|
|
Anderson, J. R., Kuwahata, H., & Fujita, K. (2007). Gaze alternation during “pointing” by squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus)? Anim. Cogn., 10(2), 267–271.
Abstract: Gaze alternation (GA) is considered a hallmark of pointing in human infants, a sign of intentionality underlying the gesture. GA has occasionally been observed in great apes, and reported only anecdotally in a few monkeys. Three squirrel monkeys that had previously learned to reach toward out-of-reach food in the presence of a human partner were videotaped while the latter visually attended to the food, a distractor object, or the ceiling. Frame-by-frame video analysis revealed that, especially when reaching toward the food, the monkeys rapidly and repeatedly switched between looking at the partner's face and the food. This type of GA suggests that the monkeys were communicating with the partner. However, the monkeys' behavior was not influenced by changes in the partner's focus of attention.
|
|
|
|
Rapin, V., Poncet, P. A., Burger, D., Mermod, C., & Richard, M. A. (2007). [Measurement of the attention time in the horse]. Schweiz Arch Tierheilkd, 149(2), 77–83.
Abstract: A study carried out on 49 horses showed that it is possible to measure the attention time by operant conditioning. After teaching horses an instrumental task using a signal, we were then able to test their attention time by asking them to prolong it increasingly while setting success and failure criteria. Two tests were performed 3 weeks apart. The 2nd test was feasible without relearning, a proof of memory, and was repeatable, a proof of consistency in the attention time. A significant difference was observed between the 3 age groups. Young horses often performed very well during the 1st test but their attention dropped in the 2nd test while older horses were more stable with respect to attention and even increased it slightly. The study shows that there are individual differences but it was not possible to prove a significant influence of breed, gender and paternal influence. Consequently, learning appears to be one of the most interesting approaches for evaluating the attention of horses and for observing their behaviour.
|
|
|
|
Heyes, C. M., & Dawson, G. R. (1990). A demonstration of observational learning in rats using a bidirectional control. Q J Exp Psychol B, 42(1), 59–71.
Abstract: Hungry rats observed a conspecific demonstrator pushing a single manipulandum, a joystick, to the right or to the left for food reward and were then allowed access to the joystick from a different orientation. The effects of right-pushing vs left-pushing observation experience on (1) response acquisition, (2) reversal of a left-right discrimination, and (3) responding in extinction, were examined. Rats that had observed left-pushing made more left responses during acquisition than rats that had observed right-pushing, and rats that had observed demonstrators pushing in the direction that had previously been reinforced took longer to reach criterion reversal and made more responses in extinction than rats that had observed demonstrators pushing in the opposite direction to that previously reinforced. These results provide evidence that rats are capable of learning a response, or a response-reinforcer contingency, through conspecific observation.
|
|
|
|
Dougherty, D. M., & Lewis, P. (1991). Stimulus generalization, discrimination learning, and peak shift in horses. J Exp Anal Behav, 56(1), 97–104.
Abstract: Using horses, we investigated three aspects of the stimulus control of lever-pressing behavior: stimulus generalization, discrimination learning, and peak shift. Nine solid black circles, ranging in size from 0.5 in. to 4.5 in. (1.3 cm to 11.4 cm) served as stimuli. Each horse was shaped, using successive approximations, to press a rat lever with its lip in the presence of a positive stimulus, the 2.5-in. (6.4-cm) circle. Shaping proceeded quickly and was comparable to that of other laboratory organisms. After responding was maintained on a variable-interval 30-s schedule, stimulus generalization gradients were collected from 2 horses prior to discrimination training. During discrimination training, grain followed lever presses in the presence of a positive stimulus (a 2.5-in circle) and never followed lever presses in the presence of a negative stimulus (a 1.5-in. [3.8-cm] circle). Three horses met a criterion of zero responses to the negative stimulus in fewer than 15 sessions. Horses given stimulus generalization testing prior to discrimination training produced symmetrical gradients; horses given discrimination training prior to generalization testing produced asymmetrical gradients. The peak of these gradients shifted away from the negative stimulus. These results are consistent with discrimination, stimulus generalization, and peak-shift phenomena observed in other organisms.
|
|
|
|
Biederman, G. B., Robertson, H. A., & Vanayan, M. (1986). Observational learning of two visual discriminations by pigeons: a within-subjects design. J Exp Anal Behav, 46(1), 45–49.
Abstract: Pigeon's observational learning of successive visual discrimination was studied using within-subject comparisons of data from three experimental conditions. Two pairs of discriminative stimuli were used; each bird was exposed to two of the three experimental conditions, with different pairs of stimuli used in a given bird's two conditions. In one condition, observers were exposed to visual discriminative stimuli only. In a second condition, subjects were exposed to a randomly alternating sequence of two stimuli where the one that would subsequently be used as S+ was paired with the operation of the grain magazine. In a third experimental condition, subjects were exposed to the performance of a conspecific in the operant discrimination procedure. After exposures to conspecific performances, there was facilitation of discriminative learning, relative to that which followed exposures to stimulus and reinforcement sequences or exposures to stimulus sequences alone. Exposure to stimulus and food-delivery sequences enhanced performance relative to exposure to stimulus sequences alone. The differential effects of these three types of exposure were not attributable to order effects or to task difficulty; rather, they clearly were due to the type of exposure.
|
|
|
|
Horowitz, A. C. (2003). Do humans ape? Or do apes human? Imitation and intention in humans (Homo sapiens) and other animals. J Comp Psychol, 117(3), 325–336.
