Abstract: Conflicts of interest within and between the sexes are important processes leading to variability in mating systems. The behavioral interactions mediating conflict are little documented. We studied pairs and harems of the snail-shell inhabiting cichlid fish Lamprologus ocellatus in the laboratory. Due to their larger size, males controlled the resource that limited breeding: snail shells. Males were able to choose among females ready to spawn. Females were only accepted if they produced a clutch within a few days of settling. When several females attempted to settle simultaneously the larger female settled first. Females were least aggressive when guarding eggs. Secondary females were more likely to settle when the primary female was guarding eggs. In established harems females continued to be aggressive against each other. The male intervened in about 80% of female aggressive interactions. Male intervention activity correlated with the frequency of aggression among the females in his harem. The male usually attacked the aggressor and chased her back to her own snail shell. When a male was removed from his harem, aggression between females increased immediately and usually the secondary female was expelled by the primary female within a few days. Time to harem break-up was shorter the more mobile the primary females' young were and did not correlate with the size difference between harem females. Male L. ocellatus interfere actively in female conflict and keep the harem together against female interests. Female conflict presumably relates to the cost of sharing male parental investment and to the potential of predation by another female's large juveniles on a female's own small juveniles.

Abstract: The formation of collaborating pairs by individuals belonging to two different classes occurs in the contexts of reproduction and intea-specific cooperation as well as of inter-specific mutualism. There is potential for partner choice and for competition for access to preferred partners in all three contexts. These selective forces have long been recognised as important in sexual selection, but their impact is not yet appreciated in cooperative and mutualistic systems. The formation of partnerships between members of different classes has much in common with the conclusion of trade agreements in human markets with two classes of traders, like producers and consumers, or employers and employees. Similar game-theoretical models can be used to predict the behaviour of rational traders in human markets and the evolutionarily stable strategies used in biological markets. We present a formal model in which the influence of the market mechanism on selection is made explicit. We restrict ourselves to biological markets in which: (1) Individuals do not compete over access to partners in an agonistic manner, but rather by outcompeting each other in those aspects that are preferred by the choosing party. (2) The commodity the partner has to offer cannot be obtained by the use of force, but requires the consent of the partner. These two restrictions ensure a dominant role for partner choice in the formation of partnerships. In a biological market model the decision to cooperate is based on the comparison between the offers of several potential partners, rather than on the behaviour of a single potential partner, as is implicitly assumed in currently accepted models of cooperation. In our example the members of one class A offer a commodity of fixed value in exchange for a commodity of variable value supplied by the other class, B. We show that when the B-class outnumbers the A-class sufficiently and the cost for the A-class to sample the offers of the B-class are low, the choosiness of the A-class will lead to selection for the supply of high value commodities by the B-class (Fig. 3a). Under the same market conditions, but with a high sampling cost this may still be the evolutionariy stable outcome, but another pair of strategies proves to be stable too: relaxed choosiness of class A coupled with low value commodities supplied by class B (Fig. 3b). We give a number of examples of mating, cooperative and mutualistic markets that resemble the low sampling cost situation depicted in Fig. 3a.