Abstract: Behavioural adaptation to ecological conditions can lead to brain size evolution. Structures involved in behavioural visual information processing are expected to coevolve with enlargement of the brain. Because birds are mainly vision–oriented animals, we tested the predictions that adaptation to different foraging constraints can result in eye size evolution, and that species with large eyes have evolved large brains to cope with the increased amount of visual input. Using a comparative approach, we investigated the relationship between eye size and brain size, and the effect of prey capture technique and nocturnality on these traits. After controlling for allometric effects, there was a significant, positive correlation between relative brain size and relative eye size. Variation in relative eye and brain size were significantly and positively related to prey capture technique and nocturnality when a potentially confounding variable, aquatic feeding, was controlled statistically in multiple regression of independent linear contrasts. Applying a less robust, brunching approach, these patterns also emerged, with the exception that relative brain size did not vary with prey capture technique. Our findings suggest that relative eye size and brain size have coevolved in birds in response to nocturnal activity and, at least partly, to capture of mobile prey.

Abstract: Imitation can be defined as the copying of behavior. To a biologist, interest in imitation is focused on its adaptive value for the survival of the organism, but to a psychologist, the mechanisms responsible for imitation are the most interesting. For psychologists, the most important cases of imitation are those that involve demonstrated behavior that the imitator cannot see when it performs the behavior (e.g., scratching one's head). Such examples of imitation are sometimes referred to as opaque imitation because they are difficult to account for without positing cognitive mechanisms, such as perspective taking, that most animals have not been acknowledged to have. The present review first identifies various forms of social influence and social learning that do not qualify as opaque imitation, including species-typical mechanisms (e.g., mimicry and contagion), motivational mechanisms (e.g., social facilitation, incentive motivation, transfer of fear), attentional mechanisms (e.g., local enhancement, stimulus enhancement), imprinting, following, observational conditioning, and learning how the environment works (affordance learning). It then presents evidence for different forms of opaque imitation in animals, and identifies characteristics of human imitation that have been proposed to distinguish it from animal imitation. Finally, it examines the role played in opaque imitation by demonstrator reinforcement and observer motivation. Although accounts of imitation have been proposed that vary in their level of analysis from neural to cognitive, at present no theory of imitation appears to be adequate to account for the varied results that have been found.

Abstract: We present an experiment showing that New Caledonian crows are able to choose tools of the appropriate size for a novel task, without trial-and-error learning. This species is almost unique amongst all animal species (together with a few primates) in the degree of use and manufacture of polymorphic tools in the wild. However, until now, the flexibility of their tool use has not been tested. Flexibility, including the ability to select an appropriate tool for a task, is considered to be a hallmark of complex cognitive adaptations for tool use. In experiment 1, we tested the ability of two captive birds (one male, one female), to select a stick (from a range of lengths provided) matching the distance to food placed in a horizontal transparent pipe. Both birds chose tools matching the distance to their target significantly more often than would be expected by chance. In experiment 2, we used a similar task, but with the tools placed out of sight of the food pipe, such that the birds had to remember the distance of the food before selecting a tool. The task was completed only by the male, who chose a tool of sufficient length significantly more often than chance but did not show a preference for a matching length.

Abstract: An overview of mechanistic and functional accounts of stimulus generalisation is given. Mechanistic accounts rely on the process of spreading activation across units representing stimuli. Different models implement the spread in different ways, ranging from diffusion to connectionist networks. A functional account proposed by Shepard analyses the probabilistic structure of the world for invariants. A universal law based on one such invariant claims that under a suitable scaling of the stimulus dimension, generalisation gradients should be approximately exponential in shape. Data from both vertebrates and invertebrates so far uphold Shepard's law. Some data on spatial generalisation in honeybees are presented to illustrate how Shepard's law can be used to determine the metric for combining discrepancies in different stimulus dimensions. The phenomenon of peak shift is discussed. Comments on mechanistic and functional approaches to generalisation are given.

Abstract: We review socially biased learning about food and problem solving in monkeys, relying especially on studies with tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and callitrichid monkeys. Capuchin monkeys most effectively learn to solve a new problem when they can act jointly with an experienced partner in a socially tolerant setting and when the problem can be solved by direct action on an object or substrate, but they do not learn by imitation. Capuchin monkeys are motivated to eat foods, whether familiar or novel, when they are with others that are eating, regardless of what the others are eating. Thus, social bias in learning about foods is indirect and mediated by facilitation of feeding. In most respects, social biases in learning are similar in capuchins and callitrichids, except that callitrichids provide more specific behavioral cues to others about the availability and palatability of foods. Callitrichids generally are more tolerant toward group members and coordinate their activity in space and time more closely than capuchins do. These characteristics support stronger social biases in learning in callitrichids than in capuchins in some situations. On the other hand, callitrichids' more limited range of manipulative behaviors, greater neophobia, and greater sensitivity to the risk of predation restricts what these monkeys learn in comparison with capuchins. We suggest that socially biased learning is always the collective outcome of interacting physical, social, and individual factors, and that differences across populations and species in social bias in learning reflect variations in all these dimensions. Progress in understanding socially biased learning in nonhuman species will be aided by the development of appropriately detailed models of the richly interconnected processes affecting learning.