Abstract: A. Whiten, D. M. Custance, J.-C. Gomez, P. Teixidor, and K. A. Bard (1996) tested chimpanzees' (Pan troglodytes) and human children's (Homo sapiens) skills at imitation with a 2-action test on an “artificial fruit.” Chimpanzees imitated to a restricted degree; children were more thoroughly imitative. Such results prompted some to assert that the difference in imitation indicates a difference in the subjects' understanding of the intentions of the demonstrator (M. Tomasello, 1996). In this experiment, 37 adult human subjects were tested with the artificial fruit. Far from being perfect imitators, the adults were less imitative than the children. These results cast doubt on the inference from imitative performance to an ability to understand others' intentions. The results also demonstrate how any test of imitation requires a control group and attention to the level of behavioral analysis.
|
|
|
|
Call, J., Brauer, J., Kaminski, J., & Tomasello, M. (2003). Domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) are sensitive to the attentional state of humans. J Comp Psychol, 117(3), 257–263.
Abstract: Twelve domestic dogs (Canis familiaris) were given a series of trials in which they were forbidden to take a piece of visible food. In some trials, the human continued to look at the dog throughout the trial (control condition), whereas in others, the human (a) left the room, (b) turned her back, (c) engaged in a distracting activity, or (d) closed her eyes. Dogs behaved in clearly different ways in most of the conditions in which the human did not watch them compared with the control condition, in which she did. In particular, when the human looked at them, dogs retrieved less food, approached it in a more indirect way, and sat (as opposed to laid down) more often than in the other conditions. Results are discussed in terms of domestic dogs' social-cognitive skills and their unique evolutionary and ontogenetic histories.
|
|
|
|
Dusek, J. A., & Eichenbaum, H. (1997). The hippocampus and memory for orderly stimulus relations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A., 94(13), 7109–7114.
Abstract: Human declarative memory involves a systematic organization of information that supports generalizations and inferences from acquired knowledge. This kind of memory depends on the hippocampal region in humans, but the extent to which animals also have declarative memory, and whether inferential expression of memory depends on the hippocampus in animals, remains a major challenge in cognitive neuroscience. To examine these issues, we used a test of transitive inference pioneered by Piaget to assess capacities for systematic organization of knowledge and logical inference in children. In our adaptation of the test, rats were trained on a set of four overlapping odor discrimination problems that could be encoded either separately or as a single representation of orderly relations among the odor stimuli. Normal rats learned the problems and demonstrated the relational memory organization through appropriate transitive inferences about items not presented together during training. By contrast, after disconnection of the hippocampus from either its cortical or subcortical pathway, rats succeeded in acquiring the separate discrimination problems but did not demonstrate transitive inference, indicating that they had failed to develop or could not inferentially express the orderly organization of the stimulus elements. These findings strongly support the view that the hippocampus mediates a general declarative memory capacity in animals, as it does in humans.
|
|
|
|
Acuna, B. D., Sanes, J. N., & Donoghue, J. P. (2002). Cognitive mechanisms of transitive inference. Exp Brain Res, 146(1), 1–10.
Abstract: We examined how the brain organizes interrelated facts during learning and how the facts are subsequently manipulated in a transitive inference (TI) paradigm (e.g., if A<B and B<C, then A<C). This task determined features such as learned facts and behavioral goals, but the learned facts could be organized in any of several ways. For example, if one learns a list by operating on paired items, the pairs may be stored individually as separate facts and reaction time (RT) should decrease with learning. Alternatively, the pairs may be stored as a single, unified list, which may yield a different RT pattern. We characterized RT patterns that occurred as participants learned, by trial and error, the predetermined order of 11 shapes. The task goal was to choose the shape occurring closer to the end of the list, and feedback about correctness was provided during this phase. RT increased even as its variance decreased during learning, suggesting that the learnt knowledge became progressively unified into a single representation, requiring more time to manipulate as participants acquired relational knowledge. After learning, non-adjacent (NA) list items were presented to examine how participants reasoned in a TI task. The task goal also required choosing from each presented pair the item occurring closer to the list end, but without feedback. Participants could solve the TI problems by applying formal logic to the previously learnt pairs of adjacent items; alternatively, they could manipulate a single, unified representation of the list. Shorter RT occurred for NA pairs having more intervening items, supporting the hypothesis that humans employ unified mental representations during TI. The response pattern does not support mental logic solutions of applying inference rules sequentially, which would predict longer RT with more intervening items. We conclude that the brain organizes information in such a way that reflects the relations among the items, even if the facts were learned in an arbitrary order, and that this representation is subsequently used to make inferences.
|
|
|
|
Pepperberg, I. M. (2002). In search of king Solomon's ring: cognitive and communicative studies of Grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus). Brain Behav Evol, 59(1-2), 54–67.
Abstract: During the past 24 years, I have used a modeling technique (M/R procedure) to train Grey parrots to use an allospecific code (English speech) referentially; I then use the code to test their cognitive abilities. The oldest bird, Alex, labels more than 50 different objects, 7 colors, 5 shapes, quantities to 6, 3 categories (color, shape, material) and uses 'no', 'come here', wanna go X' and 'want Y' (X and Y are appropriate location or item labels). He combines labels to identify, request, comment upon or refuse more than 100 items and to alter his environment. He processes queries to judge category, relative size, quantity, presence or absence of similarity/difference in attributes, and show label comprehension. He semantically separates labeling from requesting. He thus exhibits capacities once presumed limited to humans or nonhuman primates. Studies on this and other Greys show that parrots given training that lacks some aspect of input present in M/R protocols (reference, functionality, social interaction) fail to acquire referential English speech. Examining how input affects the extent to which parrots acquire an allospecific code may elucidate mechanisms of other forms of exceptional learning: learning unlikely in the normal course of development but that can occur under certain conditions.
|
|
