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Bernstein, I. S., & Dobrofsky, M. (1981). Compensatory social responses of older pigtailed monkeys to maternal separation. Dev Psychobiol, 14(2), 163–168.
Abstract: Thirteen 3-5-year-old pigtailed monkeys were subjected to five 2-hr maternal separations while remaining in their normal social group. Significant changes in activity profiles were noted during separation and reunion phases. This suggests the continued social dependence of older offspring upon the matriarch. The shift in social activities reflected attempts by the juvenile and adolescent subjects to compensate for maternal absence by intensification of other affiliative social behavior and avoidance of potentially socially disruptive situation. The subjects oriented more towards kin in the absence of the matriarch, but actual time with kin decreased. Upon the return of the matriarch, the intensified some responses depressed during her absence and returned to preseparation social relationships. Play and aggressive responses declined whereas social approaches increased during maternal absences. Submissive responses declined upon the return of the matriarch, and play increased. The subjects also showed a marked, temporary increase of direct interaction, largely sniffing and grooming, with the matriarch upon her return.
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Hoff, M. P., Nadler, R. D., & Maple, T. L. (1981). Development of infant independence in a captive group of lowland gorillas. Dev Psychobiol, 14(3), 251–265.
Abstract: In March 1976, 3 lowlands gorillas (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) were born to primiparous females living with an adult male in a large compound at the field station of the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center of Emory University. Observations of parent and infant behavior began at the birth of the infants, using several methods of data collection. This report focuses on the development of independence in these infants over the 1st 1 1/2 years of life. As expected, measures of mother-infant contact and proximity decreased with age. Several measures suggested that infant independence developed as an interactive process between mothers and infants, with primary responsibility changing over the months of study. Maternal behaviors that served to maintain mother-infant contact were found to decrease with age, with an eventual shift to infant responsibility for contact maintenance. Additionally, the adult male appeared to influence developing independence as reflected in the maternal protectiveness evoked by his behavior.
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Gould, J. L. (2004). Animal cognition. Curr Biol, 14(10), R372–5.
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Griffin, B. (2002). The use of fecal markers to facilitate sample collection in group-housed cats. Contemp Top Lab Anim Sci, 41(2), 51–56.
Abstract: The provision of proper social housing is a priority when designing an experiment using domestic cats as laboratory animals. When animals are group-housed, studies requiring analysis of stool samples from individual subjects pose difficulty in sample collection and identification. In this study, commercially available concentrated food colorings (known as bakers pastes) were used as fecal markers in group-housed cats. Cats readily consumed 0.5 ml of bakers paste food coloring once daily in canned cat food. Colorings served as fecal markers by imparting a distinct color to each cat s feces, allowing identification in the litter box. In addition, colored glitter (1/8 teaspoon in canned food) was fed to cats and found to be a reliable fecal marker. Long-term feeding of colorings and glitter was found to be safe and effective at yielding readily identifiable stools.
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Marten, K., & Psarakos, S. (1995). Using self-view television to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior in the bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus). Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 205–224.
Abstract: In mirror mark tests dolphins twist, posture, and engage in open-mouth and head movements, often repetitive. Because postures and an open mouth are also dolphin social behaviors, we used self-view television as a manipulatable mirror to distinguish between self-examination and social behavior. Two dolphins were exposed to alternating real-time self-view (“mirror mode”) and playback of the same to determine if they distinguished between them. The adult male engaged in elaborate open-mouth behaviors in mirror mode, but usually just watched when played back the same material. Mirror mode behavior was also compared to interacting with real dolphins (controls). Mark tests were conducted, as well as switches from front to side self-views to see if the dolphins turned. They presented marked areas to the self-view television and turned. The results suggest self-examination over social behavior.
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Anderson, J. R. (1995). Self-recognition in dolphins: credible cetaceans; compromised criteria, controls, and conclusions. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 239–243.
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Hart, D., & Whitlow, J. W. J. (1995). The experience of self in the bottlenose dolphin. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 244–247.
Abstract: Marten and Psarakos have presented some evidence which suggests that objective self-awareness and possibly representations of self may characterize the dolphins' experience of self. Their research demonstrates the possibility of similarities in the sense of self between primate species and dolphins, although whether dolphins have subjective self-awareness, personal memories, and theories of self--all important facets of the sense of self in humans--was not examined. Clearly, even this limited evidence was difficult to achieve; the difficulties in adapting methods and coding behavior are quite apparent in their report. Future progress, however, may depend upon clarification of what are the necessary components for a sense of self and an explication of how these might be reflected in dolphin behavior. We are mindful of the authors' point (pp. 219 and 220) that the dolphin lives more in an acoustic than a visual environment. Thus, while tasks relying upon vision may reveal the presence or absence of the sense of self in primates, it might well be the case that in dolphins self-related experiences might be better revealed in auditory tasks. But then, what is the nature of human self-awareness in terms of audition? While both conceptual and methodological hurdles remain, Marten and Psarakos have demonstrated that important questions can be asked about the minds and phenomenal worlds of nonanthropoid species.
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Loveland, K. A. (1995). Self-recognition in the bottlenose dolphin: ecological considerations. Conscious Cogn, 4(2), 254–257.
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Parker, S. T. (1997). A general model for the adaptive function of self-knowledge in animals and humans. Conscious Cogn, 6(1), 75–86.
Abstract: This article offers a general definition of self-knowledge that embraces all forms and levels of self-knowledge in animals and humans. It is hypothesized that various levels of self-knowledge constitute an ordinal scale such that each species in a lineage displays the forms of self-knowledge found in related species as well as new forms it and its sister species may have evolved. Likewise, it is hypothesized that these various forms of levels of self-knowledge develop in the sequence in which they evolved. Finally, a general hypothesis for the functional significance of self-knowledge is proposed along with subhypotheses regarding the adaptive significance of various levels of self-knowledge in mammals including human and nonhuman primates. The general hypothesis is that self-knowledge serves as a standard for assessing the qualities of conspecifics compared to those of the self. Such assessment is crucial to deciding among alternative reproductive and subsistence strategies. The qualities that are assessed, which vary across taxa, range from the size and strength of the self to its mathematical or musical abilities. This so-called assessment model of self-knowledge is based on evolutionary biological models for social selection and the role of assessment in animal communication.
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Panksepp, J. (2005). Affective consciousness: Core emotional feelings in animals and humans. Conscious Cogn, 14(1), 30–80.
Abstract: The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain-mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamics of brain systems that generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form, primary process affective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional “gift of nature” rather than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements. Affective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot be evaluated in animals with sufficiently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incentives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientific study of primary process emotional/affective states is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (“instinctual”), albeit experientially refined, emotional action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reflect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems-including SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain systems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal affective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most effectively monitored via the ethological analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of specific brain zones-effects that are affectively laden. For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss affective brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextually situated nature, are more difficult to understand in any neuroscientific detail. In other words, the information-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals than the more homologous emotional/motivational affective state functions of the brain.
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