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Cheney, D. L., Seyfarth, R. M., & Silk, J. B. (1995). The responses of female baboons (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) to anomalous social interactions: evidence for causal reasoning? J Comp Psychol, 109(2), 134–141.
Abstract: Baboons' (Papio cynocephalus ursinus) understanding of cause-effect relations in the context of social interactions was examined through use of a playback experiment. Under natural conditions, dominant female baboons often grunt to more subordinate mothers when interacting with their infants. Mothers occasionally respond to these grunts by uttering submissive fear barks. Subjects were played causally inconsistent call sequences in which a lower ranking female apparently grunted to a higher ranking female, and the higher ranking female apparently responded with fear barks. As a control, subjects heard a sequence made causally consistent by the inclusion of grunts from a 3rd female that was dominant to both of the others. Subjects responded significantly more strongly to the causally inconsistent sequences, suggesting that they recognized the factors that cause 1 individual to give submissive vocalizations to another.
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Clement, T. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2000). Development of a single-code/default coding strategy in pigeons. Psychol Sci, 11(3), 261–264.
Abstract: We tested the hypothesis that pigeons could use a cognitively efficient coding strategy by training them on a conditional discrimination (delayed symbolic matching) in which one alternative was correct following the presentation of one sample (one-to-one), whereas the other alternative was correct following the presentation of any one of four other samples (many-to-one). When retention intervals of different durations were inserted between the offset of the sample and the onset of the choice stimuli, divergent retention functions were found. With increasing retention interval, matching accuracy on trials involving any of the many-to-one samples was increasingly better than matching accuracy on trials involving the one-to-one sample. Furthermore, following this test, pigeons treated a novel sample as if it had been one of the many-to-one samples. The data suggest that rather than learning each of the five sample-comparison associations independently, the pigeons developed a cognitively efficient single-code/default coding strategy.
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Clement, T. S., Weaver, J. E., Sherburne, L. M., & Zentall, T. R. (1998). Simultaneous discrimination learning in pigeons: value of S- affects the relative value of its associated S+. Q J Exp Psychol B, 51(4), 363–378.
Abstract: In a simple simultaneous discrimination involving a positive stimulus (S+) and a negative stimulus (S-), it has been hypothesized that positive value can transfer from the S+ to the S- (thus increasing the relative value of the S-) and also that negative value can transfer from the S- to the S+ (thus diminishing the relative value of the S+; Fersen, Wynne, Delius, & Staddon, 1991). Evidence for positive value transfer has been reported in pigeons (e.g. Zentall & Sherburne, 1994). The purpose of the present experiments was to determine, in a simultaneous discrimination, whether the S- diminishes the value of the S+ or the S- is contrasted with the S+ (thus enhancing the value of the S+). In two experiments, we found evidence for contrast, rather than value transfer, attributable to simultaneous discrimination training. Thus, not only does the S+ appear to enhance the value of the S-, but the S- appears to enhance rather than reduce the value of the S+.
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Crystal, J. D. (1999). Systematic nonlinearities in the perception of temporal intervals. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process, 25(1), 3–17.
Abstract: Rats judged time intervals in a choice procedure in which accuracy was maintained at approximately 75% correct. Sensitivity to time (d') was approximately constant for short durations 2.0-32.0 s with 1.0- or 2.0-s spacing between intervals (n = 5 in each group, Experiment 1), 2.0-50.0 s with 2.0-s spacing (n = 2, Experiment 1), and 0.1-2.0 s with 0.1- or 0.2-s spacing (n = 6 in each group, Experiment 2). However, systematic departures from average sensitivity were observed, with local maxima in sensitivity at approximately 0.3, 1.2, 10.0, 24.0, and 36.0 s. Such systematic departures from an approximately constant d' are predicted by a connectionist theory of time with multiple oscillators and may require a modification of the linear timing hypothesis of scalar timing theory.
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Dawson, B. V., & Foss, B. M. (1965). Observational learning in budgerigars. Anim. Behav., 13(4), 470–474.
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de Waal, F. B. M., & Davis, J. M. (2003). Capuchin cognitive ecology: cooperation based on projected returns. Neuropsychologia, 41(2), 221–228.
Abstract: Stable cooperation requires that each party's pay-offs exceed those available through individual action. The present experimental study on brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) investigated if decisions about cooperation are (a) guided by the amount of competition expected to follow the cooperation, and (b) made instantaneously or only after a period of familiarization. Pairs of adult monkeys were presented with a mutualistic cooperative task with variable opportunities for resource monopolization (clumped versus dispersed rewards), and partner relationships (kin versus nonkin). After pre-training, each pair of monkeys (N=11) was subjected to six tests, consisting of 15 2 min trials each, with rewards available to both parties. Clumped reward distribution had an immediate negative effect on cooperation: this effect was visible right from the start, and remained visible even if clumped trials alternated with dispersed trials. The drop in cooperation was far more dramatic for nonkin than kin, which was explained by the tendency of dominant nonkin to claim more than half of the rewards under the clumped condition. The immediacy of responses suggests a decision-making process based on predicted outcome of cooperation. Decisions about cooperation thus take into account both the opportunity for and the likelihood of subsequent competition over the spoils.
