet dogs and eleven 2.5-year-old children to others' past perceptual access was tested for object-specificity in a playful, nonverbal task in which a human Helper's knowledge state regarding the whereabouts of a hidden toy and a stick (a tool necessary for getting the out-of-reach toy) was systematically manipulated. In the four experimental conditions the Helper either participated or was absent during hiding of the toy and the stick and therefore she knew the place(s) of (1) both the toy and the stick, (2) only the toy, (3) only the stick or (4) neither of them. The subjects observed the hiding processes, but they could not reach the objects, so they had to involve the Helper to retrieve the toy. The dogs were more inclined to signal the place of the toy in each condition and indicated the location of the stick only sporadically. However the children signalled both the location of the toy and that of the stick in those situations when the Helper had similar knowledge regarding the whereabouts of them (i.e. knew or ignored both of them), and in those conditions in which the Helper was ignorant of the whereabouts of only one object the children indicated the place of this object more often than that of the known one. At the same time however, both dogs and children signalled the place of the toy more frequently if the Helper had been absent during toy-hiding compared to those conditions when she had participated in the hiding. Although this behaviour appears to correspond with the Helper's knowledge state, even the subtle distinction made by the children can be interpreted without a casual understanding of knowledge-formation in others.
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Hayashi, M., & Matsuzawa, T. (2003). Cognitive development in object manipulation by infant chimpanzees. Anim. Cogn., 6(4), 225–233.
Abstract: This study focuses on the development of spontaneous object manipulation in three infant chimpanzees during their first 2 years of life. The three infants were raised by their biological mothers who lived among a group of chimpanzees. A human tester conducted a series of cognitive tests in a triadic situation where mothers collaborated with the researcher during the testing of the infants. Four tasks were presented, taken from normative studies of cognitive development of Japanese infants: inserting objects into corresponding holes in a box, seriating nesting cups, inserting variously shaped objects into corresponding holes in a template, and stacking up wooden blocks. The mothers had already acquired skills to perform these manipulation tasks. The infants were free to observe the mothers' manipulative behavior from immediately after birth. We focused on object-object combinations that were made spontaneously by the infant chimpanzees, without providing food reinforcement for any specific behavior that the infants performed. The three main findings can be summarized as follows. First, there was precocious appearance of object-object combination in infant chimpanzees: the age of onset (8-11 months) was comparable to that in humans (around 10 months old). Second, object-object combinations in chimpanzees remained at a low frequency between 11 and 16 months, then increased dramatically at the age of approximately 1.5 years. At the same time, the accuracy of these object-object combinations also increased. Third, chimpanzee infants showed inserting behavior frequently and from an early age but they did not exhibit stacking behavior during their first 2 years of life, in clear contrast to human data.
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Bovet, D., Vauclair, J., & Blaye, A. (2005). Categorization and abstraction abilities in 3-year-old children: a comparison with monkey data. Anim. Cogn., 8(1), 53–59.
Abstract: Three-year-old children were tested on three categorization tasks of increasing levels of abstraction (used with adult baboons in an earlier study): the first was a conceptual categorization task (food vs toys), the second a perceptual matching task (same vs different objects), and the third a relational matching task in which the children had to sort pairs according to whether or not the two items belonged to the same or different categories. The children were tested using two different procedures, the first a replication of the procedure used with the baboons (pulling one rope for a category or a relationship between two objects, and another rope for the other category or relationship), the second a task based upon children's prior experiences with sorting objects (putting in the same box objects belonging to the same category or a pair of objects exemplifying the same relation). The children were able to solve the first task (conceptual categorization) when tested with the sorting into boxes procedure, and the second task (perceptual matching) when tested with both procedures. The children were able to master the third task (relational matching) only when the rules were clearly explained to them, but not when they could only watch sorting examples. In fact, the relational matching task without explanation requires analogy abilities that do not seem to be fully developed at 3 years of age. The discrepancies in performances between children tested with the two procedures, with the task explained or not, and the discrepancies observed between children and baboons are discussed in relation to differences between species and/or problem-solving strategies.
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Call, J., Carpenter, M., & Tomasello, M. (2005). Copying results and copying actions in the process of social learning: chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens). Anim. Cogn., 8(3), 151–163.
Abstract: There is currently much debate about the nature of social learning in chimpanzees. The main question is whether they can copy others' actions, as opposed to reproducing the environmental effects of these actions using their own preexisting behavioral strategies. In the current study, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and human children (Homo sapiens) were shown different demonstrations of how to open a tube-in both cases by a conspecific. In different experimental conditions, demonstrations consisted of (1) action only (the actions necessary to open the tube without actually opening it); (2) end state only (the open tube, without showing any actions); (3) both of these components (in a full demonstration); or (4) neither of these components (in a baseline condition). In the first three conditions subjects saw one of two different ways that the tube could open (break in middle; caps off ends). Subjects' behavior in each condition was assessed for how often they opened the tube, how often they opened it in the same location as the demonstrator, and how often they copied the demonstrator's actions or style of opening the tube. Whereas chimpanzees reproduced mainly the environmental results of the demonstrations (emulation), human children often reproduced the demonstrator's actions (imitation). Because the procedure used was similar in many ways to the procedure that Meltzoff (Dev Psych 31:1, 1995) used to study the understanding of others' unfulfilled intentions, the implications of these findings with regard to chimpanzees' understanding of others' intentions are also discussed.
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Dunbar, R. I. M., McAdam, M. R., & O'connell, S. (2005). Mental rehearsal in great apes (Pan troglodytes and Pongo pygmaeus) and children. Behav. Process., 69(3), 323–330.
Abstract: The ability to rehearse possible future courses of action in the mind is an important feature of advanced social cognition in humans, and the “social brain” hypothesis implies that it might also be a feature of primate social cognition. We tested two chimpanzees, six orangutans and 63 children aged 3-7 years on a set of four puzzle boxes, half of which were presented with an opportunity to observe the box before being allowed to open it (“prior view”), the others being given without an opportunity to examine the boxes before handling them (“no prior view”). When learning effects are partialled out, puzzle boxes in the “prior view” condition were opened significantly faster than boxes given in the “no prior view” condition by the children, but not by either of the great apes. The three species differ significantly in the speed with which they opened boxes in the “no prior view” condition. The three species' performance on this task was a function of relative frontal lobe volume, suggesting that it may be possible to identify quantitative neuropsychological differences between species.
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