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Defolie, C., Malassis, R., Serre, M., & Meunier, H. (2015). Tufted capuchins (Cebus apella) adapt their communicative behaviour to human’s attentional states. Anim. Cogn., 18(3), 747–755.
Abstract: Animal communication has become a widely studied field of research, especially because of the associated debates on the origin of human language. Due to their phylogenetic proximity with humans, non-human primates represent a suitable model to investigate the precursors of language. This study focuses on the perception of the attentional states of others, an important prerequisite to intentional communication. We investigated whether capuchins (Cebus apella) produce a learnt pointing gesture towards a hidden and unreachable food reward as a function of the attentional status of the human experimenter. For that purpose, we tested five subjects that we first trained to indicate by a pointing gesture towards the human partner the position of a reward hidden by an assistant. Then, capuchins were tested in two experimental conditions randomly ordered. In the first condition—motivation trial—the experimenter was attentive to the subject gestures and rewarded him immediately when it pointed towards the baited cylinder. During the second condition—test trial—the experimenter adopted one of the following attention states and the subject was rewarded after 10 s has elapsed, regardless of the subject’s behaviour. Five attentional states were tested: (1) experimenter absent, (2) experimenter back to the monkey, (3) experimenter’s head away, (4) experimenter watching above the monkey, and (5) experimenter watching the monkey face. Our results reveal a variation in our subjects’ communicative behaviours with a discrimination of the different postural clues (body and head orientation) available in our experimental conditions. This study suggests that capuchins can flexibly use a communicative gesture to adapt to the attentional state of their partner and provides evidence that acquired communicative gestures of monkeys might be used intentionally.
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Dougherty, D. M., & Lewis, P. (1991). Stimulus generalization, discrimination learning, and peak shift in horses. J Exp Anal Behav, 56(1), 97–104.
Abstract: Using horses, we investigated three aspects of the stimulus control of lever-pressing behavior: stimulus generalization, discrimination learning, and peak shift. Nine solid black circles, ranging in size from 0.5 in. to 4.5 in. (1.3 cm to 11.4 cm) served as stimuli. Each horse was shaped, using successive approximations, to press a rat lever with its lip in the presence of a positive stimulus, the 2.5-in. (6.4-cm) circle. Shaping proceeded quickly and was comparable to that of other laboratory organisms. After responding was maintained on a variable-interval 30-s schedule, stimulus generalization gradients were collected from 2 horses prior to discrimination training. During discrimination training, grain followed lever presses in the presence of a positive stimulus (a 2.5-in circle) and never followed lever presses in the presence of a negative stimulus (a 1.5-in. [3.8-cm] circle). Three horses met a criterion of zero responses to the negative stimulus in fewer than 15 sessions. Horses given stimulus generalization testing prior to discrimination training produced symmetrical gradients; horses given discrimination training prior to generalization testing produced asymmetrical gradients. The peak of these gradients shifted away from the negative stimulus. These results are consistent with discrimination, stimulus generalization, and peak-shift phenomena observed in other organisms.
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Dunbar, K., & MacLeod, C. M. (1984). A horse race of a different color: Stroop interference patterns with transformed words. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform, 10(5), 622–639.
Abstract: Four experiments investigated Stroop interference using geometrically transformed words. Over experiments, reading was made increasingly difficult by manipulating orientation uncertainty and the number of noncolor words. As a consequence, time to read color words aloud increased dramatically. Yet, even when reading a color word was considerably slower than naming the color of ink in which the word was printed, Stroop interference persisted virtually unaltered. This result is incompatible with the simple horse race model widely used to explain color-word interference. When reading became extremely slow, a reversed Stroop effect--interference in reading the word due to an incongruent ink color--appeared for one transformation together with the standard Stroop interference. Whether or not the concept of automaticity is invoked, relative speed of processing the word versus the color does not provide an adequate overall explanation of the Stroop phenomenon.
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Dusek, J. A., & Eichenbaum, H. (1997). The hippocampus and memory for orderly stimulus relations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 94(13), 7109–7114.
Abstract: Human declarative memory involves a systematic organization of information that supports generalizations and inferences from acquired knowledge. This kind of memory depends on the hippocampal region in humans, but the extent to which animals also have declarative memory, and whether inferential expression of memory depends on the hippocampus in animals, remains a major challenge in cognitive neuroscience. To examine these issues, we used a test of transitive inference pioneered by Piaget to assess capacities for systematic organization of knowledge and logical inference in children. In our adaptation of the test, rats were trained on a set of four overlapping odor discrimination problems that could be encoded either separately or as a single representation of orderly relations among the odor stimuli. Normal rats learned the problems and demonstrated the relational memory organization through appropriate transitive inferences about items not presented together during training. By contrast, after disconnection of the hippocampus from either its cortical or subcortical pathway, rats succeeded in acquiring the separate discrimination problems but did not demonstrate transitive inference, indicating that they had failed to develop or could not inferentially express the orderly organization of the stimulus elements. These findings strongly support the view that the hippocampus mediates a general declarative memory capacity in animals, as it does in humans.
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